

Circunstancia. Año VII - N^o 18 - Enero 2009

Presentación

TERRORISMO ISLAMISTA A TRAVÉS DEL MEDITERRÁNEO: ¿QUÉ RIESGOS Y AMENAZAS?

Los riesgos y amenazas relacionados con un terrorismo de orientación islamista son comunes a la estabilidad política y la cohesión social de los países que se localizan en la cuenca mediterránea. Sin embargo, las manifestaciones de dicho terrorismo adquieren rasgos propios de unos casos a otros, al igual que varía su incidencia. Hay expresiones de dicho fenómeno asociadas más bien con conflictos como el que enfrenta a palestinos e israelíes. Otras, sin embargo, se encuentran abiertamente vinculadas con el actual terrorismo global relacionado directa o indirectamente con Al Qaeda. Hay países que han estado o están afectados por los actos de terrorismo islamista con frecuencia, como Argelia, Israel e incluso Turquía o Egipto. Otros en los que han tenido lugar episodios tan graves como los atentados de Casablanca o Madrid, pero no se registra una campaña de terrorismo internacional sostenida, aunque en los últimos se hayan desbaratado planes para cometer nuevas atrocidades no sólo en España sino también en Francia o Italia, así como en Marruecos o Túnez. Estamos, pues, ante riesgos y amenazas comunes a los países ribereños del mediterráneo, que es preciso valorar con rigor para desarrollar iniciativas proporcionadas, respetuosas con los derechos humanos, multifacéticas y eficaces, tanto de prevención como de erradicación del terrorismo islamista, en el ámbito que corresponde a cada una de las jurisdicciones estatales afectadas y asimismo en el marco de una imprescindible acción colectiva.

Este número de *Circunstancia* incluye una serie de textos que fueron inicialmente presentados como ponencias en los distintos paneles que configuraron la VII edición del Seminario Permanente de Estudios sobre Terrorismo, celebrado en la Fundación José Ortega y Gasset, en Madrid, entre los días 17 y 19 de noviembre de 2008. En esta ocasión, bajo el título de "Terrorismo islamista a través del Mediterráneo ¿Qué riesgos y amenazas?" y coorganizado con el Real Instituto Elcano, en colaboración con la Secretaría de Estado de Seguridad y la Embajada de Estados Unidos en España. Quien leyere tiene a su disposición una serie de textos escritos por reconocidos especialistas de hasta nueve nacionalidades diferentes, diversas instituciones tanto nacionales como extranjeras y variados enfoques, cuyos contenidos cubren distintos países --del Sur de Europa, la orilla oriental del Mediterráneo y el Norte de África-- y diferentes aspectos actualizados del tema. Confío en que constituyan un material interesante y valioso para mejor entenderlo. Sólo me cabe agradecer a la Fundación José Ortega y Gasset la extraordinaria acogida que año tras año, desde 2002, proporciona al Seminario Permanente de Estudios sobre Terrorismo y que esta vez --y a buen seguro que no será la última-- se manifiesta igualmente en las páginas de la revista *Circunstancia* con un monográfico derivado de las presentaciones y los debates que en la última edición del mismo tuvieron lugar.

Fernando Reinares
(Coordinador del número)

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HAMAS AND GLOBAL JIHAD: THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE

Jonathan Fighel

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Israel is fighting not only Hamas, a radical Islamist religious/political movement whose ideological and strategic goal is to destroy Israel as a Jewish state in order to build on it a Sharia Islamic Taliban-style one, which is facing a coalition of radical actors – Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah – which is responsible for the destabilization of the entire Middle East for the last two decades. [2]. Hamas poses strategic short and long-term threats of destabilization on Israel as well as on the Palestinian structured entity in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Israeli military campaign ("Cast Lead"), that started in 27th December 2008, as a reaction to Hamas' strategic decision to end violently the temporary six month ceasefire, is to crack and weaken Hamas is aimed to restore Israel's deterrence on Hamas, dismantle its terrorist motivations and operational capabilities in Gaza Strip and create a new strategic reality in the southern border of Israel.

Another dimension of the long term strategic long term outcome of the current Israeli military actions is to suppress Hamas entrenched and victorious in the Gaza Strip which represents a radical Islamic threat to the moderate Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and future affects on the stability and possibly the survival of the moderate Arab regimes in Jordan and Egypt, threatened by radical Islam take over. Israel's current military all out campaign in Gaza Strip is directed against a Hamas terror radical regime that has controlled the Gaza Strip since its 2007 coup, creating the conditions of the emergence of other militant global Jihad oriented Islamist organizations in Gaza in the past two years. If Israel clearly defeats Hamas, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) will win. He will claim that he attempted to avoid the confrontation, but Hamas's stubbornness, insensitivity to Palestinian interests, and work on behalf of regional powers provoked Israel's actions. Abbas will be able to present himself to the people of Gaza as the savior who will rebuild what Hamas has destroyed with its adventurous and destructive policies.

Hamas and global Jihad strategic threat on the Palestinian Authority

Hamas' strategic long-term objective that has been evident since its inception in 1987 is to take over and replace the PLO in the leadership of the National Palestinian Movement. For that end, the Hamas aspires to take over the PLO and its institutions including the Palestinian Authority's governmental, security and civil apparatus established in 1994 as a result of the implementation of the Oslo Accords signed between the PLO and Israel. Palestinian leaders statements of concern were published extensively after Hamas' violent coup in Gaza in summer 2007. The London Arabic daily newspaper "Al-Hayat" published an extensive interview with Muhammad Dahlan, member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and member of the Revolutionary Council of the Fatah Movement, formerly head of the Palestinian Preventative Security Force in the Gaza Strip and Arafat's protégée. The interview included 4 segments published between August 30th and September 2nd 2008 on the newspaper's website [3]. In the first segment Dahlan claims, "...there is no difference between the Hamas, interested in establishing an Islamic Emirate in Gaza, and Al-Qaeda" [4]. According to Dahlan, there is no certain indication that the decision to take over Gaza has been arrived at by the Hamas alone or with the aid of outside factors, but the result, according to him, is clear – Hamas intends to establish an Islamic Emirate in the Gaza Strip.

Dahlan continues to state that, Hamas operates for the implementation of this plan, which isn't a general plan or a principled aspiration. "This isn't just a plan, it is already being implemented. They [the Hamas] are firing judges and teachers and appointing in their stead others, on their behalf. They are taking over non-governmental establishments even if they are not connected to the Fatah. [The Hamas] said they have problems with Dahlan and his people, and later on attacked members of the Executive Force and members of the Central Committee and have arrested Dr. Zachariah Al-Agha later on they attacked all Fatah members who actually identified with the Hamas, banished them from their houses and destroyed them on their heads since the Hamas sees only itself. They attacked [members] of the Islamic Jihad and confiscated their weapons, closed down the Popular Front's broadcasting station..." [5]

Dahlan has noted the Al-Qaeda influence in Gaza strip and claimed that the conditions and the environment are suitable for enhancing Al-Qaeda's influence. According to him, the Gaza strip is fraught with chaos and weapons. In Gaza there is a state of loss of vision and strategy with the Hamas and also amongst all the forces of power active in the Gaza strip, which is suitable as an environment for Al-Qaeda. Dahlan concludes, "as far as I am concerned, there is no difference between the Hamas and Al-Qaeda. They are all the same". [6] In his eyes, Hamas is not a force that will prevent the entry of Al-Qaeda factors into the Gaza strip, as claimed by Hamas leader in Damascus Haled Masha'al. Dahlan states that Hamas itself, as a radical Islamic Palestinian organization, is not a source of national Palestinian pride when under its actual rule in the Gaza strip it has murdered 600 people a year, injured about 2,500 people, crippled 800 to 900 people and has made thousands of arrests. Dahlan states "this Islamic model has no connection with Islam in its tolerant means" [7] as everyone knows.

Based on Dahlan statements and analysis of Hamas activities since its inception in 1987, it is evident that the strategic objective of Hamas within the Palestinian arena is to take over and replace the PLO in the leadership of the National Palestinian Movement. For that end, the Hamas aspires to take over the PLO and its institutions including the Palestinian Authority's governmental, security and civil apparatus established in 1994 as a result of the implementation of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO, that was recognized by Israel for the first time, under the patronage of the international community as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". Following the success of Hamas's military takeover in the summer of 2007, over the Palestinian Authority's security organization in Gaza, Hamas's complete takeover of the Gaza strip was completed in the summer of 2008 with two additional power moves in the field of the civil system, taking over control on the educational and health systems, thus Hamas has completed its takeover of the Authority's systems and has established a new reality on the ground, to the surprise of the world.

Hamas's "Islamic Emirate"

On June 20th 2007, about a week after the Hamas has completed its takeover of the Gaza strip, the Palestinian Authority President, Abu Mazen has delivered an emotional and angry speech to the PLO's Central Committee in Ramallah. Abu Mazen has emphasized that establishing an "Islamic Emirate" under the control of Hamas in the Gaza strip has no legitimacy and no roots in Islam. According to him "it is a struggle between the [Palestinian] national project and the project of the militias, between the Homeland project and the "Emirate" project or the fake country..." Therefore Abu Mazen has stated that "there is no dialogue with these murderous conspirators" "and there is no choice but to end the revolution on all its aspects and phenomena..." [8]

In this context one should be reminded of Abu Mazen's speech in January 2007 regarding the legality of the Palestinian representation where it was claimed that after the Hamas has won the elections to the Legislative Council, all the organizations refused to participate in its government "as Hamas has refused to recognize the PLO who is the political backup and the source of the Palestinian Authority rule". According to him, when he advised the Hamas to honor previous commitments and agreements, it refused to accept it. [9] About eight months after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza strip in a successful, short and violent military coup, on February 27th 2008, in an interview to the daily paper "Al-Hayat", Abu Mazen warned that elements of Al-Qaeda are in Gaza operating with Hamas's knowledge enabling their entry and exit from the Gaza strip. [10]

With Hamas's takeover of the Gaza strip, a radical Islamic entity was established practicing terrorism to achieve its goals, having tight connections with the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt (whose Palestinian branch is Hamas), and with Iran, the radical Islamic Shiite state. During its takeover of the Gaza strip, Hamas has proclaimed its support of Islamic rule and its victory over infidels. This entity has found itself immediately to be in a violent conflict with Abu Mazen, chairman of the "Palestinian Authority" representing the national-secular Fatah movement and due to this, Abu Mazen and official Palestinian and Egyptian media used terms such as "Islamic Emirate" when describing the new entity that has been established in the Gaza strip.

The term "Islamic Emirate" has a distinct negative connotation in the modern history of Islam. This term is referred to a small territory ruled by an Emir (leader) of a fanatic Islamic cult, trying to force radical Islam, while differentiating from its "infidel" environment. The large majority of Islamic organizations and groups who were active (and still are) in Egypt and other Muslim/Arabic countries wanted to organize in emirates ruled by Islamic law. Examples can be seen in the Al-Qaeda organization that has pronounced the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Iraq, the Fatah Al-Islam organization in Lebanon, the Islamic militias of the Shari courts in Somalia and Jihad groups in Egypt.

At the end of August 2008 the crisis between the Fatah and the Hamas has reached the PA governmental schools on the Gaza strip. With the opening of the school year at the beginning of September 2008, the Hamas government has removed by force and fired many teachers and principals who belonged to the Fatah. In response, the Fatah teacher's union has gone on strike and refused to come and teach at the schools. The Hamas, apparently prepared for this scenario, appointed in their stead 2,000 new teachers inclined politically to Hamas who had just graduated a few months before their training. The teachers supporting Fatah were afraid to break the strike and return to their posts due to threats from the union in Ramallah that they will not receive their salary if they do. The Hamas government has fired them and brought in their stead the young teachers who have recently finished their studies at the universities. At the same time the Hamas police have raided the offices of the "Palestinian Teachers' Union" identified with Fatah in the Gaza strip and has taken them over. In addition, the police have detained dozens of teachers identified with Fatah for questioning, releasing them after several hours.

Beforehand on August 24th 2008, about half of the teachers in Gaza announced a strike due to discrimination in their employment on the part of the Palestinian Ministry of Education in Gaza, controlled by the Hamas. They claimed that teachers supporting Fatah are transferred from the schools they were teaching at in favor of teachers supporting the Hamas, in order to reduce the organization's influence in Gaza. The Deputy Minister of the Palestinian Ministry of Education, Muhammad Shkair, rejected their claims and said that the teachers were transferred due to "technical and managerial" reasons. [11]

Hamas's takeover of the educational system at the Gaza strip proves the importance of this sector to the Hamas in the process of "Islamization" of the Gaza strip and the allocation of resources and personnel to the molding of the new image of the Palestinian society in Gaza. The educational system employs thousands of employees and requires a lot of current funding for the payment of salaries and the maintenance of educational structures in Gaza. [12]

According to Dahlan, the Hamas is a hostage of Iran, Hamas activists do not conceal it, saying that the Palestinian Authority and Fatah are allies of the United States, and this alliance causes injustice to other Palestinian sectors. Hamas and Iran, with the aid of Syria, have an interest in establishing a countering force. Iran, and Syria to a lesser degree, participates in the decision making process of the Hamas movement in Gaza and the headquarters in Damascus but not regarding Hamas leadership in the western bank. Iran is motivated by its own interests, and therefore is involved in expanding its influence in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine through financial support, verity of weapons, explosives, operational knowledge and training.

[Volver](#)

Processes of Islamization and Radicalization in the Gaza strip

The Hamas has never deviated from its devotion to the ethos and the Palestinian struggle as reflected in the Hamas covenant, and it strongly rejects the Jewish right to self-determination and calls for the establishment of a Palestinian-Islamic state on the entire land of "Palestine". Since Israel's disengagement from the Gaza strip (on August 2005) a new reality was created, which accelerated the establishment of Hamas's distinct area of control in the Gaza strip. Hamas was wise enough to translate its strengthening power to more gains within the Palestinian political arena. In the elections for the Legislative Council (on January 2006) it won the majority of votes and comprised a government it headed on March 2006. Later on (on June 2006) the Hamas has taken over by force the Gaza strip, neutralizing the Fatah's military and political power and the Palestinian security mechanisms, and established in the strip a radical-Islamic entity. This entity is supported by Iran and Syria, has its own internal and foreign policy, runs a campaign of terrorism against Israel and is separate from the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, led by Abu Mazen and the Fatah.

Following Hamas's takeover of the Gaza strip in mid June 2007, a radical Islamic political entity was created, with the markings of a sovereign country. This entity controlled by Hamas, a movement with a radical Islamic ideology, aspires to apply it on the general Palestinian population beyond the enforcement of the Islamic social codes in daily life, Hamas controls the social-educational-religious systems acting for the assimilation of radical Islam, according to Hamas's point of view, amongst the population in the Gaza strip. The process emerging since Hamas's takeover of the Gaza strip is of turning radical Islam into a mandatory way of life influencing the people's daily lives. The population, forced to adopt a more strict religious Islamic line as a public expression of their total loyalty (Baiya-Arabic) to the Hamas government characterized by an ideological aggression as a built-in modus operandi due to its nature. This reality crystallizes the growing difference between the Gaza strip ruled by the Hamas and the West Bank ruled by Abu Mazen and the Fatah with their national-secular character.

The "Jaljalat" Groups in Gaza -Global Jihad Phenomenon

Under Hamas's rule in Gaza, organizations characterized as global Jihad began appearing and started carrying out attacks against western entities present and operating in the Gaza strip.

Under the auspices of Hamas rule, since 2005 a new radical Islamic stream was established mainly composed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives, disillusioned from the "pragmatic" conduct of Hamas, its deviation and betray from the path of Jihad. This radical entity bearing the Arabic Islamic name "Jaljalat"(Rolling thunder, peal)[13] is new pro Al Qaeda and global Jihad oriented compilation, operating in Gaza strip without any interference of the Hamas government, as a spearhead committed to maintain the "flame" of Jihad against Israel and to "purify" the Palestinian society from western presence and influence. Radical Islamic organizations, which are identified with the "Jaljalat" bear Islamic names taken out from the Islamic narratives and myths repository which leaves no doubt of their global Jihad nature: "The Army of the believers-Al Qaeda in Palestine", "The Army of Islam", "The Mujahideen battalions", "The Army of the Ummah-Jerusalem" "Fatah al-Islam in the Land of Ribat", "Abu Rish Brigades - Sword of Islam", "The Jerusalem Jihad Warriors movement" and others less known.

The radical global Jihad oriented groups in Gaza adopted idioms, motives used by other similar Jihadi groups identified or affiliated with Al Qaeda, for instance the utilization of "**Thunder**"(Jaljalat-Arabic) and lightning motives taken from the Islamic narratives and myths is based on the Qur'an[14]:

"He (God) it is who shows you the lightning for fear and hope (of rain); and He brings up heavy clouds, and the **thunder** celebrates His praise; and the angels, too, fear him, and He sends the thunder-clap and. overtakes there-with whom He will; yet they wrangle about God! But He is strong in might."

Its use in the Jihadi context reflects elements of divine power, force revenge and overwhelming superiority of Jihad in the name of Allah. Images of lighting, tornadoes, and hurricanes suggest God's power, wrath, and justice. Certain Jihadi groups may associate themselves with these symbols as a means to exaggerate their power and imply that they are acting on God's will. Thus, by using these symbols, Jihadi groups are able to represent themselves and their cause as extensions of divine power. Jihadi groups often use these motives to demonize the suicide bombers phenomenon regarding to their supreme motivating and powers executed in the name and will of Allah.

On February 15th 2008 an armed gang broke into the YMCA library in Gaza and blew it up. As a result the building was destroyed and thousands of books inside were burned. This is another attack on Christian western institutions and figures, performed by one of the global Jihad organization (probably the Army of Islam), flourishing in the Gaza strip and Hamas that controls the strip, does not prevent the phenomena from going on. Sources in the Gaza strip reported that behind the explosion of the YMCA building was Mumtaz Dughmush head the Army of Islam terrorist organization that has decided to take out the Christian congregation in the Gaza strip

causing embarrassment to the Hamas. Hamas security forces detained number Army of Islam activists but they were released after a short while, following a threat made by the Army of Islam it will forcefully release its activists.

The "Army of the Ummah-Jerusalem" organization established in the Gaza strip during 2006 also views all Muslims as part of the Islamic nation, defines itself as a pure Islamic organization and therefore refrains from adopting national Palestinian characteristics. The group is yet another global jihad offshoot in the Gaza Strip. [15] Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, there has been an increase in the propaganda and terrorist activities carried out by radical Islamic groups associated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. In this concept it differs from the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine who present a Palestinian- Islamic approach as organization that wish to realize national Palestinian objectives as well.

The 'Fatah Al-Islam on the land of Ribat" organization took responsibility for the shooting towards the Yad Mordechai Kibbutz. It is a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon constituting a branch of global Jihad. Its center of power was at the Nahar El-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in north Lebanon where it was quashed by the Lebanese army in September 2007. Recently it began taking responsibility for terrorist attacks from the Gaza strip mainly rocket launching and mortars.

It should be mentioned that Israeli targets are not the only targets for organizations identifying with global Jihad in the Gaza strip but also targets inside the strip identified with the west. For some time, organizations identified with global Jihad are attacking Internet cafes throughout the strip. In addition, during President Bush's visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority (January 9-11 2008) the organization calling itself The "Army of the Believers —the Al-Qaeda Organization in Palestine" claimed responsibility for two previous attacks on the International American school in Gaza. [16]

The "Army of Islam"(Jaish Al Islam)

The Hamas rule in Gaza is accompanied at all times with the process of an unprecedented military growth in power and building of a military array, offensive and defensive, based on Hamas military branch activists and internal security mechanisms controlled by Hamas.

Apart from them, in the Gaza strip operating several other terrorist organizations, whose numbers are estimated to be between 3000 to 4000 people. Between the Hamas and most of these organizations there is a close operational cooperation, which the Hamas attributes great importance to. Especially prominent is the operational cooperation between the Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees and the "Army of Islam".

In reference to Islamic groups ideologically close to the idea of global Jihad and Al-Qaeda, Dahlan states in the interview that the "Army of Islam", a local organization in Gaza strip is led by Muntaz Dughmush, is ideologically close to Al-Qaeda but does not belong to the Hamas. According to Dahlan, the important thing is that Hamas has exploited the "Army of Islam" as its tool, serving Hamas's own interests and employed at a certain period of time in performing several assassination and missions against the Palestinian Authority and part of its leadership in the Gaza strip. The "Army of Islam" that is led by the Dughmush family members, is involved in criminal activities and operates openly and publicly in cooperation with Hamas regime in Gaza. Dahlan recounts that Dughmush was one of the officers of the Palestinian Preventative Security Force, led by him before the outbreak of the second Intifada, that gave birth to many factions, groups and interests and brought into Gaza the Hezbollah, Iran and other organizations.

The "Army of Islam" has captured the public consciousness on May 8th 2007 about two weeks after the abduction of the British journalist Alan Johnston when it published a tape announcing its responsibility for the abduction and presenting its demands. The "Army of Islam" representative's announcement included radical Islamic terminology used by Al-Qaeda and global Jihad entities identified as Al-Qaeda supporters.

The "Army of Islam" is the name of a radical Islamic Palestinian organization in the Gaza strip numbering several dozen activists, ideologically identified with the ideas of global Jihad and keeping in contact with its activists. Heading the organization is Muntaz Dughmush, a member of a powerful clan in the Gaza strip, who has retired a year ago with his group of supporters from the Popular Resistance Committees. The "Army of Islam" has maintained in the past close connections with Hamas, at least at its beginning stages. The "Army of Islam" has adopted characteristics of global Jihad activities, such as abducting foreigners and attacking places of recreation in the Gaza strip (such as internet cafes) that they believe hurt Islamic morality. The organization was one of the three organizations (Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees) that announced their responsibility for the abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (June 25th 2006) and was also behind the abduction of two reporters from the American news network Fox News.

The "Army of Islam" as a local Palestinian organization in the Gaza strip, with a radical Islamic orientation and ideology, acts for the promotion of global Jihad objectives, which are not predominantly Palestinian and whose scope goes beyond the Israel-Palestinian conflict that was characterized in the past as a national, ideological, secular and territorial conflict. The raise of Hamas and other radical Islamic forces has spilled over the conflict to a fundamental Islamic religious one, in large part thanks to the increased power and the rooting of Hamas in the Palestinian arena.

[Volver](#)

Is Hamas Al-Qaeda?

Muhammad Dahlan is well aware of the fact that the achievements of the national Palestinian project are under concrete threat of being expropriated by the Hamas who is challenging and threatening the Palestinian secular nationalistic territorial achievements. Hamas strives to implement its Pan - Islamic religious as an Arab-Muslim definition with its territorial dimensions according to the idea of the Islamic "Ummah"(the borderless nation of Islam). According to Hamas, the liberation of Palestine is only one step on the road for establishing a global Islamic Caliphates. This is the true and threatening base of the struggle led by Hamas to undermine Fatah/PLO,

which Dahlan speaks about pointing at Hamas as a threat akin to Al-Qaeda similarly threatens to overthrow moderate Arab and Muslim countries.

Although Hamas is not Al Qaeda, it would be fair to see Hamas as a local Palestinian movement identifies itself with the radical Islamic concept of establishing an Islamic entity in Palestine as a first stage, then merge with other Islamic entities across the globe beyond the actual existing political order in which countries maintain its geographical boundaries.

Its ideological roots, political agenda and principles striving to apply Islam rule everywhere, with the current and historical affinity to the Muslim Brotherhood movement as a worldwide organization. This ideology strives for the application of political and social-cultural principles and way of life as a universal Islamic concept, which later to become also one of the ideological basic principles of Al-Qaeda. Hamas praise and icon the heroic figure of the political-Islamic scholar and philosopher Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian from the village of Silat Al-Hartia in the West Bank (near Jenin), a charismatic figure, Al-Qaeda's ideologist who was Osama Bin Laden's "spiritual mentor". [\[17\]](#)

Dr. Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden's mentor, is considered still a revered model in the Palestinian arena and amongst the Hamas who turned him into a model of inspiration and emulation, and amongst supporters of global Jihad around the world. Azzam's ideology and concepts influenced Bin Laden to a great extent, which is the most influential figure in "global Jihad" these days; also Hamas strived to implant Azzam's Jihadi doctrine and legacy amongst its people. Dr. Abdullah Azzam is still a major source of inspiration for Hamas as well as to the global Jihad organization around the world. Hamas acts relentlessly in emphasizing Abdullah Azzam as a Palestinian who influenced not only Jihad ideology in the local context of the Palestinian struggle, but also by aggrandizing his contribution and making him a role model beyond the local national Palestinian dimension to all global Jihad organizations including Al-Qaeda. Sheikh Yassin was directly tied to the one documented case of operational crossover between Hamas and al-Qaeda. Nabil 'Ukal, a 27-year-old resident of the Jebaliya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip was a Hamas *Da'awa* activist undergoing religious instruction in Pakistan, was recruited in February 1998 for military training in the al-Qaeda camps of Afghanistan. In April of that year, upon completion of his al-Qaeda training, 'Ukal visited Yassin in Gaza. The sheikh appointed a go-between and provided 'Ukal with \$5,000 seed money to finance 'Ukal's Gaza terrorist cell. Later, when 'Ukal and one of his recruits wanted to travel back to Pakistan and Afghanistan for additional training and meetings, Yassin provided another \$5,000 and prepared a cover story for the Israeli authorities about medical treatment in Jordan. A month before his arrest by Israel in June 2000, 'Ukal hosted Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," in his home. [\[18\]](#)

Despite the fact that actuality Hamas's operational activities focuses at this stage on Israel and the "territories", as a radical Islamic organization it does not refrain from expressing ambitions and identification with the Islamic organizations active in other Jihad arenas around the world while expressing identification and solidarity with their actions and objectives (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq etc).

Dahlan's statement does not differentiate between Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and reflects the understanding of the strategic threat posed by radical Islam that characterizes organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Hamas, both operate through purist ideology and terrorist acts to crush the infidel and illegitimate Arab regimes and establish an Islamic "Sharia" state. Hamas like Al-Qaeda defines itself as a worldwide movement as detailed in the preface to the Hamas covenant "The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realized". [\[19\]](#) In the second chapter of the Hamas covenant the universal character of the Muslim Brothers movement is emphasized and that the Hamas movement is part of it: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization, which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times" [\[20\]](#)

In this respect there is no cardinal ideological or long term strategic difference between Hamas and Al-Qaeda who operate for the achieving of same long-term goal, even though in the short term, and for tactical local operational considerations they act on different levels, directions and emphasis. While Al-Qaeda operates for the realization of its goals through global Jihad and Jihad arenas around the world, the Hamas at this stage and in the context of the Israeli conflict operates for the realization of its goals through local Jihad in the boundaries of the Palestinian Authority and in the State of Israel.

At this stage and for various reasons Hamas is not interested in being identified as an organization belonging or acting as part of Al-Qaeda, even though it does not oppose and turns a blind eye to the strengthening of the extremism processes inspired by global Jihad entities and extreme radical organizations who adopt Al-Qaeda's ideology and its patterns of action in the new territories under its rule in Gaza Strip. Hamas for practical reasons, wishes to distinct itself from the global Jihad and Al Qaeda as a local Palestinian organization, whose struggle is justified and needs the international community's recognition. A full operational merge with Al Qaeda and being identified as such is perceived by Hamas counter productive and unbeneficial in their efforts to gain internal Palestinian political support coincided with political and funding support by Muslim and Arab states. These needs are often compensated with radical Islamic rhetoric and statements using similar radical Islamic motives and symbols similar to Al Qaeda. Yet, it is needed to point out that Hamas is still a radical Islamic movement which share a large number of common denominators with Al Qaeda and under its direct rule in Gaza a number of groups with global Jihad orientation are on a constant growth.

In this connection it should be mentioned that for a number of months the Hamas movement exchanges verbal punches with Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's second in command, who attacked over and again the Hamas for having abandoned the "way of Jihad" and for having "sold Palestine" for the comforts of government. [\[21\]](#) Speakers on behalf of Hamas blamed Al-Zawahiri that his positions stem from his ignorance regarding the Palestinian reality. They claimed he encourages operational activists with the Hamas to undermine the organization's leadership for the purpose of creating a rift in the Hamas that will provide Al-Qaeda with access inside Palestine. Hamas at this stage for political considerations is reluctant to abandon its position as a local independent Palestinian movement and join Al Qaeda, although they share a wide spectrum of ideological

common denominators.

The roots of conflicts between Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Hamas movement stem from the results of Hamas's victory at the elections for the Legislative Council on January 25th 2006. This victory constituted a political "earthquake" not only in the internal-Palestinian arena but also in the Middle East. As for the first time in the history of the Middle East a distinct terrorist organization with a radical Islamic Sunni characteristics who is identified ideologically with global Jihad entities, gained power through democratic elections. Hamas's rise to power forced it to deal unexpectedly with the tough day today constraints of the Palestinian reality and actual "earthly" problems as a governing power and its responsibilities on a daily basis to maintain and provide urgent constant needs to its people, unlike Al-Qaeda that does not have to "run a country", and is dismissed from any obligations, responsibilities of acting within constrains. These constraints forced Hamas to adopt a pragmatic appearance (without abandoning its long term radical Islamic ideology and its covenant) in its conduct since it took over government. In its effort to gain international recognition and legitimacy, Hamas was adopting a restrained terrorist attack policy, blurring extreme messages and "softening" them for "western ears" and the willingness to include the Fatah in the government according to the "Mecca Agreement" (who made Ayman Al-Zawahiri extremely angry, because of its content and due to the fact it was held in Mecca, the holiest city to Islam, under the patronage of the Saudi regime, mortal enemy of Osama Bin laden heading Al-Qaeda).

It should be emphasized that simultaneously to Hamas's expressions of temporary pragmatism in its governmental conduct in all aspects of daily life, Hamas hasn't abandon its ideological principles in viewing Palestine as land dedicated to Islam, in completely negating Israel's right to exist and adopting "Jihad" and "Mukawamah" (violence and terrorism) as a strategy through which the whole of Palestine will be "liberated". Alongside with its harsh criticism on Hamas and as a result of its priorities, Al-Qaeda has tried to "stake a claim" also in the "territories", with an emphasis on the Gaza strip located in a close proximity to the Sinai Peninsula, which in recent years is a center for global Jihad activities. In the territory of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, there are today several dozen activists identified ideologically with global Jihad and with its activities around the world. These activists are trying to build a terrorist operational infrastructure in Gaza under Hamas rule, but separately from Hamas's terrorist infrastructure while emulating global Jihad operational characteristics.

At this stage there is no certain information that can indicate to a direct operational connection between Hamas and Al-Qaeda beyond the ideological connection and the sprout of small local organizations orientated to global Jihad ideology and similar style of operation to Al-Qaeda, mainly against western targets in the Gaza strip. It should be emphasized that despite this, one cannot ignore the worrisome phenomena that the Gaza strip under Hamas rule has become since the summer of 2007 an armed radical Islamic stronghold, a fact that spurred and quickened the appearance of new terrorist factors with an affinity to global Jihad who operate openly and without fear for the establishment of a global Jihad strongholds in the Gaza strip who has become to a great extent a safe haven.

Gaza as a safe haven for terrorism

Since Hamas's taking over the power in Gaza in the summer of 2007 there is a marked rise in violent terrorist organizations acting without disturbance under the protection of the Hamas rule, lack of law enforcement and even encouragement or tacit agreement to activities of organizations with radical Islamic ideology with inclinations to global Jihad. Hamas's interests were met by these organizations as the "flag bearers" of the authentic "struggle" ("Mukawamah"-in Arabic, implication for armed struggle). Hamas used the radical Islamic elements to enhance its own status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the local arena and the inter-Arab and Islamic arena against Israel .

These organizations operate freely in the Gaza strip and enjoy the radical Islamic inspiration and auspices of Hamas, which allows (or at least doesn't prevent) their built up process as local spearhead in the Gaza strip with an affinity to global Jihad. The situation in the strip creates comfortable and undisturbed conditions for the entry of global Jihad factors through the Egyptian border into the strip in the process of building their operational abilities without disturbance. The Gaza strip under the rule of the Hamas has become a safe haven for these organizations that act to base a nucleus for the promotion of terrorist operational and propaganda abilities in the name of global Jihad.

Conclusion

Al-Qaeda's interest in reviving jihad in Palestine and making it part of its global enterprise is evident in numerous video and audio messages it has produced, especially since 2007. So far, however, Al-Qaeda has not claimed to establish any presence in Palestine, nor has it acknowledged having direct ties to any of the self-proclaimed Jihadi groups that are currently active in this region, especially in Gaza. Moreover, despite its considerable efforts, Al-Qaeda has apparently failed to convince Hamas – the ruling force in Gaza to abandon its political agenda, and to declare its loyalty to Al-Qaeda and its support for Al-Qaeda's efforts.

In spite of the above mentioned, Muhammad Dahlan who belongs to the younger generation of leadership of the Fatah and represents the pragmatic secular-national school in the Palestinian society, reflects in his words a growing concern in face of the erosion of the basis of legitimacy of the PLO and the Fatah as representing the Palestinian interest when he refers to the Palestinian Authority which was established as a result of the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO, as a political entity in modern terms.

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The Israeli Battle in Gaza -Palestinian Political survival

The success of Israel 's military campaign to reach its security objectives and crack Hamas, as declared by the Israeli government, will have a direct impact on the Islamization and radicalization of the Palestinian issue as

represented by Hamas, which poses a threat for any potential progress towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Hamas's radical Islamic foundations and ideological commandments are "non-starter" positions. The new reality created by Hamas in Gaza poses a great deal of concern within the Palestinian secular national movement, in Israel and the west as well.

The Palestinian national aspiration towards a rational pragmatic two states solution, are threatened by the Islamic Hamas whose maximal, irrational radical Islamic aspirations pose internal Palestinian danger to the very existence of the PLO, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The simple strategic equation should be clear, metaphorically presented within a connected vessels system, suppressing military and political measures in weakening Hamas will directly effect the strengthening of the future of Palestinian Authority.

A successful outcome of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza to weaken and break Hamas as representing of the radical Islamic global and local threat, creating a new fundamental security strategic change, will have a direct effect and a major impact on role of the Palestinian Authority within the internal Palestinian arena to fulfill its national political aspirations and goals. The outcome of the conflict in Gaza will shape the future of the Palestinian politics. A clear defeat of Hamas would strengthen the PA's internal position for the first time since losing Gaza in 2007. However, an unclear outcome that restores the status quo or ends in a relative stalemate would allow Hamas to claim victory. The London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed warned that under Hamas's rule, Gaza was becoming like Afghanistan, a hotbed of poverty, violence and strife among armed factions. [22] Al-Homayed stated: "The transformation of the Gaza strip into another Afghanistan is a future whose first casualty will be the Palestinians and their cause. This cause has been shattered by Hamas, whose members want to rule as they will, and are waiting for the world to accommodate them". Homayed continues his somber analysis accusing Hamas as "a very real danger to the Palestinian cause. They have already blown the chance of creating a Palestinian state by splitting off from the legitimate authority of Abu Mazen... we must take a decisive stand against Hamas, for a simple reason, the boat in which they are drilling holes will not only drown them, but will drown all of us, and we will all be the victims"[23]

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[1] "Jaljalat" Islamic idiom, taken from the ancient Islamic ethos and narratives. Posted on affiliated Al Qaeda web sites in a triumphal poem video clip in which "the Islamic peal will tremble the western world". See Jaljalat Jihadi version nasheed (Islamic song). <http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?t=107206>. Also Islamic Jihad video clip "Saraya Al Quds Jaljalat" <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EiXr2Rou3A&feature=related>

[2] See Ely Karmon, "Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas: A Coalition against Nature. Why does it Work?" *Proteus Monograph Series*, Volume 1, Issue 5, May 2008, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., USA, at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/proteus/docs/karmon-iran-syria-hizbollah.pdf>.

[3] <http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues>

[4] Ibid.

[5] <http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues/08-2008/Item-20080829-0f7cf21e-c0a8-10ed-01bf-ee336cd96a38/story.html>

[6] <http://www.daralhayat.com/special/dialogues/>

[7] Ibid.

[8] Al-Jazeera, June 20th 2007.

[9] Al-Hiyat Al-Jedida, January 9th 2007

[10] http://www.daralhayat.com/arab_news/levant_news/02-2008/Item-20080226-5773fc52-c0a8-10ed-017c-4324294e94c0/story.html

[11] <http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=1016741&contrassID=2&subContrassID=21&sbSubContrassID=0>

[12] . <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3586971,00.html>

[13] "Jaljalat" Islamic idiom, taken from the ancient Islamic ethos and narratives. Posted on affiliated Al Qaeda web sites in a triumphal poem video clip in which "the Islamic peal will tremble the western world". See Jaljalat Jihadi version nasheed (Islamic song). <http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?t=107206>. Also Islamic Jihad video clip "Saraya Al Quds Jaljalat" <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EiXr2Rou3A&feature=related>

[14] Surah xiii. 13,14.

[15] Al-Ayyam, 12 January 2008.

[16] Testimony of Steven Emerson Before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 9, 2008, p.17. <http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Emerson040908.pdf>.

[17] Yoni Fighel, "Sheikh Abdullah Azzam: Bin Laden's Spiritual Mentor," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 27 September 2001.

[18] Yoni Fighel and Yael Shahar, "The Al-Qaida-Hizballah Connection", February 26, 2002 in ICT Web Site <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=425>

[19] The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18 August 1988. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm>

[20] Ibid

[21] Aljazeera TV, 11 March 2007

[22] Tariq Alhomayed, " Gaza: Following Afghanistan 's Footsteps", October 6, 2008. <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=14308>

[23] Ibid.

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Abstract

With Hamas's takeover of the Gaza strip, a radical Islamic entity was established practicing terrorism to achieve its goals, having tight connections with the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt (whose Palestinian branch is Hamas), and with Iran, the radical Islamic Shiite state. Hamas is challenging and threatening the Palestinian secular nationalistic territorial achievements and striving to implement its Pan - Islamic religious as an Arab-Muslim definition with its territorial dimensions according to the idea of the Islamic "Ummah"(the borderless nation of Islam). This entity has found itself immediately to be in a violent conflict with Abu Mazen, chairman of the "Palestinian Authority" representing the national-secular Fatah movement and due to this, Abu Mazen and official Palestinian and Egyptian media used terms such as "Islamic Emirate" when describing the new entity that has been established in the Gaza strip. Following Hamas's takeover of the Gaza strip in mid June 2007, a radical Islamic political entity was created, with the markings of a sovereign country. This entity controlled by Hamas, a movement with a radical Islamic ideology, aspires to apply it on the general Palestinian population. Under Hamas's rule in Gaza, organizations characterized as global Jihad began appearing and started carrying out attacks against western entities present and operating in the Gaza strip. This radical entity bearing the Arabic Islamic name "Jaljalat"(Rolling thunder, peal) [1] is new pro Al Qaeda and global Jihad oriented compilation, operating in Gaza strip without any interference of the Hamas government, as a spearhead committed to maintain the "flame" of Jihad against Israel and to "purify" the Palestinian society from western presence and influence. Hamas activities are evident that the strategic objective of Hamas within the Palestinian arena is to take over and replace the PLO in the leadership of the National Palestinian Movement.

Key words

Hamas, PLO, The Palestinian Authority, Fatah, Abu Mazen, Muhammad Dahlan, Jaljalat, Gaza, Al Qaeda, Army of Islam, Jihad, The Army of the believers-Al Qaeda in Palestine, The Mujahideen battalions, The Army of the Ummah-Jerusalem, Fatah al-Islam in the Land of Ribat, Abu Rish Brigades – Sword of Islam, The Jerusalem Jihad Warriors movement Israel, military campaign.

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ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE MAGHREB: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ALGERIA

Anneli Botha

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

- **Introduction**
- **Brief historical overview**
- **Structure and area of activities**
- **Modus Operandi and Target Selection**
- **Spill-over to Europe**
- **Conclusion**

Introduction

With a number of groups in the region trying to change the political dispensation in their respective countries, the threat of terrorism in North Africa is not a new phenomenon or challenge to safety and security in the region. Throughout history these groups have been confronted with operational and structural challenges, brought along by counter terrorism initiatives (both on domestic and international levels). Subsequently, in order to survive or to remain relevant these groups had to adapt their strategic focus, structure and operations into a transnational angle. Groups in Algeria were however the only ones able to present a significant threat, while groups in Morocco and Tunisia were driven underground, leading to a decentralized network that sporadically managed to commit acts of terrorism – more remarkably in Morocco than Tunisia. Despite the initial success of groups in Algeria, the Algerian state managed to increase its effectiveness in countering terrorist groups. As a result, those who remained operational were 'forced' to change direction, most notably reflected in the change in name of the Salafist Group of Preaching and Combat, better known by its French acronym GSPC to al-Qa'eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb. In other words the AQLIM reflected this 'need' to remain relevant. It is however noteworthy that although its target selections haven't changed much – operations predominately directed against members of the security forces and government – its tactics are becoming more and more indiscriminate, particularly through the execution of suicide attacks (a new phenomenon).

Despite this long history, commentators often refer to al-Qa'eda's involvement in North Africa as a new trend. For example, David Welch, the US State Department's Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on 23 October 2008 made the following statement "After having reduced its influence and being defeated ideologically in the Middle East and Iraq, al-Qa'eda is trying to spread to other areas. That is why we have the need to combine all regional efforts to confront the threat."^[1] Despite growing reference to Al-Andalus in al-Qa'eda's propaganda, it is essential to place the development of Islamist extremism in North Africa, including Algeria and its relationship with al-Qa'eda and the latter's philosophy in historic context.

On an ideological level (returning to the name change of the GSPC) the relationship between *al-Qa'eda* and North African groups have an equally long history. Although often overlooked by more recent commentators the eventual name change of the GSPC only formalized this long process. This name change also openly propagated its regional intentions in providing an ideological framework of reference, in addition to providing training to less structured initiatives in the region and beyond. Using the Iraq card and local dissatisfaction with the 'War against Terrorism' a predominantly domestic focus turned to the transnational.

The following brief paper recognizes that the threat Islamist extremism and terrorism presents can be divided into two categories: Attacks perpetrated by individuals/groups affiliated to North Africa in Europe; and secondly, attacks directed at Western targets in North African countries. This paper will however specifically concentrate on the latter category with specific reference to Algeria (in particular developments since its name change). In conducting this assessment, analysis will concentrate on attacks directed at Western targets in the GSPC/AQLIM's broader campaign.

Brief historical overview

Algeria, as with a large number of countries in North Africa and the Middle East experienced a re-emergence of extremism in the late 1980s and early 1990's. Externally influenced by the defeat of the Soviet Union and the return of Afghan *mujahideen* (that included nationals from around the world), extremists found domestic conditions to their advantage. These included inter alia, closed political systems and poor socio-economic conditions made worse by urbanization and feelings of marginalization. Extremists had a number of rallying points in common, including:

- Calls to replace the current political dispensation with more 'Islamic' governments;
- Reference to the model of the Iranian Revolution (although Shi'a) in replacing a pro-Western ruler with an Islamic dispensation;
- Creation of Israel and the subsequent Palestinian question placing a question mark on Western

overwhelming support for Israel; and

• The consequences of the First Gulf War, namely the perceived humiliation of Islamic fighters (Iraqi) at the hands of the United States (despite the Alliance that included Muslim governments) and the 'settling' of Western Christian forces in Saudi Arabia (that also host the most sacred sites in Islam).

Influenced by above-mentioned briefly referred to circumstances, a number of groups came to the forefront and ultimately disappeared from the scene during a long history of domestic terrorism that increased in magnitude after the cancellation of the first round of elections in 1991. Leaving *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)* or the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching. As a breakaway faction of the GIA, the GSPC initially focused its attacks predominantly on members of the security forces, adhering to Salafist interpretations and ideals. Initially, the group aimed to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and to establish a government based on Islamic principles. Although much can be said since Hassan Hattab formed the GSPC in 1998, the current head of the GSPC Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, received renewed attention when he officially announced in January 2007 that it had changed its name to the al-Qa'eda Organisation for the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM). This step introduced a number of changes that impacted on the security, not only in Algeria, but also the region as a whole. Although *al-Qa'eda* was instrumental in the initial split from the GIA, due the latter's indiscriminate killing of civilians, the GSPC under the leadership of Hattab supported a low key alliance with *al-Qa'eda* in which the organization would be predominately independent while its members would be trained by *al-Qa'eda*. However this position was not supported by other leadership figures within the GSPC or *al-Qa'eda* that opted for a closer alliance. Most notably Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed Alwan, a Yemeni national was sent to Algeria by al-Qa'eda to encourage a more formal relationship. Alwan was however killed by Algerian security forces in 2002. Despite this setback Hassan Hattab was 'forced' to step down, to be replaced by Nabil Sahraoui also known as Abu Mustapha Ibrahim. Despite assistance and use of networks in neighbouring countries, Nabil initiated a dedicated campaign in October 2003 to recruit Tunisian and Libyan nationals into the structure and operations of the GSPC in Algeria – indicating early attempts to present the GSPC as a regional organisation. Despite the fact that Algerian security forces killed Nabil in June 2004 (to be replaced by Abdelmalek Droukdel or Abu Musab Abdul Wadud), 2004 can be described as an important year for the GSPC in adopting its 'new' focus for two reasons:

1. The GSPC established a dedicated Internet website with an equally dedicated propaganda arm; and
2. War was declared against foreigners and foreign companies.

Despite this 'new direction', operations in Algeria remain to be traditional, as will be briefly referred to later in this paper.

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Structure and area of activities

Regarding the GSPC's structure, officially the organization is divided into zones, of which the following three zones are the most active: Zone 2 (also incorporates the central command that include Algiers, Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou and the Kabylie region); Zone 5 focusses its attention on eastern Algeria with its border with Tunisia (that also includes Tunisian and Libyan nationals); and Zone 9 includes the smuggle networks in Algeria's southern border with Niger and Mali. An emir heads each zone, which is further subdivided into *katibas*, or brigades, with each *katiba* subdivided into three or four *fassilas*. A *fassila* in turn is made up of two *sarayas*, each with 12–18 members, often working in smaller groups of between two and six members. After the name change, Droukdel announced that four basic zones – Central (Algeria); East (Tunisia); South (Sahel); and West (Mauritania) – replaced existing zones. Although the GSPC incorporated other nationalities in its structure for a number of years, this announcement reconfirmed its regional ambitions. Assessing its actual size is unfortunately not an easy task due to its loose decentralized structure, as well as the fact that support can also come in the form of in-principle support that often result in the creation of support networks.

Support networks provide assistance in the form of documentation, firearms and safe haven. Support networks involving members of the same family and friends are common, and are especially difficult to monitor and infiltrate. Although support networks were also found in Western Algeria, during 2007, members of the security forces dismantled a number of logistical support networks in the east of the country; in areas close to Algiers, such as Blida, Jijel, Skikda and Bourmedes, as well as areas to the southeast, including El Oued. For example, with our attention on 2008, in January the gendarmerie arrested 12 nomad shepherds of a terrorist support network operating in southwest M'sila. Two people among those arrested made earlier use of President Bouteflika's national reconciliation and were freed from prison in 2006. In supporting the operations of GSPC/AQLIM, these shepherds sold stolen livestock to finance the purchase of weapons. Weapons smuggling is relatively common in the region that has even seen a development of arms factories. For the month of January 2008 alone, 45 hunting rifles, four of which were sawed-off, and nine Beretta automatic pistols were recovered in M'sila. [ii] Again in August security forces came across an old woman, who manufactured traditional firearms and ammunition. After investigations they also discovered a secret workshop inside her residence. This came after security forces during 2007 came across the existence of a workshop in a migrant investor's house, who owned a restaurant in the centre of Tlemcen. [iii]

Although it is difficult to establish a relationship between support networks and networks recruiting fighters for Iraq, a merge into another could be expected for the following two reasons:

- Established support networks could redirect their focus to recruitment for Iraq as this cause is now more popular domestically than GSPC/AQLIM's own campaign.
- Recruitment networks use the war in Iraq to attract new recruits who believe they will be sent to Iraq after basic training in Algeria but who are in fact being absorbed into GSPC/AQLIM's domestic campaign.

In addition to North African legal and illegal immigrant communities that are merging Europe and North Africa

security interests, the war in Iraq facilitates recruitment in both Europe and North Africa. Although to be expected, offering training to new recruits on their way to Iraq, contribute to growing concerns in Algeria – where and under what circumstances immigrant communities were radicalized in Europe are equally concerning. In one example Mbark el-Jaafari was arrested in February 2007 in Reus, Spain for recruiting 32 potential suicide bombers to be sent to Iraq via Algeria. Iraq was still used during 2008 as a rallying point. For example during late June eight Algerians stood trial after being charged of “recruitment for combat in Iraq” through a Tunisian national known as Aboulwalid. The eight Algerians, aged between 24 and 43 years, planned to join the fighting in Iraq in 2006 in Mostaganem Province, where they had been on vacation. One of the group members, Samir, offered help in contacting Aboulwalid who supervised a network that recruited militants from Arab states to fight the US forces in Iraq. One of the suspects, known as Hashimi, prepared to travel with four members of the group to Iraq after each of them raised 40,000 Algerian dinars to cover the travel costs. The cross involvement of different nationalities further contribute to a transnational character of organizations involved.

Mobile training camps, in particular those in northern Mali provided training to nationals as far south as Nigeria, nationals from neighbouring countries, other countries in Western Africa as well as individuals recruited in Europe. The attraction: recruitment networks for Iraq foreign fighters; as well as the image that AQLIM represents the interest of *al-Qa’eda* in the region. On this level the GSPC/AQLIM migrated from a domestic to transnational terror group. Ultimately the survival of GSPC/AQLIM depends on its ability to attract transnational attention. Although this might be the case with individual support, broader attention and integration is still a topic for discussion, particularly since the Libyan Islamic Combat Group alienated themselves with *al-Qa’eda* Central and not AQLIM. Although one could read a lot in this decision, a possible explanation might lay with the person who made this announcement and developments in Libya itself in relation to LIFG. According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu al-Laith al-Liby (subsequently killed on 29 January 2008) made this announcement in a joint video recording in December 2007. Analysts questioned Abu al-Laith’s influence in Libya, due to his status as a senior *al-Qa’eda* military commander based in Pakistan/Afghanistan, not Libya. Security forces in Libya defeated the group and forced many of its members to go underground or leave the country, ultimately leading to negotiations between domestic members of LIFG and the Libyan government, thereby placing a question mark on the weight this alliance has on the ground.

Irrespective of this analysis, successes in Algeria reflect the involvement of other nationalities in operations in Algeria. For example in late January 2008 security forces killed five terrorists, active in the “Abi Zeid Belmokhtar group” in the Rhourd Ennous area, 300 kilometres south of Ouargla. Those killed included individuals from Chad, Mali, Niger or Mauritania. [iv] During mid-March, operations in the Boudekhane mountains, in the Province of Khenchela, resulted in the elimination of five terrorists while several others were wounded. Most of the elements from this group were natives of sub-Saharan regions, particularly Mali, Chad and Mauritania. [v] Following the elimination of Libyan and Moroccan nationals before 2008 – (in 2006) the security services arrested a large number of foreigners who intended to join terrorist groups. In April 2007, three Libyans were captured, and members of the security forces again eliminated Libyan nationals in 2008. In early June 2008, the Algerian army in an operation in Khenchela killed another Libyan national that was part of a group of Libyans who had joined the GSPC/AQLIM to receive training in the use of arms with the aim of opening battle fronts in their country of origin. [vi] Essentially the border triangle between Mali, Niger and Algeria is a haven for AQLIM, since the kidnappers of the Austrian hostages used the Zawak valley in Mali. According to information at the time Yahia Djaouadi, the emir of the ninth region of the AQLIM hid the two Austrian hostages (who subsequently were released) in the area between Algeria, Mali and Niger. Kidnappers constantly moved between Mali and Niger in Quad. [vii]

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Modus Operandi and Target Selection

Although its modus operandi includes the resort to suicide attacks (an unfamiliar tactic in Algeria), the focus of its target selection, in addition to a few attacks directed against foreign workers/companies, is still directed against the Algerian state and its security forces. During 2007, 45 percent of attacks were directed against Algerian security forces, while 24 percent of attacks involved casualties of both members of the security forces and civilians. While during the first six months of 2008, 60 percent of attacks were directed at the security forces and 12 percent included casualties of both security forces and civilians. Notwithstanding this assessment on its target selection, the fact that the GSPC/AQLIM resorted to indiscriminate tactics such as suicide attacks, implied that although the target might represent the state, this indiscriminate tactic often result in mass casualties, including innocent civilians.

In answering the question: What does the GSPC/AQLIM hope to achieve through violence? The GSPC realized that its own organization became too weak (as a result of the reconciliation process, elimination and the arrest of key leadership figures) and in order to survive it had to adopt the *al-Qa’eda* brand, while *al-Qa’eda* could enhance its influence in this region through this alliance. Notwithstanding this strategy, Algerian security forces had a number of successes against AQLIM during 2008 (till date). In one of these successes security forces discovered a tunnel more than 400 meters long and eight blockhouses during early February in Sid Ali Bounab, 90 kilometres from Algiers. Clothing and food were also seized by the security forces who were looking for bomb-making labs of the Ettefdjir Katibat, led by amir Amar Torfi alias Abou Meriam, who, according to our sources, was reportedly behind the two attacks in Thenia and Naciria. Security forces acted on intelligence provided by the two repentants. [viii]

Considering the primary motivation of the GSPC to officially align itself to *al-Qa’eda*: To present itself as *al-Qa’eda*’s representative in the Maghreb – with the growing outrage from the public as a result of AQLIM’s indiscriminate killing of civilians while targeting government representatives, came a growing possibility that AQLIM might increase its attacks against Western targets. Since its official alignment (that came with the name change) in January 2007 till June 2008, 157 attacks have been recorded, of which eight attacks were directed against Western targets. During the same period fifteen suicide attack were recorded of which two were directed against Western targets, notably on 21 September 2007 when a suicide bomber targeted a convoy of

foreign workers employed by a French company near Lakhdaria; and one of the 11 December 2007 suicide bombers targeted the UN offices in Algiers. On the topic of suicide bombings, it is important to note that in relation to other bombings, including roadside bombings, the use of suicide bombings is still a 'limited' tactic with 11 percent of bombings in 2007 and 9 percent of bombings recorded during the first six months of 2008 that reflected the use of suicide operations.

Countering the threat from suicide bombers, members of the security forces also enhanced the intelligence gathering capacity (particularly from former members that were captured or that surrendered to security forces), that in mid-February 2008 led to the distribution of a poster that included the photograph, age, address and town/city of 33 suspected potential suicide bombers, one of them a woman. Seventy percent of those identified came from Algiers, particularly from Kouba, Hussein-Dey, Bourrouba and Ain-Naadja while some are natives of Dellys, Boumerdes, Djelfa, etc. These identikit were obtained from intelligence provided by members of support networks arrested earlier. [\[ix\]](#)

It was not only Algerian security forces that had successes against AQLIM, in March 2008 an AQLIM cell active between Bamako and Timbuktu was broken up by the Malian security agencies. Abou Osama a veteran in the war against the Russian army in Afghanistan, fell into a trap that ultimately led to his arrest. [\[x\]](#) It was also announced that between January 2007 and March 2008 security forces successfully acted against several attempts to smuggle phosphates and concentrated fertilizers in eight provinces. An estimated 50 tons were seized from Souk Ahras, Tebessa and El Tarf provinces in eastern Algeria and Saida, Mascara and Sidi Bel Abbes provinces in the west. In the south, the authorities confiscated chemicals from Ouargla Province as came from Tunisia through El Oued Province. [\[xi\]](#) In addition to smuggle routes for chemicals used in the construction of explosive devices, firearms smuggle routes were also well established through history. This resulted in 'alliance' between terrorists and smugglers, the latter purely motivated by financial gain. The first weapons trafficking networks were established, particularly in certain regions that gradually specialized in that activity. As part of this, the communities of Magra, Djeddar, Barika, and many others in the provinces of M'sila, Biskra, and El Oued turning these areas into veritable nerve centres. This problem escalated to such an extent that since the late 1990's, it was easier to buy a Kalashnikov in Ouargla, Tamanrasset, El Oued, and Illizi than a car. Batna is however considered as the nerve centre of the arms trafficking. In countering this growing threat, security forces have set up permanent roadblocks all along the highways generally used by the traffickers resulting in a decrease in smuggling. Operations during the last few years also made use of metal detectors and canine patrols. With the exception of the Djelfa, M'sila, and Biskra regions and the border regions in the far south, the phenomenon also affects the country's eastern and western borders, particularly the provinces of Tlemcen and Tebessa where the trafficking of antipersonnel mines, explosive devices, detonators, detonator cords, slow wicks, and shells for hunting rifles occurs. [\[xii\]](#) In addition to the use of the region for smuggling, security forces also became increasingly concerned by an increase of extremist activities in western Algeria. For example in September 2008 a network of recruiters were broken up in Oued Rhiou. After the east, where they succeeded with operations against the security forces in Jijel, Skikda and Batna, the terrorists are trying to establish themselves in the western region, in the old fiefs of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), in Tissemsilt, Relizane and Sidi Bel Abbes in particular. The army however has retaken its positions on several strategic axes to prevent the terrorists from once again penetrating into the mountains of the region located between Relizane, Sidi Bel Abbes and Tissemsilt, and even the mountainous regions located between Tlemcen and the far west of the country. [\[xiii\]](#) In late August, in Oued Rhiou, in Relizane Province, security agencies also broke up a network of recruiters working on behalf of the GSPC. These recruiters used illegal immigrants to allow the new recruits to get to the Oued Djer region in Blida, where a terrorist leader took care of them. For each young man recruited, the recruiters received more than 500,000 dinars from the GSPC. The GSPC's recruiters target poor young men with a blank legal record and generally with no record with the security agencies. [\[xiv\]](#)

The ability of the GSPC/AQLIM to target Algiers in its attacks (after a period of calm in the capital since 2003) implied that the organization managed to reactivate cells and support networks in and around Algiers. Secondly, its structures in the south – in addition to act as a supply network – began to target Mauritania and southern Tunisia:

- 4 June 2005, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the former emir of Zone 9 killed 15 soldiers in an assault on a military base in Mreiti, Mauritania.
- 24 December 2007: Attack on a French family near Aleg.
- 30 December 2007: Attack on military base near Galaouia.
- 31 January 2008: Gunmen attack the Embassy of Israel in Nouakchott.
- Two Austrian tourists were kidnapped in southern Tunisia between 18 and 25 February 2008.
- 15 September 2008: Members of AQLIM killed 12 Mauritanian soldiers as they were ambushed 70 kilometres (45 miles) east of Zouerat. The twelve men that went missing included a captain, a corporal, nine privates and a civilian desert guide. On 19 September they were found in the desert 30 kilometres northeast of the northern town of Tourine (all twelve were decapitated).

Western Algeria, in particular its border with Morocco and Mauritania also received increasing attention. In addition to above-mentioned attacks in Mauritania and continuous smuggle activities at the Moroccan border, growing concern was raised in relation to the activities of Al-Mahdhara. In an article published in early February 2008 it was mentioned that people from various nationalities legally travelled to be enrolled in these religious schools that promote Wahhabism, financed by people from the Gulf. The remote location implies that religious authorities and security forces cannot control its activities, particularly since these schools are located in desert areas, far away from the two nearest populated areas. According to the sources mentioned in the article, one of the schools is situated near a Moroccan border checkpoint called Karkarat; while one of the biggest religious schools called Mahdharat Maata Moulana with 25 branches is based in the region of Akjoujt, Mauritania. The same school has an estimated 3 000 students, including Moroccans who come from the south, especially from

Laayoune and Goulimine. Another school is called Mahdharat Ahl Addoud where the Salafi Wahhabi thought is being taught to about 2 400 students from various nationalities. The school has 32 branches and is located in the Oued Ennaga region and it is one of the schools that have been functioning secretly in the region. [xv] Although not aligned to AQLIM the spread of Salafi and Wahhabi thinking in remote areas, beyond the watchful eye of the state, not to mention the level of isolation that accompanies these and similar structures, are concerning.

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Spill-over to Europe

Despite the primary focus on Algeria, the following section hopes to briefly place the current felt threat presented by North African nationals in context. In addition to the arrest of Mbark el-Jaafari in February 2007 in Reus, Spain for recruiting 32 potential suicide bombers to be sent to Iraq via Algeria (and other similar operations, networks involving North African nationals in Europe is not a new trend). What is however new is the attention Western governments and security forces direct at these 'networks'. Support operations were established in European countries in reaction to counter-operations in North African countries in the 1990s. Freedom of speech, association and the classification of extremism and associated terrorism in their countries of origin as 'domestic', even granting political asylum to extremists led to the creation of support networks to operations in Northern African countries, including Algeria. These support networks concentrated on:

1. Providing safety for operatives wanted in North African countries (although the focus is on North Africa, extremists from throughout the world used Europe to their advantage). Specialized forgery cells further facilitated the settlement of wanted suspects.
2. Financial assistance through legal as well as illegal means to support operations in their respective countries of origin. Fraud became an illegal means to financially support operations.
3. Weaponry was also smuggled to particularly Algeria
4. Recruitment

Although France was initially a favourite base, due to historic alliances with France (former colony), language was therefore not an obstacle. However, increasing counter operations against extremists in France (due to growing targeting of French nationals and interests in Algeria) led to a number of terrorist attacks in Paris in 1995/6. Subsequently operatives spread to other European countries, involving individuals from mixed nationalities. Activities in France already served as an example where a diversion away from support operations manifested in direct acts of terrorism. It also introduced vulnerabilities surrounding immigrant communities and the threat presented by the ability of extremists to be 'integrated' into immigrant communities. Linking immigration directly with terrorism might however further lead to marginalization and isolation, ultimately impacting on integration and the negative impact all of these issues have on radicalization.

Conclusion

Wrapping up this brief discussion on Algeria, the following strengths and vulnerabilities need our attention:

- Following the loss of experienced GSPC members as a result of surrender, arrest or elimination by security forces, GSPC/AQLIM is trying to attract both foreign fighters and younger followers, including women – between the ages of 16 and 20 – though are often inexperienced, are idealists who can be easily manipulated. These new recruitment techniques have presented a new challenge to the security forces, in that it is more difficult to implement proactive measures against individuals with no previous records or who have not raised suspicion and are therefore unknown to security forces. In addition to these trends, radicalization often takes place over a short period and further place additional pressure on security forces.
- Changing its tactics from targeting security forces in remote mountainous areas, on which members of security forces answered with search and destroy operations and aerial bombings, to suicide attacks in populated areas, influenced the need for security forces to change its tactics: Intelligence driven operations to identify and arrest those involved in a pro-active approach. This strategic change in thinking implies the need to restructure its intelligence structures, while the former emphasis was on the military. It also calls for the growing involvement of the public in coming forward with information on suspicious activities. In this context it is worth noticing that the involvement of the population in counter terrorism is well established, leading to a number of successes.
- Growing pressure from the public as a result of its suicide operations, might possibly contribute to an increase in operations against Western targets. Although the 20 August 2008 attack in Bouira targeting SNC-Lavalin employees - that left 12 people dead and 15 wounded - was not discussed in this analysis, it is interesting to note that notwithstanding the statement "we are choosing our targets carefully and we are always careful with your blood. We do not target the innocent" those killed in the attack were Algerian nationals. The statement in itself reflects a growing intention not to target those classified as 'innocent', but rather to target and kill the intended target – foreigners and state representatives.
- Presenting a regional focus implies the involvement of other nationalities and the operational focus of the GSPC/AQLIM beyond the jurisdiction of Algeria. Concerning is the fact that the person responsible for the attack against SNC-Lavalin was not Algerian, but from Mauritania (Abdul Rahman Abu Zeinab al-Mauritani) reflecting the success - although still early - to present AQLIM as a regional organization. Although Algeria has a good relationship with Tunisia, the relationship with Morocco is often challenging, while relations with other neighbouring countries might face similar challenges. This is worsened by the fact that long porous borders and the inability to establish territorial jurisdiction over its territories overall leads to uncontrolled areas that are being exploited by smugglers who also cooperate with terrorists.

On the question of vulnerabilities:

- The GSPC/AQLIM lost support from within through its decision to adopt indiscriminate tactics, such as

suicide attacks (an uncommon strategy in Algeria) as well as the leadership style of Droukdel in replacing experienced leaders since he questioned their loyalty. This led to a low morale and a number of surrenders.

- Outrage and renewed resolve from the public to get rid of the organization, influenced after the decision of the GSPC/AQLIM to resort to suicide attacks, led to community members coming forward with information that resulted in the arrest of key members.

Any domestic based terror organization needs some kind of domestic support base, that impacts on its target selection and *modus operandi*. The fear however exists that when the group operates with a broader audience in mind, these self-imposed limitations are increasingly disregarded. From above analysis it is clear that GSPC/AQLIM finds itself in the middle: Although rhetoric is geared to sell itself as a regional organization, based on its target selection, the organization falls within the category of a domestic insurgent/terrorist organization, sporadically targeting a Western target to justify its existence. The future of the organization is still in the balance.

On the question of a link between the Maghreb and Europe and the threat this represents to European nationals in North Africa or European countries directly, much more can be said. Although operations in Algeria are predominately directed against traditional domestic targets, the fear exists that in order to 'sell' itself as a regional representative of al-Qa'eda, AQLIM will gradually increase its attacks against Western representatives and interests. In contrast to this potential new threat, Morocco and Tunisia reflected a stronger anti-Western focus in its prior target selection. Although attacks are far between (threat and previous incidents not discussed in this paper), uncovered plots reflected a definite Western target selection (in comparison to a traditional anti-Algerian government establishment focus in Algeria):

- The 2002 Straits of Gibraltar plot;
- Activities in Tetouan and its focus on Ceuta and Mililla as part of the liberation of al-Andalus;
- The Mesahell cell plot to target the US embassy while recruiting potential fighters for Iraq coordinated with Algerian and Libyan operatives; and
- In Tunisia, the Tunisian Combat Group plot to target US as well as Algerian and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001

In addition to the threat to Western and European countries and nationals, the policies of European countries in dealing with extremism where nationals from North African countries are involved in, also raised concern in countries these individuals originated from. Deportation as a strategy to get rid of suspected extremists is seen by a number of officials as transferring the problem to North Africa. The fact that people (including those from North Africa) were radicalized in Europe, often resulted in individuals with European citizenship (although originated in North Africa) being arrested (without being able to successfully prosecute these individuals in Europe) led to questions, for example on how to deal with them on arrival in Algeria. Without being able to build a case beyond the jurisdiction of Algeria (in this case) these individuals might equally radicalize and recruit extremists to be used domestically or externally in current hotspots such as Iraq or even Europe, without addressing or defusing the situation, thus leading to a new cycle of extremism.

As with many countries around the world, the potential spill-over of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is also feared in Algeria. Again reconfirming the need for an intelligent and strategic approach and strategy to deal with extremism and terrorism, considering that everything is interconnected. Although countries might be under the impression of 'dealing' with extremism and terrorism, they might without realizing it, 'export' extremism and terrorism to another country.

[Volver](#)

[i] BBC Europe, 2008. Al-Qa'idah in Maghreb poses "major, dangerous and growing" threat - US official, 24 October.

[ii] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian forces arrest 12 nomads on charges of supporting M'sila terror network, 28 January.

[iii] Salafists logistical base in Western Algeria, 25 August 2008, <http://www.echoroukonline.com/eng/algeria/3068.html>

[iv] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian army kills five Maghreb Al-Qaidah fighters, 3 February.

[v] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian paper says army kills five terrorists, wounds others in eastern province, 26 March.

[vi] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian army kills Libyan "terrorist" in Khenchela, 14 June.

[vii] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian Al-Qa'idah group uses Austrian hostages as "human shield" 1 September.

[viii] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian army destroys tunnel, eight "terrorist" hideouts in Kabylie, 12 February.

[ix] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian security agency identifies 33 would-be suicide bombers, 17 February.

[x] BBC Middle East, 2008. Malian security forces arrest Algerian Al-Qa'idah commander, 3 March.

[xi] BBC Middle East, 2008. Algerian terrorists' sources of fertilizers "dried up", 31 March.

[xii] Interviews with security personnel supported by BBC Middle East, 2008 Arms trafficking on Algeria, Mali,

Niger border area examined, 15 May.

[xiii] BBC Middle East, 2008. Security forces break up Islamist recruitment network in western Algeria, 8 September.

[xiv] BBC Middle East, 2008. Security forces break up Islamist recruitment network in western Algeria, 8 September.

[xv] BBC Middle East, 2008. Moroccan paper says rich Gulf people finance Wahhabi schools in Mauritania, 4 February.

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Abstract

Although the threat of terrorism in North Africa is not a new challenge to safety and security in the region, its focus constantly changes. Recently this manifested in the name change of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, commonly known as the GSPC to al-Qa'eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM).

Notwithstanding the fact that this new direction was influenced by an attempt to remain relevant – therefore influenced by weakness not strength – it signalled to the international community that al-Qa'eda not openly confirmed its presence in the region, but with it came an increase in threat perception to Western interests and nationals. The following brief paper hope to place the threat to Europe and Western interest in context: Firstly in particularly Algeria, but secondly the threat presented by individuals originally from North Africa directly to European countries. The paper conclude with a call to European countries to carefully assess the medium- to long-term impact counter-measures have in the broader fight against radicalization, extremism and terrorism.

Key words

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); Al-Qa'eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM or AQIM); Support networks; Suicide attacks or bombings; Deportation.

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FACETS OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN ITALY

Armando Spataro

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

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- **The Italian legal system to fight the international terrorism.**
- **The reinforcement of international cooperation facilitates the abandonment of particularistic views and the exchange of information. The need to respect the fundamental rights of the people.**

My speech is based on my experiences as an Italian prosecutor. I have been working for almost 30 years in fighting organized crime and terrorism. I am currently the coordinator of the specialized group of anti- terrorism prosecutors at the District Attorney's office in Milan.

This paper focuses on an analysis of the phenomenon of so called Islamic terrorism^[1], as it manifests itself on Italian territory (with occasional references to the European and international context), included some valuations on funding and possible connections with the internal terrorism and common organized crime. I will also attempt to give a brief synthesis of the main investigations that have been conducted in Italy in these last years, trying to categorize the various associations operating in the country. The final part of the paper will regards legal themes: it will focus the principal Italian legal instruments to fight terrorism, the situation of international cooperation against this type of terrorism and, according to the Italian point of view, the issue of the balance between public security and safeguard of human rights, or between the need of an effective fight against terrorism and simultaneous respect of the guarantees of the individuals.

Up to March 11 of 2004, despite the threats from some important terrorist organizations, international experts saw Europe as backwater for logistic operations, a place to be used for proselytism, to dispatch militants into war zones with false documents, and to obtain money and resources in order to finance and support terrorist activity. However, the March 11 tragedy in Madrid was a rude awakening for everyone, justifying those who had asked to invest in new instruments to fight international terrorism. Naturally, the London July 2005 bombings have reinforced the urgency of this need.

Preface to the analysis of the Italian situation

It is impossible to attempt a full history of Islamic radicalism, which has culminated into terrorism. Moreover, despite his expertise and even though legal investigations usually document a piece of history, a magistrate is certainly not the best suited individual to take on the role of the historian.

For our purposes it will suffice to remember that the problem of Islamic terrorism manifested itself in Italy after the retreat of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The Afghan conflict, as many remember, had undoubtedly served as a catalyst to the response of the Jihad^[2] in defence of *dar al-islam* (the land of Islam), which according to their vision was being threatened from the Soviet invasion. This, as we know, brought a move to the area and to nearby Pakistan by various prominent figures in Islamic fundamentalism and hence, through the creation of numerous training camps, a coming together of many energies in defence of the cause of the "Afghan brothers". The eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was celebrated by Osama bin Laden and his cohorts as a triumph, and as proof of the real possibility of taking the fight against the enemies of Islam to every part of the world. It was, then, in Afghanistan that the hard core of *Al Qaeda* concentrated and organized itself: a concentration of leadership, volunteers and infrastructures of militant Islam (further intensified after 1996) that ceased to exist only with the military operation in late 2001. By the beginning of 2002, the material assets were destroyed, the personnel dispersed, and it was clear that a new phase of Islamic militancy was starting. From then on "*Al Qaeda*" became the designation for a general programme to attack the West and the governments, including Islamic ones, accused of being its instruments. Despite these difficulties, the dangerousness of these movements has not waned as the events in Madrid and in London unfortunately demonstrated.

The organization and strategies of the Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, consequently, got further localized and

fragmented: the terrorist threat and the bomb attacks do not derive from one only strategic head quarter.

The danger to Italians and Europeans in such a project is not exclusively determined by the number of victims or the destructiveness of terrorist acts, but by the degree of penetration of the jihad ideology. It tends to turn pieces of territory – especially the urban periphery where the presence of Muslim immigrants is more intense – into appendices of the fundamental version of *dar al-islam*. The threat is therefore present in our own territory.

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The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism in Italy : general considerations on its structure, origins, logistical support, cover-up activities, behavioural rules, financing, possible connections with organized crime and internal terrorism

It is clear that Italian investigators are faced by a network of Islamic cells, which are not rigidly structured under one single hierarchical organization and which cannot be grouped under one single denomination. Actually, more recently, the ethnic and national identity of the members of the various groups has become less important, whereas for various years it had been the main distinguishing factor (however, we will return to this point later). An informal confederation of cells seems to have formed, all interconnected and it is not always certain, despite what the press often implies, that Bin Laden is their leader or that they are members of Al-Qaeda.

After all, Al-Qaeda means "the Base": It functions as a sort of service centre or reference point. Bin Laden himself debunked the term. In a conversation with a correspondent of Al-Jazira from Kabul on October 10, 2001 the sheik claimed *"Things are not as the West depicts them, namely that there is an organization with a specific name, Al-Qaeda. This term is very old and it originated against our will. Our brother Abu 'Ubaida al-Bansiri crated (in Afghanistan) a base to train young men to fight the perverted, arrogant, terrorist Soviet empire (...). That training camp was called "the base"(Al Qaeda, in Arabic: n.d.r.)"*. In sum, the label Al-Qaeda is today sort of like the label of a firm whose function is the promotion of the holy war, and which was initially created in the eighties to support the mujahedeen who infiltrated from Pakistan into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. However, it has never been characterized by a vertical hierarchical structure. After all, the jihad movement itself is characterized by a horizontal structure, based on a network that aspires to engulf the entire Islamic community (*umma islamiyya*) into its cause.

This is therefore the conviction of Italian public prosecutors , a conviction that is also shared by scholars, experts and investigators of different backgrounds.

Islamic terrorists in Italy , come primarily from the North African area even if –as has been claimed – there are alarming signs of a Pakistani presence as well.

At first these terrorists held on to their specific national identity. At the beginning of the nineties the terrorist groups that began to establish themselves in Italy were mostly Algerians. They used our country as a logistic base and for proselytism. However, these were isolated groups who took advantage of the flow of immigrants into Europe from their own country. They became nested in ethnic communities where it was easier to camouflage themselves. They planted their roots around places of worship, namely, near mosques and Islamic centres. Algerians from the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) and Takit w-al-Higra (Anathema and Exile) and later on, Egyptians (al-Jihad and al-Gamà al-Islamia) as well as the Moroccans have been a major presence in our country. In the last years there have been numerous important Tunisian fundamentalists. The latter are well settled in Milan and are followers of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. However, the different groups that have been discovered by investigations in Italy, such as that of Ansar Al Islam and others of Moroccan and Tunisian origin, included di Hib Ut Tahrir will be discussed later.

Up to now, the role of Islamic terrorist cells in Italy has been primarily to provide logistic support. These cells have primarily focused on making counterfeit documents (forgery of residence permits, ID cards & passports..) for the other groups, for themselves, and for followers of the Al-Qaeda project. Evidence gathered in the Italian investigations has revealed important similarities with the evidence gathered in investigations conducted in Europe and in other countries. These findings have also indicated that the acquisition and circulation of counterfeit documents that are made with care and precision is a fundamental aspect of the pursuit of terrorist activities. The availability of good documents allows terrorist leaders (who must maintain continuous communication with peripheral cells), as well as those carrying out a possible terrorist attack, to move around the world with very few risks. The investigations also revealed that these counterfeit documents are provided by individuals who produce them as a profession, but who do not belong to any type of terrorist organizations. These individuals are willing to offer their services to terrorist groups in exchange for a compensation and are fully aware that these documents will be used for terrorist activities.

It has also been established that Islamic terrorists in Italy are involved in different types of cover-up activities, which do not correspond to any particular typology. They are often entrepreneurs (mostly engaged in autonomous entrepreneurial activities, as was the case with a group in Milan, which ran a cleaning service in Gallarate, near Milano, or in apparently legal activities aimed at finding job's opportunities and getting residential status), merchants, managers of import-export businesses, call centres, etc. Some are also professors, students, technicians, artisans, electricians, unskilled labourers, and some are unemployed. They are surrounded by numerous supporters. These individuals all live above any kind of suspicion in the outskirts of big cities or in the hinterland where it is much easier to camouflage themselves.

The members of terrorist organizations operating in Italy, naturally, are also involved in collecting funds (through financing methods that will be described below) to send "combatants" to war zones or to training camps; furthermore, there are intense contacts with other individuals who engage in similar terrorist activities but who live and operate in other European countries: a significant event in this respect was the arrest of an Egyptian, **Rabei Osman Ahmed Ed Sayed**, who arrived in Milan on 6.6.04. Rabei was sentenced in Italy as a member of a terrorist organization and was indicted – although later acquitted – in the trial in Spain of those accused of being involved in the massacre in Madrid perpetrated on 11 March 2004: in fact, Rabei, who was under arrest

while he was preparing –on the eve of the elections to the European Parliament – another attack along with accomplices operating in Belgium and France, has proved to be an important element in the Islamist terrorist world, at the centre of a dense network of personal contacts with individuals resident in almost all European countries.

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How do Islamic terrorists live in Italy ? Statements by collaborators, manuals and other documents

For an investigator, the sources for the knowledge of terrorist behaviours and motivations are, first and foremost, *the statements made by them in the course of interrogations*, both at the investigation stage and subsequently at the public hearings, as well as their *conversations, intercepted and recorded* with authorizations and in the ways the law allows. Among the statements, particular relevance attaches to those of *collaborators with justice* (so-called *supergrasses*, referred to in Italian as *repenters*), who normally seek to explain to judges their own life stories and the reasons for their criminal choices, even before describing the dynamics and indicating the perpetrators of the crimes committed. Another important source of knowledge is – obviously– *the documents of an ideological nature produced by the terrorist organizations*. I have in mind not only the training manuals and the documents claiming the crimes committed, but also the messages circulating on the Internet and those – some on digital or audiovisual supports – that are often confiscated in terrorists' flats or other places they frequent.

Till this moment, the Italian prosecutors obtained the collaboration by three former members of terrorist groups of so-called Islamic type: they have described the reasons that impelled them towards their own subsequent criminal choices. They had not been members of radical groups in their homelands, and often not even been strictly observant of the rules of the Islamic religion. Once they arrived in Italy, however, their difficulties fitting in, the marginalization they immediately suffered, the precariousness of their resources for living, and finding out that their lives were quite different from how they had imagined them beforehand proved to be a spur for certain recurrent elements in their stories. These elements are: the search for a feeling of belonging to a community (that of the Islamic immigrants), the attempt to reaffirm their own identity and, finally, the search for personal prestige through contact with "strong," powerful leaders of those communities, whose "authority" was also reflected on those who had become their habitués and friends: their recruiters. It was from such contacts, then, that the progressive indoctrination of the penitents had derived, coming about in "separated" areas of certain mosques, certain cultural institutes and religious schools, or also in private houses. This indoctrination started, first, with seeing images that aroused a sense of humiliation and rage, like those of the Guantanamo camps and Abu Ghraib, then went through hearing cassette tapes containing appeals to "*brotherhood*" and descriptions of how the training camps work, and finally was effected through instructions and lessons on how to strike and kill the infidel enemy. For this purpose, it was stated, the "recruiters" used videocassettes showing scenes of violence in Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq etc. and sheikhs extolling *Jihad* and the use of weapons in defence of the faith. It was common, indeed almost inevitable, during these phases for many of them to commit minor crimes in order to survive. At the end of this process, said one of the collaborators, "*you do not see terrorists around you, but people who are in the right*," and again, "*by the end you know you are right and that the religious conquest of the world cannot come about peacefully, but by the sword*".

As I said before, useful elements for assessing the rules of conduct and the motivations of terrorists can also be derived from the content of ideological documents disseminated internationally on the internet or items seized in the course of various enquiries. They all consistently show that the religious view of the world, obviously in the distorted perspective specific to the terrorists, constitutes the main reason for their behaviour, whereas practically no importance attaches to the mere aspiration to liberate specific occupied territories or oppressed peoples.

This is the sense of the message contained in the document founding the so-called "*World Islamic Front*", dating from February 1998, when Osama bin Laden, announcing the formation of the *World Islamic Front*, issued a statement promising a "Jihad against Zionists and Crusaders." [3] It cited the "sword verses" from the Koran: "Fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them," emphasizing the international dimension of the ongoing struggle between good and evil. The statement also included a *fatwa*: "to kill Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country [...] to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque" [in Mecca], in order for "their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim".

But it is also interesting to read a few passages from "*Military Studies for the Jihad against the Tyrants*", the title of a document that seems to be a manual for training terrorists, consisting of 180 pages, found in the house of a suspected Al-Qa'ida terrorist in Manchester, England, in May 2000. It specifies, *inter alia*, that the chief mission the military organization is responsible for is the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement by an Islamic regime; that among the other missions are the dissemination of appeals and writing of messages to mobilize the people against the enemy and the blowing up and destruction of places of entertainment, perversion and sin. The "correct" interpretation of the Koran and the teachings of those who have studied it are then mentioned to justify in religious terms torture and killings of hostages [4].

An identical vision of *Jihad* is contained in the 252-page manual in Arabic found in July 2002 in a flat in Milan used by people sentenced for terrorism. It is a publication entitled "*Basic Elements for the preparation of the Jihad for the cause of Allah*". It contains numerous references to Koran verses, edicts and extracts from recitations usually studied in the religious schools, commented on in support of the arguments successively presented. It states that *Jihad* is a duty on all Muslims – however "*weak and divided*" – fighting against "*the oppressors*" (the communist, socialist and democratic regimes and, in particular, the Muslim governments that follow those political approaches) and that "*their duty is, through training, to purify their minds to exalt the word of God and ensure*

they fear nothing, not even death."

In the vision of the future attacker, the terrorist act is then described not only as an act of destruction, but above all as a message of justice and collective redemption: "against them [the infidels], hold force ready to the limit of your power, through actions of war, spreading terror (through all the earth) among your enemies and those of Allah, and among those ye know not, but Allah does."^[5]

Other important ideological documents may be mentioned here, among them those seized in the course of investigations in Italy between 2003 and 2004, in the Milan residence of an Egyptian imam charged with terrorism. Among the documents seized was one entitled "*Jihad in the name of Allah – introduction - definition*". It states that "*Jihad in the name of Allah*" enables the believer to "accept separation from home and family and has taught him how to live in exile [...] Another important point in preparing men for JIHAD is to create a feeling of friendship and brotherhood among the mujahidin, who become like brothers and help each other and share everything". And again: "JIHAD is an integral and obligatory part of the Islamic religion. The mujahidin are the devotees of Allah and show the whole world the path of truth, sacrifice their lives to help humanity to enjoy Islam and be blessed by Allah in this life and the next. They preach the word of Allah to bring the people from darkness to light, they fight the tyrants with the sword and with their teeth [...] They prefer hunger, thirst and fear to repletion and security in this life."

Similarly, from the contents of the documentation and videocassettes seized on 31 March 2003 in a house in Parma from two Kurds charged with and later found guilty of terrorism, one can unambiguously deduce the following conclusion: the various "guerrillas" or "wars" from time to time under way or imminent (like those in Afghanistan and Kurdistan, ongoing at the time the videos concerned were made; or those in Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia or Iraq) constitute mere opportunities – however important – to implement a much broader programme of struggle. This programme, by giving concrete significance to the word Jihad, sets itself the objective of bringing "pure" Islamic law and the Caliphate back to the same frontiers as its greatest historical extent, including parts of Spain and the Balkans.

And again, in the course of a recent Italian judicial investigation, a conversation between two terrorists was recorded in which they even hoped that the war in Iraq would "never finish" (and that the United States would not change their programme for it), so as to justify their own war against the West.

So it's possible to claim the absolute irrelevance of the objective of liberating occupied territories: this remains true although admittedly particular political motivations may very well be set beside the idea of a cosmic war against the infidels, which characterizes the terrorist movement on an international scale.

Of course, the knowledge of the above mentioned contents of such manuals, videocassettes and conversations is important not only to gain an understanding of the mentality and the meaning of the behaviour of members of the Jihad. It is also important to appreciate the relevance in relation to crimes of association. It is in fact evident that the almost obsessive preoccupation with personal training or the provision of money (even of sums that are not particularly consistent) to the families of militants and to battlefields does not simply have a mere military-religious value.

In fact, it might be useful to mention one further possible motivation for the suicidal act, certainly linked with those of a religious nature: in connection with various Italian judicial investigations into suspected crimes of "financing" terrorist groupings, it emerged that sums of money collected as voluntary contributions from the faithful (*zakat*^[6]) served – often unwittingly to them – not to finance the "terrorist act" as such (enabling, for instance, the coverage of the associated costs), but to guarantee a future to the family members of a suicide attacker or someone who died in the course of a terrorist action. Just this prospect of lasting support to their own families may sometimes underpin the intentions of those who have decided to join the *Jihad*, and facilitate recruitment work.

It is useful, at this point, to examine some specific issues that can be of interest to this particular conference, namely those related to possible channels involved financing Islamic terrorism and any possible links with organized crime and national terrorist groups.

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Financing terrorism

The following valuations will be limited, instead, to the elements that have emerged throughout the investigations conducted during these last years.

With regards to the latter, it has already become evident that financing of the "combatants" constitutes not only one of the main activities of the followers of the groups that have been investigated. It is also a behavioural norm.^[7]

That being said, investigations have yielded the following:

- No proof emerged of financing originating from the leaders of terrorist organizations living out of Italy and assigned to members of terrorist cells operating in Italy .
- No actual cases of financing – through sophisticated banking channels or transactions - have been identified.
- Full legal evidence of the transfer (or actual delivery) of funds from individuals believed to belong to terrorist groups, to their comrades involved in similar activities often outside of Italy or in training camps. Investigations carried out in Milan ascertained the transfers of small sums of money (never more than five thousand euro) through alternative channels, for example Western Union.
- Through the collaborators declarations we obtained the evidence on drug trafficking and money's forgery

committed for the purpose of financing terrorist activities, but in both cases the accused have been never involved in trafficking huge amounts of currency and drugs. Some terrorists were also sentenced for these crimes.

- An additional investigation was conducted involving a number of individuals accused of having provided false fiscal documentation to help a firm, which supported one of the main suspects of a terrorist group, evade taxes. The firm's profits were also utilized to finance the needs of the criminal group.
- Small companies, registered under the names of individuals suspected of terrorist activities, were also uncovered through the investigations. It is quite probable that these companies were being utilized for illegal financing of terrorist activities.
- An investigation revealed the systematic use of extortion at the expense of other citizens of Islamic faith. Funds thus obtained were used for the establishment of a cooperative for various commercial activities;
- On numerous occasions, cash was confiscated from individuals under investigation. This money was going to eventually be sent to combatants residing abroad. During the investigations carried out in Milan, for example, approximately 5,000 euros, in coins, were confiscated on September 4, 2002 from a suspect under investigation, who was driving back to Bologna. 8,525 euros were also confiscated on July 12, 2002 from the apartment in Milan mentioned above, while 200,000 euros, in cash, were confiscated in Padova on October 2, 2003, in addition to false documents all in possession of Bentiwaa Farida (the only Islamic woman involved in Italian investigations), who was holding them for other people.

At last, some valuations on the global blacklisting system for financiers of [al-Qaeda](#) and other terrorist groups : already since some years, according to counterterrorism officials and prosecutors in Italy (before the judgements on 11.7.07 of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities – Second Chamber in the Sison case - n. T-47\2003, and in Stichting Al Aqsa case - n. T-327\2003; and before the judgement of European Court Justice – Grande Chambre on 3.9.2008 in the "Kadi-Al Barakaat" cases), the global blacklisting system is a lack of due process and the potential for political abuse. People named to the U.N. blacklist cannot examine the evidence against them, cannot remain on the list indefinitely and are not granted an automatic right of appeal. I want also to underline that [in January 2008, the 47-nation Council of Europe](#) concluded that the U.N. and E.U. blacklists were "totally arbitrary and have no credibility whatsoever." The Milan's prosecutors have dropped criminal investigations of several accused al-Qaeda financiers targeted by the U.N. sanctions after failing to find evidence that would stand up in court. Of course, we cannot accept the principle that if the Security Council of the U.N. or Council of the E.U. enter a name on the blacklist, it could be considered evidence against the suspect before Italian Courts.

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Connections with common and/or organized criminality; or with internal terrorist groups

The most concrete element that demonstrates the existence of a connection between international terrorist groups and common Italian criminality is the **wide availability to the terrorists of counterfeit identity documents of all types, often stolen**, drugs and false money.

It seems reasonable to assume that these common criminals involved in the lucrative trafficking of counterfeit documents, drugs and false money are supplying these to terrorist groups and individuals. Anyway, except for very rare cases, none of the defendants in proceedings involving Islamic terrorism have ever been Italian citizens. It is very common, instead, for Moroccans, Tunisians, etc. to be arrested for these crimes. It is often impossible to determine if these individuals are connected to terrorist groups.

There are no elements to affirm a relation between:

- **Terrorist groups and organized crime.** With the exception of a few isolated cases^[8], no weapons^[9] have been confiscated in operations against Islamic terrorism. Therefore, it is impossible to hypothesize about any possible connections with regards to how and by whom, they are being supplied. Moreover, there was no follow-up to the confiscation of weapons in Turin in 1998, which probably came from the "ndrangheta" (Calabrese mafia) and which were in the possession of Egyptians suspected of terrorist activities. In 2003 twenty-eight illegal immigrants from Pakistan were arrested and ammunitions were confiscated, all found in a repossessed house belonging to a Camorra boss, Salvatore Giuliano. This episode is obviously alarming; however, it cannot yet be viewed as proof of a connection between terrorist groups and organized crime. Perhaps more significant is a revelation made by a collaborator of the "casalesi camorra" clan. He claimed that in 1997, while in prison, he established some contacts with an Algerian member of the GIA, who wanted to strike a deal with him to get assistance from the clan to transfer weapons from the region of Campania to an Algerian group. Nothing has emerged to indicate any concrete outcomes from these contacts. More recently, an alarming episode has emerged: a Moroccan, one El Faoual El Akil Abdelilah, who was arrested as a result of the investigation into the Madrid massacre of 11.3.04, had already been under arrest in Naples in December of 2003, along with four others linked to a Camorra organization operating in Naples, having been found to be in possession of 24 kg of cocaine. An investigation is now underway although it will be necessary to await its completion to evaluate whether these events can be interpreted as signs of more stable links between organized crime and the world of Islamist terrorism.

- **Islamic terrorist organizations and Red Brigades or national terrorist groups.** The simple fact that the Red Brigades have given attention to the theme of Islamic revenge against the United States in their documents fits with the tradition of Italian organized terrorism. There is no trace of weapons being supplied by the red brigades to Islamic groups.

Some additional short news on the terrorist behaviours in Italy :

- it has also been proved in Italy that terrorists have made clever use of the Internet, which by its very nature is practically beyond any form of control, allowing complete anonymity to its users: the web is currently the principal means for propagating the ideology of Jihadist groups and it also provides access to all sorts of information, including the preparation of powerful and highly-destructive home-made devices;
- we don't know in Italy either the terrorism of second generation or the so called "*jihadist return*" phenomenon.

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Terrorist groups in Italian territory and the main investigations in Italy .

What follows is a brief list of the investigations of Islamic terrorism conducted in Italy in the last years (as well as recently), and an attempt to group them according to the specific terrorist organizations to which they refer. Despite this categorization, the difficulty involved in trying assign those under investigation to a particular group will become apparent, since their criminal relations have increasingly become more complex and intricate.

The "Armed Islamic Group" (GIA)

The GIA was formed in Algeria by veterans of the Afghan war and was the center of numerous and important investigations conducted in France , Belgium , and Great Britain . For a long time, and beginning at least since 1995, the Algerian component of the Islamic terrorist galaxy has been the most present in Italy , and has attracted most of the attention of the magistrates. The presence and the activities of Algerian terrorist groups in Italy are largely documented. Many people were sentenced as members of this terrorist organization in Milan, Naples and Bologna. Also in Turin, some Algerians were investigated in 1995 for possible contacts with other nationals involved in the attacks of the subway in Paris. However, in that case, they were only convicted for the possession of false identity documents.

The end of the 90's and beginning of 2000 witnessed the progressive dismantling of Islamic terrorist networks. This phenomenon was brought about by important investigations in many European countries, by the successful efforts of security organizations in North African countries, and in the Maghreb region, and by the irreversible fragmentation of the main terrorist organizations. All of these factors weakening of the central role of Algerian terrorist groups, with the exception of the G.S.P.C. group, which will be discussed below.

In the last years, the Algerians, who were for many years the epicentre of Islamic terrorist activities, and a point of reference even in Europe, have lost in Italy their central role

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

The development of radical fundamentalist groups in Algeria and in North Africa is characterized by the constant development of alliances and cooperative relations among the different groups and their emirs. The "GSPC", which mainly operates in the southern part of Algeria , is an example of this tendency. The "GSPC" developed as a separate group after splintering from the "GIA" because of disagreements within the latter. After separating from the "GIA", the "GSPC" succeeded in obtaining a reasonable level of control of the European networks in charge of providing logistic support. Many recent events and documents demonstrate the willingness on the part of some of the main members of the "GSPC" to support the international jihad's cause advocated by Al-Qaeda. It appears that the "Tunisian Islamic Front" also supports the "GSPC". This in turn explains the notable presence of a Tunisian component in the sphere of "GSPC" activities. It was in fact found that the Italian cell of the Tunisian Islamic Front of which the Tunisian and Afghan veteran Essid Sami Ben Khemais a member, was closely cooperating with the GSPC.

Many people were sentenced as members of this terrorist organization in Milan, (operation "*Al Muhajirun*"): their activities gravitated around the *Islamic Cultural Institute* of Milan. Investigations revealed a prominent role on the part of the Tunisian component. Tunisian militants had, in fact formed significant ties with Algerian militants in the Afghan training camps. Two additional investigations, related to the one discussed above were simultaneously conducted around Varese, near Milan (the individuals under investigations were involved in activities aimed at obtaining funds to support the Salafist group mentioned above. They obtained these funds mostly through fiscal fraud, namely, by creating false invoices from the businesses they owned, and through the fraudulent appropriation of leased vehicles, which they then sold abroad. Their places of business were also utilized for the storage and distribution of propaganda materials from extremist Islamic groups) and the region of Campania (in Naples and Caserta, investigators uncovered evidence of criminal collaboration between people suspected of terrorist activities and individuals, involved in the production of counterfeit documents. The latter did not belong to any kind of terrorist organizations).

The Moroccan Islamist Combatant Group

The Moroccan radical Islamic movement, which ended up becoming a terrorist group, came into being with the foundation of the Moroccan Islamic Youth Movement-MJIM (1972, Casablanca). The movement was based on the model of the Egyptian "Muslim Brothers".

The MJIM has traditionally been involved in recruiting young Moroccan immigrants to Europe. (With the exception of France and Great Britain , the Moroccan community generally constitutes the largest group of Maghrebi immigrants in Europe). However, there are other Moroccan terrorist groups that have been the object of investigations in Italy . Lately, particularly after the attacks of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca, the attention of magistrates from Morocco as well as from the rest of the world has been focused on Islamic extremists Salafiya Jihadiya, which is believed to have been responsible for that attack. It is absolutely certain that in the current phase of international investigations, there is a high level of focus on the massive flow into Europe of Moroccan citizens suspected of terrorist activities.

Many people were sentenced as members of this terrorist organization in Milan and Brescia.

Ansar al Islam

The profile of this Islamic movement as well as the first signs of its terrorist ties were obtained from statements given to the Norwegian authorities by the founder of the movement himself, Mullah Krekar, born in Sulaymania, Iraq. Mullah Krekar is currently in political exile in Norway, where he was questioned by Milan prosecutors, after "Ansar al Islam" became part of terrorist groups connected to Al-Qaeda on February 24, 2003. The group, originally founded by Kurdish militants with the political objective of fighting Saddam Hussein's secular regime, chose after to support the "Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders" according to Bin Laden's proclamations.

When authorities arrested Mullah Krekar (now he lives free in Norway) they also found various wireless phone numbers belonging to other members under investigation in Milan. Moreover, in March and November of 2003 various members of the organization were arrested in Lombardy and were sentenced by the Milan and Brescia Courts. They were accused of international terrorism, of stealing identity documents, and of facilitating illegal immigration into our country. They are still in prison. Investigations have uncovered the existence of a recruiting network, whose purpose was to send volunteers/mujahadeen to training camps in Kurmal, a district of Sulamaniya - a Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq under the control of Ansar Al Islam. The journey to Kurmal was expected to begin in Italy and proceed through Turkey and Syria. This particular cell, with branches in other Northern Italian cities, was also in charge of providing logistic support to the various threads by stealing counterfeit identity documents and by providing money to the brothers in battle. During the investigations, phone conversations with one of the members under investigation who was in a training camp of Kurmal in Kurdistan were intercepted. While in the camp, he was being provided with money to support his activities.

Hizb Ut Tahir al Islami

The organization **Hizb Ut Tahir al Islami** was recently subject to an investigation and is mainly composed of Moroccan and Tunisian militants. It appears to be structured in *Companies*, being constantly engaged in recruiting new adepts to send to "hot spots" such as Irak and Afghanistan for military training and to commit terrorist attacks. The *Companies* are spread not only throughout Italy but also in other Western European countries, in addition to Algeria, Syria and other areas of the Middle East. Members of these organizations have links, although indirect, with the previously mentioned Ansar Al Islam. As in all other investigations conducted in Italy, again a prime activity is the forging of identity cards and documents to facilitate clandestine immigration and emigration.

Other investigations in Italy

Numerous trials and investigations are also in progress in the districts of Milan, Genoa, Venice, Naples, Perugia, Bologna, Turin, Trento, Brescia and other more. The individuals under investigation are in scrutiny for their role in terrorist association, in the circulation of counterfeit documents and in illegal immigration.

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An update on the evaluation of the modalities of operation of Islamic terrorist groups and of the risk factors in Italy.

As I said before, the US bombings of Afghanistan forced Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to abandon the territories in which they had established themselves, giving way to a project of a strongly evocative nature – the development of a sort of "Islamic International" known as the "World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders".

In this context, Italy, by way of its positioning, is an important international crossroads where extremist Islamic networks can install their support structures.

According to various police units, many jihad members in Italy have begun to relocate from metropolitan areas into minor towns where it is often more difficult to conduct effective investigations. But in the aftermath of the tragedy in Madrid the level of risk is evidently higher for every European country, particularly for Italy, because of its support of the US intervention in Iraq, and the positive results of operations against networks of Islamic terrorism in Italy.

In the recent past, the strongest warnings to Italy have come from London. According to Muhammad al-Mas'ari, converted into a follower of Bin Laden's cause while already a physics professor in Saudi universities: "*Italy's participation in the war in Afghanistan has dragged it into a confrontation with Islam, which should have been preferably avoided. This has damaged Italy. In addition, arresting several people and depriving them of supportive resources – these are problems*^[10]". The Egyptian Yasir al-Sirri, alia Abù 'Ammar, founder of the Observatory of Islamic information, explained that our country functioned as a logistical base, a gateway for the mujahadeen active in the Balkans.

"*Italy was the favourite gateway for Bosnia. It had for Islam the same role that Pakistan had for Afghanistan. Followers of Islam had a sincere interest in the stability of Italy. It was a refuge (...) Italy served as a point of departure for thousands of Islamic believers who went to Afghanistan to defend the jihad. However, these individuals never created any problems in Italy because they never considered it a target*". According to Abù 'Ammar, the special relationship with Italy has now been lost because of Rome's policies: "*After September 11, Italy's attitude changed. It adopted the American stance, contradicting its own national security interests. In so doing, Italy violated the 'Aqd al-Aman', the security pact with the Islamic world. Moreover, he concludes: "... I observe that Italy is becoming a US ally, I consider Italy an enemy of Islam. Originally, Italy wasn't a target. It is her alignment with America that has changed the situation*^[11]".

Obviously, the audio message from October 18, 2003, whose source is believed to be Osama Bin Laden, takes on a very specific meaning for Italy. The message proclaims: "*The right to strike all countries that cooperate in military operations with the Americans*"; among them Italy. An earlier analogous message from November 12, 2002 also mentioned Italy.

In the sphere of the various proceedings, many phone communications among individuals under investigation were intercepted. Statements containing clear references and aspirations – more than actual projects – to attack Italy were recorded and examined as evidence by judges.

This is exactly the scenario that constituted the background of the terrorist attack of November 12 against the Command post of the Italian Carabinieri in Nassariyah, which killed 19 Italian citizens, two of them civilians. The same can be said of the other bomb attacks against Italian targets in the last years in Afghanistan ,

Mosques

An issue that for years has been the object of many heated and often misinformed discussions is the role that mosques can have in the spreading propaganda of Islamic extremism.

Mosques undoubtedly play a central role in Islam not only in the religious sphere, but in the political and ideological one as well, in full observation of the Islamic belief in the indissolubility of religion, state, and society.

At the same time, and in light of the information gathered through investigations and the arrests of many imams, it can be ascertained that mosques have often played a role in the diffusion of radical anti-western propaganda materials. In fact, mosques often run the risk of representing a crossroads for the contacts among numerous members of fundamentalist cells in Italy .

In these cases, the boundary between the freedom of worship and illegal activities can become easily blurred without even having to get to the level of readiness of support for terrorist activities or for constant activities of proselytism.

It is superfluous here, to underline the importance of using maximum caution in investigations involving members and leaders of mosques (however, I think that currently, in Italy, the most of imam are moving to moderate positions and it is too dangerous for terrorists to frequent mosques). Failure to exercise such caution could potentially result in a divisive strategy that would entail giving up control of part of our territory, thus creating an advantage for Islamic terrorism. In short a clash of civilizations and its underlying ideology are not necessary. At the same time, we cannot feign an integration which does not in fact exist and which is often rejected. Therefore, the path to pursue is one that creates an encounter with Muslims in Europe and that eliminates communication barriers in order to establish reciprocal respect, awareness of the respective cultural identities, and respect for our laws. Otherwise we will not be able to prevent some mosques and some Islamic cultural centres from cultivating hatred against Italy.

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The Italian legal system to fight the international terrorism.

It is important to remember that the Italian magistracy and police forces (as in Spain) were able to demonstrate an excellent level of professionalism in the darkest years of domestic terrorism during the 70's and good part of the 80's, when the red brigades and other right wing and left wing subversive groups killed about 200 people. Magistrates and police played a variety of roles. Metaphorically speaking, one can argue that just as the spread of a dangerous disease can help to generate antibodies and build immunity, the spread of aggressive terrorism can help in the development of effective responses. The latter has in fact been the case with all Italian institutions involved in the suppression of terrorism. Their ability to respond effectively has been strengthened as a result of the spread of aggressive terrorist movements in the country.

Certain regulations regarding penal law and procedures, punishment, and the organization of the magistracy and of the police forces, have been in place for some time in relation to **crimes related to the mafia and to terrorism**. Since September 11, 2001, international directives regarding terrorism were undertaken in Italy through the introduction of additional regulations:

- Decree with the force of law 28.9.2001 n. 353, converted into Law 27.11.2001 n. 415 which bears "*Sanctions for the violations of measures adopted in relation to the Taliban regime*";
- Decree with the force of law 12.10.2001 n. 369, converted into Law 14.12.2001 n. 431 which bears "*Urgent dispositions to counteract the financing of international terrorism*", which created the "Financial Security Committee", set up in the Ministry of Economics and Finance;
- **Decree with the force of law 18.10.2001 n. 374, converted into Law 15.12.2001 n. 438** bearing "*Urgent dispositions to counteract international terrorism*", which constitutes the **most relevant legal change** and has:
 - Introduced the crime of association with terrorist intent even at the international level (new formulation of article 270 bis of the Penal Code);
 - Brought terrorist investigations under the jurisdiction of the 26 Public Prosecutor's Offices of each district (in order to ensure a higher degree of expertise and specialization. The competence of the individual judges has not changed and remains anchored to the 166 administrative districts. Nor has an office been created to coordinate the 26 Public Prosecutor Offices involved in the fight against terrorism. This role is instead entrusted to the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (National Antimafia Office), responsible for counteracting the activities of mafia associations (hopefully, this role should also extend to the anti-terrorist sector, where doesn't still exist a National Counterterrorism Prosecution Office);
 - Made it possible to intercept telephone calls and other systems of communications, with the Judge's authorization, if there is sufficient evidence of criminal conduct or if such interception is deemed necessary (whereas under the normal regulations, such interceptions require serious evidence or the absolute necessity for such interceptions). The results of this activity, of course, can be used as legal evidence;

- Allowed for such interceptions to take place as preventive measures with the authorization of the Public Prosecutors (and without the requirement of the intervention of the Judge in Preliminary Investigations); the results of this activity cannot be used as legal evidence;
- Allowed members of the police force to conduct undercover activities;
- The extension of preventive measures, originally intended for anti-mafia activities, to the sector of international terrorism;
- The utilization of videoconferencing systems for questioning of prisoners and collaborators and their participation during trials.

The Italian administration already expected trial collaborators in cases of terrorism to give priority to issues of detention, sanctions, and security, and to add a special aggravating factor to for crimes committed with terrorist intent to allow for tougher penalties.

After London bomb attacks (July 2005): Decree with the force of law 27.7.2005 n. 144, converted into Law 31.7.2005 n. 155 bearing "Urgent dispositions to counteract international terrorism".

Along with certain aspects that are probably innovative and debatable, Law n. 144/2005 appears to be fully in line with the policy on criminality adopted after the events of 11 September (namely, the above mentioned laws). In essence, the new procedure appears to be coherent with the wish to renounce any instruments that are incompatible with the rule of law.

Law 27.7.2005 n. 144 has nevertheless introduced:

- a) the "residence permit for purposes of investigation", arising from the policy of rewards which Italian law has now applied for some time to those who cooperate in criminal investigations regarding the Mafia or terrorist organisations (as well as in various other types of criminality);
- b) a complex of new measures specifically aimed at preventing the risk of attacks against public safety, through the introduction of more stringent administrative rules for activities deemed to be theoretically dangerous (such as the new rules for the public management of telephony and Internet, for activities involving the use of explosives, for aviation, prevention of terrorism in airports, etc.);
- c) new rules for the expulsion of foreigners for reasons of prevention of terrorism;
- d) the possibility for the Directors of Information Services, under Government authority, to request authorization from the General Prosecution Office at the Court of Appeal to carry out preventive interception activities, with no value as evidence in judicial proceedings;
- e) the obligation for purchasers of SIM mobile telephony cards to identify themselves and the obligation to preserve data on telephone and telematic traffic, with new rules for the acquisition of these data for procedural purposes, under the authority of the Public Prosecutor and for a justified reason within 24 months of having been preserved;
- f) the newly designated crime of "possession and manufacture of forged identification documents", valid for expatriation, with the consequent broadening of the reasons for optional arrest for those caught in the act of committing a crime;
- g) the extension from 12 to 24 hours for arrest to obtain personal identification, in response to the objective and frequent difficulty of rapidly ascertaining a person's real identity (especially if they originate from outside the European Union) and the authenticity of their identification papers;
- h) new crimes in the Penal Code (enrolment for international terrorist activities - ex art. 270 *quater* c.p. – and providing training for terrorist activities, also international – ex art. 270 *quinquies* c.p. – that also foresees the penalization of the person undergoing training) and the improvement in the judicial definition of terrorist crimes (including – ex art. 270 *sexies* - "conduct leading to terrorist acts", through formulations based on the notion of international terrorism according to the terms adopted in art. 1 of the Framework Decision of the European Council of 13.6.2002).

Finally, **some technical and legal notes on Italian legal system:**

- the system of regulations that are specific counterterrorism, and which have been explained above, always requires Legal Authorities to authorize and monitor the various investigative activities;
- Criminal investigation in Italy is mandatory and the Public Prosecutor is an independent figure exactly as the Judge. The Government cannot then order Prosecutors to halt investigations or omit specific elements ;
- the Italian judicial police is organized in counterterrorism specialized unities; besides is headed by, and takes orders from, the Public Prosecutors office only. It is therefore not duty-bound to heed orders from the Government in relation to judicial investigations;
- there are different competences between judicial police and Intelligence services (they have specific skills to State safety, but are obliged to transfer to judicial police any news they receive on possible crimes);
- there are no functional bonds between Intelligence services and Judicial Authorities and prosecutors and judge cannot use as evidence, in the investigations or trials, the news of secret service source;
- the Italian legal system allows defendants to be tried and sentenced *in absentia*, with the assistance of a lawyer, if necessary appointed by the judge.
- The Italian procedural system doesn't contemplate special Courts having jurisdiction on terrorism cases. These cases fall within the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts pursuant to the common rules establishing the

competence of local Courts. It's an option adopted by the Italian legislator according to a long standing legislative tradition. According to this choice, the fight against transnational terrorist organizations has never been weakened, as well as it happened at the time of the internal terrorism.

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The reinforcement of international cooperation facilitates the abandonment of particularistic views and the exchange of information. The need to respect the fundamental rights of the people.

Everybody says that we need to reinforce international cooperation, but I think that there is no need to introduce new institutions. Rather, we must improve those institutions that already exist, enforce existing legislation and abandon particularistic views.

Numerous United Nations and European Union conventions, resolutions, declarations are already effective. There are black lists of terrorists and their organizations, as well as institutions such as Eurojust and Europol (and others outside Europe) which are important organizations for coordinating investigative efforts, and providing a framework where prosecutors and investigators can exchange data and elaborate common strategies.

Of course it's also possible that other international treaties be drafted and adopted: **there is, for instance, a need for the international community to step up the effort to find a common definition for terms such as "terrorist act" and "terrorist group"**. In fact, there is still heated debate on the difference between the terrorist activities and violent actions by freedom fighters.

And, with regards to the procedures, it is important to note the problems arising from the absence of a common shared standard regarding the use of evidence collected in accordance with local laws. It would probably be necessary to bring about conventions and agreements with the goal of guaranteeing that legitimate evidence acquired in accordance to local laws be admissible in other states (except for when the means used to acquire evidence are in breach of human rights or fundamental principles of each State).

However, given our experience, **it seems particularly necessary to ensure the effective functioning of already existing resources.** Naturally some administrative differences may create difficulties: in Great Britain, for example, there is no Public Prosecution, as in the other European countries.

However, the current difficulties are not caused by such differences.

We need to abandon particularistic views: **the exchange of information and the coordination of investigations need to be immediate and spontaneous.** After all, the spontaneous exchange of information is already contemplated by some international treaties, such as the Strasbourg convention of 8 November 1990 on money laundering, or the Brussels convention of 29 May 2000, on judicial assistance, signed by E.U. member States, and the Palermo convention on transnational organized crime.

In any case, the system of rules and parameters for carrying out counterterrorist activities, **suggests some reflections on the current historical context, and particularly on how to improve the fight against international terrorism.**

As I said before, **our most serious problem is the profound difference between European civil law countries and common law systems**

During a meeting organized by the New York University in Madrid in February 2006, the Attorney general of Spain said clearly: "*Terrorism is not a type of war. It is organized crime, even if it has specific features and different motivations.*" .

I agree entirely with this statement. Of course I'm also aware of the differences between terrorist activities in war zones and terrorist actions in countries that are not in a state of war.

At that point it must be clear that if terrorism is not a way of waging war, it can only be fought with lawful means, respecting both the rights and civil liberties of those involved in the investigations.

I believe that respecting the guarantees and the law must be our guiding light. And we cannot forgo this, even with regard to international cooperation.

However, at an international level, we too often find that the Anglo-American vision of how to combat terrorism is through war. Yet, at the same time, they also state that they cannot apply the international conventions that are used in a state of war, such as the Geneva Convention.

Now, this means that the trial in the courts of justice is considered an obstacle. I don't think one can accept the fact that the existence of an extremely dangerous enemy should call into question the legitimacy of the law.

Why should Western democracies apply different rules, for specific crimes, against specific foreign nationals, from the ones applicable to their own citizens? This situation is incompatible with the rule of law, but it smacks of racism.

And I'm saying this also with reference to other activities, such as the illegal detentions and renditions. These are the most shocking aspects of the situation, in which terrorism is fought without due process. I think that the attention reserved by Council of Europe and European Parliament to this problem is very important: both Institutions criticized many European Governments, included the Italian one, for their reticence on these points.

Besides, the kidnapped are handed over to other countries where torture exists. And then someone says:

"Renditions have been set up for people who are then sent to countries where torture does not take place."

But that's, at best, a diplomatic guarantee with no practical significance. The reality is different and carries many negative consequences: as well as the serious, well known, mistakes of the suspect identity, these procedures damage enormously the fight against terrorism.

Damaging, for instance, the on going investigations, because normally the police are already investigating the people who have been abducted, but the investigations are consequently stalled.

But this is also a serious blow to the process of integration with the Islamic community. Because if we expect the laws and the rules to be respected, the democratic states have to show and prove that the law and the rules do exist, they are valid and they apply to everyone and especially to those whose duty is to uphold the law.

At the same time, we cannot ignore what is taking place in the field of alien expulsion for reasons of terrorism prevention. Can we seriously maintain that these measures aim at fighting terrorism? Or isn't rather the opposite true, namely that terrorism serves the purpose of justifying indiscriminate policies of expulsion as a means of countering a planetary phenomenon which would require a completely different approach, based on principles of human solidarity and on the findings of in-depth social and economic analyses.

So, arbitrary administrative deportations, along with *renditions* and "*secret prisons*", must become the main targets of a strong cultural and legal commitment not merely to safeguard civil rights, but also to protect human dignity.

It was often said, for instance, by the former United Kingdom Prime Minister Blair, that the international rules have to change to fight effectively the terrorism threats. This argument stand if we are talking about rules that can help the police to investigate more efficiently. But if these statements imply that the rules can be cancelled or suspended, we must say "*no, they must be applied and they mustn't be changed!*".

We understand the general situation, but the tradition and the legal culture of European countries cannot accept any other way of acting.

The European states are bound to respecting human rights: the European convention on the human rights that was signed by our countries. And this convention also imposes active duties on the states to uphold these rights: if the ratifying states don't comply, they can be threatened with legal actions.

So, it's our duty to work so that the European countries fight for the globalizations of the rights

I'd like to recall very often one of the rulings of the Supreme Court of Israel. The President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Barak, stated that democracies, when they are fighting terrorism, do it with one hand tied behind their back. I think that this image is very clear. Democracy also means accepting costs and sacrifices. But if we adopt the procedure of violence, of illegality, if we don't guarantee the fair trial before a legal Court to the suspected, we would be really doing a disservice to combating terrorism and we would create further reasons for terrorists to justify their violent actions.

So, as a magistrate, but also as a citizen, I would like to conclude by affirming that the fight against terrorism can only be conducted with the full and absolute respect for human rights. A well-known Italian academic said: "It would be serious and unforgivable error on the part of western democracies to betray themselves by violating human rights and ignoring the fundamental rights of people, rights that have constituted the basis of Western civilization for at least five centuries. A betrayal of these values would constitute a real victory of the terrorists and of the only side that is fighting a war of religion". I agree entirely.

- *"Terrorists are certainly dangerous individuals, because their aim consists of destroying, by all means, our democratic system and western values. It is nevertheless shocking that we fight these terrorists ourselves by renouncing the fundamental institutions of our democratic system; our judicial system; the fundamental principle of Human Rights and the guarantee of a fair trial. By behaving in such a way, we indirectly legitimize the fight of these people, who today in the face of the violations, are convinced that the system is brutal, illegal and uses torture. Above all, these illegal actions could lead to a sympathetic movement for the culprits of terrorist actions."* **(Dick Marty, President of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe)**

[Volver](#)

[1] The term "*so-called Islamic terrorism*" is adopted here partly to comply with the joint request of authoritative representatives of the magistracies, police forces and academic worlds of various Islamic countries, who have pointed out in the course of various meetings, for scholarly purposes or those of international cooperation, that the "*so-called*" is needed to avoid any inaccurate, not to say offensive, generalization.

[2] "**Jihad**": a term which the West often erroneously associates with "holy war." Its literal meaning is "*battle*", "*effort*" achieved on "*God's path*." *Jihad* term can also used in the sense applied by the terrorist groups, namely the obligation, incumbent on the whole community, to fight by violent methods to affirm the Islamic religion.

[3] The declaration was also signed by Al-Zawahiri (in his capacity as emir of Egyptian *Islamic Jihad*), Abu Yasir Rifa'I Ahmad Taha (of the Egyptian *al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya*) and Fazlur Rahman (emir of the *Jihad Movement* in Bangladesh).

[4] Some of the contents of the manual follow below:

Priority missions

The main mission of the military organization is to overthrow godless immoral regimes and to replace them with an Islamic regime.

Other missions

- 1) To gather information about the enemy, the country, its institutions, and its neighbouring countries;
- 2) To kidnap enemies, obtain documents, secret information, weapons;
- 3) To assassinate enemies and foreign tourists;
- 4) To liberate captured brothers;
- 5) To spread messages that mobilize the people against the enemy;
- 6) To blow up and destroy places of amusement, perversion, and sin;
- 7) To blow up and destroy embassies, and attack key economic sites;
- 8) To blow up and destroy the communication channels of cities

Living with the enemy

False currency, forged documents and personal security:

- 1) Funds for an operation must be divided into two parts: The first part must be invested in projects that guarantee an economic gain. The second must be set aside for specific operations.
- 2) Do not carry out financial activities in one single place.
- 3) Do not tell other members of the organization where the funds are.
- 4) Have adequate protection when transporting important sums of money.
- 5) Leave the money with someone who is a member of the organization and spend it only when necessary.

Precautions to adopt

- 1) Keep passports in a safe place so that it cannot be found by police and to avoid being blackmailed to gain it back (I'll give your passport back if you give me information).
- 2) All documents must be false.
- 3) When travelling with an identity card or a passport it is important to know all personal information contained therein by heart: name, profession, residence.
- 4) The brother who is covering a specific job (commander or in charge of the various links) should always possess more than one identity card or passport and must know all information contained in both sets of documents.
- 5) Any id photos must be taken without a beard.
- 6) When more than one set of identification is utilized, only one set at a time should be carried.

Operations

The organization must utilize the cells or cluster system and must consist of many cells where members don't know each other: thus if a member of a cell is captured, the other cells won't feel any repercussions.

Faxes and communication without using cables

- 1) The duration of each communication must not exceed five minutes so as not to allow the enemy to locate the apparatus.
- 2) The apparatus must be set up in places with a high concentration of frequencies, such as near television stations, embassies, and consulates.

Security measures in public transportation

A brother travelling on a "special mission" must not get involved in religious discussions and issues (praising good and condemning evil) or in trivial issues (reserving seats...).

Security for the members of the organization

It is necessary that each cell dedicated to jihad and composed of many members be subdivided into three groups, each of which must adopt their own security measures. The three groups are:

- a) The non-secret members.
- b) The secret members.
- c) The commander.

(It is not difficult to find in this subdivision in different categories a consistent analogy with the classic internal split of the Red Brigades, between the irregulars - the members who had not severed their ties with social life, their family, and work - and the regulars, namely those who even if not fugitives, had severed all ties with their past)

- 1) The first group must adopt the following security measures: Each member must not meddle in issues that are not related to him. He must not gossip or talk about information that he has come to know or that he listens to. He must never bring with him names and addresses of the members that he knows.
- 2) Measures to be adopted by secret members for their protection: In addition to the measures indicated for the first group, secret members must never reveal their real names to the other members of the organization.

Their physical appearance must not show that they belong to the Islamic world (beard, toothpicks, books, long dresses, Koran). They must never use expressions or engage in behaviours that are typical of the brothers. They must not visit Islamic sites (such as mosques, libraries, Islamic fairs, etc.). They must never let anyone overhear them make utterances about good or evil in order to avoid attracting attention on themselves. They must talk on the phone using a special code so as not to attract any attention. They must not park or take pictures in places where it is forbidden. Important note: Brothers who are married must keep their work for Jihad a secret with their wives.

Planning

Before proceeding to an operation, the commander must instruct the soldiers on what they must say if they were to be captured. He must repeat these instructions more than once to ensure that everyone has understood what to do. The soldiers must repeat to the commander what they have understood from his instructions. The commander must also sit with each member of the group to review what must be said in the case of an interrogation.

The characteristics of the members who are responsible for special operations

- 1) Physical fitness.
- 2) Good training with weapons for homicide, assault, kidnapping and attacks.
- 3) Skill, decisiveness, and the ability to remain calm.
- 4) Intelligence, precision, and shrewdness.
- 5) Calm temperament (that allows the ability to confront psychological trauma, typical of operations that cause bloodshed and mass homicide).

General principles for beating and killing hostages

Scholars of the Koran have authorized maltreatment. Beating the resistant non-believer until he reveals information and secrets about his people is permitted. The homicide of a hostage who insists on not revealing information is also permitted.

Interrogations and investigations

The brothers who are in captivity might, under torture, confess something. Nonetheless, if they are freed, they must affirm that they were tortured and must deny everything they might have revealed and ask that the questioning be repeated. When the trial begins, the brother must complain with the court about the maltreatment that he suffered while in prison.

[5] The author poses the following question to the readers: *"How do we support the effort of the Jihad being the weakest and most divided?"* The answer: *"with faith in Allah and the Prophet, with patience and few resources you will succeed in supporting the Jihad"*

It must be remembered that the preparation of the Jihad begins with the formation of the group that believed in the Jihad and that invites the others to follow. There are two types of preparations in the Jihad: a spiritual one and a material one.

The material preparation begins with the formation of a group whose political beliefs are based in religion and who thus submit themselves to very specific rules to govern their cooperation and military formation. Spiritual preparation involves observation of the faith and the group's adherence to the Shaaria, in order to spiritually prepare a mujahideen.

The author also writes: *"The brothers in the training camps and those engaged in the battlefields, asked me to write this message, which is divided into the five chapters (described above in this paper), which address the fundamental guidelines for the brothers living together in the training camps and in the battlefields."*

The author also expresses the following thought: *"The true Muslim, in order to spread the word of God must be a believer with faith in the Jihad because during military training, brothers among other things, risk their own lives. Their duty is to purify the mind through training in order to spread the word of God and in order to not fear anything, not even death"*.

The second chapter discusses the *military training rules for Muslims*. It says that Allah commands Muslims to prepare for Jihad stating "Be ready to exercise all of your strength to the utmost, through spreading terror (all over the earth) among your enemies and the enemies of Allah, and among those that you do not know, but that Allah knows". It must be remembered that the Jihad is an individual duty for almost all Muslims because many Muslim countries are currently governed by miscreant foreigners or by unfaithful local governments. Military training, therefore, is the duty of every Muslim: *"The military training of Muslims is paramount for fighting against the humble existence that the brothers are forced to conduct as a result of the rules dictated by the governments. Training is the duty of all healthy and able adult Muslims"*. If there are no available weapons, training begins with psycho-attitudinal exercises, which in addition to sincere motivation are the basis of military training.

It is also the duty of all Muslims to provide support for the militants: *"...All Muslims who are exempt from military service for the Jihad are expected to provide financial support for God's cause. They must contribute financially to the cause, by providing money for the purchase of weapons, and to support the families of those who have been permanently disabled or who have died in the battlefield. In addition to providing financial support, they are also expected to spread propaganda in favour of Jihad, exalting the victory of the brothers in battle and keeping the community informed about the crimes committed by the enemy."*

[6] The third pillar of Islam and one of the most important religious duties, the tax or *zakat* is, in a sense, the

debt to God that the Moslem owes for what He has given: it is a way to purify (*za-ka-ha*) oneself and make legal whatever one possesses. *Zakat*, like the other religious duties, is mentioned in the Koran.

[7] Refer to the contents of the already cited 252 manual typed in Arab found on July 12, 2002 in the Apartment in Milan, entitled "Basic elements for the preparation of the Jihad for the cause of Allah"

[8] Among which the confiscation of weapons, found in the possession of an Egyptian group from Turin in 1998 .

[9] In the investigation in Milan "Bazar", intercepted phone conversations reveal references to weapons and explosives which have never been confiscated.

[10] *La Repubblica*, 7/13/2002, pp 8-9.

[11] Ibid.

Abstract

Preface to the analysis of the Italian situation. The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism in Italy : general considerations on its structure, origins, logistical support, cover-up activities, behavioral rules, financing, possible connections with organized crime and internal terrorism. How do Islamic terrorists live in Italy ? Statements by collaborators, manuals and other documents. Financing Islamic terrorism in Italy. Connections with common and/or organized criminality or with internal terrorist groups. Terrorist groups in Italian territory and the main investigations in Italy . An update on the evaluation of the modalities of operation of Islamic terrorist groups and of the risk factors in Italy . Mosques. The Italian legal system to fight the international terrorism. The reinforcement of international cooperation facilitates the abandonment of particularistic views and the exchange of information. The need to respect the fundamental rights of the people: one page 21

Key words

Islamic terrorism, Italy.

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AL-QAEDA'S GLOBAL NETWORK AND ITS INFLUENCE ON WESTERN BALKANS NATIONS

Darko Trifunovic

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

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Introduction

It is of vital importance not to examine only at the contemporary world for the roots of terrorism as a method of fighting by the Islamic extremists. Though it can be said that contributing causes of Islamic terrorism are social and economic circumstances and the ideological replacement of Communism by Islamic fanaticism, the main cause motivating Islamic fanatics for centuries has been the establishment of a global Islamic state - the *Ummah*.

Thus, Islam itself has been abused as an excuse for the fanatics' ambitions. There is also the issue of misinterpreting the Koran, mostly by those Muslims who publicly declare Islam a religion of peace while in private dedicate themselves to the pan-Islamic cause that simply excludes the existence of others. Among those who engage in religious manipulation without hindrance – indeed, with approval of the highest religious authorities – are terrorists of the Al-Qaeda and the associate terrorist network.

Bosnian Muslims' religious authorities and the international community ought to be very concerned that Al-Hussein Hilmi Arman Ahmad, a.k.a. Eslam Durmo, was at the head of 16 *madrassahs*^[1] during the Bosnian civil war, and six afterwards. He was identified as the ideological leader of the radical Islamic Wahabbi movement in Islamic terrorist circles. According to the official Egyptian sources, Eslam Durmo is actually Al-Hussein Hilmi Arman Ahmad, born 14 January 1960 in Cannae. Egyptian authorities suspect him of felonies such as document forgery and the 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor. Durmo is also indicated as an associate of Osama bin Laden. As a member of "El-mujahid" unit of the "Bosnian Army," which was connected to heinous war crimes and atrocities against civilians and POWs, Durmo published a religious instruction book, titled "Ideas that need to be corrected" (*Shvatanja koja treba ispraviti*). This pamphlet was printed by the Kuwaiti so-called humanitarian NGO "Islamic Thought Revival." What could this man, with a criminal past and terrorist ties, teach Bosnian Muslim youth about religion? Who allowed him to engage in religious instruction at all? The answers are not so elusive when one considers that many governments – Iran most of all – share Eslam Durmo's opinions and beliefs.

Former Iranian leader and president Ayatollah Khomeini publicly advocated Iranian leadership of a global Islamic revolution. In Qom, on 14 January 1980, reviewing a company of 120 Pakistani officers training for terrorism and sabotage operations, he said: "We are in a war against infidels. Take this message with you – I ask all Islamic nations, all Muslims, all Islamic armies and all presidents of Muslim nations to join the Holy War. There are many enemies that need to be killed or destroyed. *Jihad* must triumph."^[2] Was he religious leader, a terrorist, or both? Long before anyone else, Khomeini began to attack Western targets with suicide bombers. He trained extremists to practice suicide attacks in Lebanon. Thousands of young Muslims from around the world were trained for suicide attacks at the Besheshita camp near Karay, west of Tehran. In addition to men, some 300 women were trained at this camp, under the instruction of Zahra Rahneward. There were many other camps for military and theological instructions, all in the function of pan-Islamic revolution. Khomeini is also the originator of the idea of using airplanes for suicide attacks. In the early 1980s, Iran had ordered a number of PC-7 airplanes for just this purpose. Pilots were sent to North Korea for suicidal training, and sent upon their return to the newly established Shahid Chamran Airbase near Busheher. Members of these suicide squadrons were called the "Pasdaran pilots."

Other nations besides Iran have accepted the ideas of Islamic revolution.

Initially, the fledgling terrorist network of Islamic extremists operated on two tracks. The first, and legal, relied on Islamic organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the World Islamic League (RABITA) and "Islamic Committee for Palestine," who practiced influence through mutual solidarity, financial aid and a network of connections in Western Europe and the US.

Other organizations focused on achieving the fundamental ideas of the Ummah through extremist groups practicing violence and terror, with the help of terrorism-sponsoring governments and the aforementioned legal

fronts. Such groups were, for example, the "Muslim brotherhood" and "Gama'a al – Islamiyya" of Egypt , and the "Armed Islamic Group" (GIA) of Algeria . These and other terrorist groups of Islamic extremists assist Muslims anywhere in the world who fight for Islamic extremist causes, offering them ideological and military assistance.

Some of today's most notorious terrorists took part in the civil wars of the former Yugoslavia – especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-Metohia. This casts a new light on the nature of these conflicts and the true aims of Islamic extremists in the Western Balkans. More alarmingly, these extremists have found military and political support from the West. For example, Issa Abdullah (a.k.a. Abu Abdullah), a naturalized US citizen of Palestinian origin and a "Hamas" member, who came to B-H to train mujahidin with other US Special Forces instructors, proceeded to conduct terrorist activities unhindered, with the full knowledge of the Clinton Administration. Other members of Abdullah's group were assembled at a New Jersey mosque, and trained on a private property nearby. Officials who had a key role in bringing in the mujahidin from North America to Bosnia and the Balkans are: Safet Catovic^[3], Ivica Misic and Muhamed Sacirbey former Bosnian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Envoy to the UN (accused for large amount of money missing from Bosnian Mission and Consulate account at UN).

[Volver](#)

Links between 9/11 and the Al-Qaeda network in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Officials of the Muslim-Croat Federation in B-H never released any information to the US investigators or lawyers representing the families of 9/11 victims, because such information would provide fresh revealing evidence on the entire B-H conflict. They would have made it obvious that the war was a *jihad*, a religious war waged against Bosnia 's Christians by the Islamic extremists.

The Interpol office in Wiesbaden, Germany sent a request to the Bosnian authorities on 18 September 2001 to verify the identity of a certain Mr. Atta, who according to their information used to reside in the hamlet of Bakotić, 8 km outside Maglaj, in 1999. Attached to the request was the photo of Mohamed Atta, and a note to verify it through a certain Mehmed Hasanić, a resident of Bakotić. This means Mohamed Atta was trained in B-H; it is known that he left B-H for Hamburg, from where he proceeded to the United States and his ultimate mission – to destroy the Twin Towers.

SEVEN KEY AL-QAEDA MEMBERS WHO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TOOK PART IN 9/11 AND ARE LINKED TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

- **Nawaf al Hazmi**, a Saudi. He was a September 11th hijacker. He fought in BiH in 1995.
- **Khalid al-Mihdhar**, from Yemen. He also was a September 11th hijacker. He also fought in BiH with the foreign *mujahideen* battalion in Bosnia in 1995
- **Sheikh Omar abd-al Rahman** (convicted of the 1993 attack on the WTC) was connected with the so-called humanitarian organization TWRA, which was a cover for terrorists. Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic made personal guarantees for TWRA's general director and personal friend Elfatih Hassanein, so he could open an account with *Die Erste Osterreich Bank* in Vienna, Austria in 1993.
- **Mohammed Haydar Zammar**, who recruited Mohamed Atta into Al-Qaeda, had a terrorist base in Bosnia . Zammar is also responsible for recruiting two of Atta's lieutenants, Ramzi Binalshahib and Said Bahaji.
- **Osama bin Laden** received a Bosnian passport from the Embassy in Vienna, Austria . Many other Al-Qaeda members were issued B-H passports, which enabled them to continue their terrorist activities.
- **Abu al-Ma'ali** (Abdelkader Mokhtari), a senior Al-Qaeda operative, was stationed in Bosnia until recently. Just a few years ago, US officials used to call him "Osama Bin Laden, Jr."
- **Bensayah Belkacem** was arrested in Bosnia in October 2001. Numbers saved in his cell phone connected him with at least one top-rank associate of Bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda's role in radical Islamic activities and events in Bosnia has been frequently mentioned in US media and official government reports since the 9/11 tragedy.

REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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.....Al-Hazmi first traveled to Afghanistan in 1993 as a teenager and came into contact with a key al-Qa'ida facilitator in Saudi Arabia in 1994. In 1995, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar traveled to Bosnia to fight with other Muslims against the Serbs. Al-Hazmi probably came into contact with al-Qa'ida leader Abu Zubaydah when Zubaydah visited Saudi Arabia in 1996 to convince young Saudis to attend al-Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan . Sometime before 1998, al-Hazmi returned to Afghanistan and swore loyalty to Bin Laden. He fought against the Northern Alliance, possibly with his brother Salem, another of the hijackers, and returned to Saudi Arabia in early 1999, [page 138] where, [], he disclosed information about the East Africa embassy bombings. Al-Mihdhar's first trip to the Afghanistan training camps was in early 1996. (131)

.....

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Mohamed Atta lived at Marienstrasse 54 in Hamburg with Bin al-Shibh, Essabar, and Bahaji. Director Tenet testified that, after Bin al-Shibh failed to obtain a U.S. visa, "another cell member," Essabar, "tried [on two

occasions in December 2000] and failed to obtain a visa in January 2001" to travel to Florida while Atta and al-Shehhi were there. Uncorroborated sources report that Essabar was in Afghanistan in late September 2001. Bahaji left Germany on September 3, 2001 for Pakistan. Uncorroborated sources also placed him in Afghanistan in late September 2001.

DCI Tenet testified that Muhammad Heydar Zammār was an acquaintance of members of Atta's circle in Hamburg, where Zammār lived. Zammār, a German citizen born in Syria in 1961, was described by DCI Tenet as "a known al-Qa'ida associate," active in Islamic extremist circles since the 1980s, who trained and fought in Afghanistan in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1995 and returned to Afghanistan a number of times between 1995 and 2000.

It has been reported that U.S. and German officials believe that Zammār is a pivotal figure in understanding the genesis of the September 11 attacks. DCI Tenet told the Joint [page 141] Inquiry that Zammār "was taken into custody by the Moroccans []" when he traveled to Morocco to divorce his wife and that he was "moved from Morocco into Syrian custody, where he has remained." It has also been reported that Zammār has provided details about the September 11 attacks to U.S. investigators. According to the DCI, Zammār has said that he met Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah in the late 1990s in Hamburg's al-Qods mosque and he "persuaded them to travel to Afghanistan to join the jihad."

DCI Tenet testified that Atta may have traveled to Afghanistan for the first

The NSA Director also cautioned in his testimony, "If these hearings were about the war that had broken out in Korea or the crisis in the Taiwan Straits that had taken us by surprise or if we had been surprised by a conflict in South Asia or if we had lost an aircraft over Iraq or if American forces had suffered casualties in Bosnia or Kosovo, in any of these cases I would be here telling you that I had not put enough analysts or linguists against the problem. We needed more analysts and linguists across the agency, period."

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TOP SECRET

Link between Bosnian terror network and Madrid terrorist attack

An Islamist group — the "Soldiers of Allah" was established in Madrid in 1994. Its associated umbrella, the "Islamic Alliance" with overseas branches, played a coordination role by co-opting leaders of other groups. Operating out of the Abu Baker mosque in Madrid, they kept in contact with Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, Palestinian Hamas, Al Qaeda and other violent and political Islamist organizations. In rural Spain, the group organized and financed medical treatment and caring for those wounded in the fighting in **Bosnia**. For instance, **Khayata Kattan**, who fought in **Bosnia** and Kurdistan, **Mohomed Needi Acaid**, who fought in the **Balkans**, and **Mohamed Zaher**, alias Abu Hmeid, received sanctuary. Similarly, **Osama Darra** who fought in **Bosnia** opened a discount audio and video store in Spain. **Abdelkrim Hammad**, alias Aldelnassa, an Afghanistan-trained GIA member wanted for murder (arrested in Tudellilla in Spain in December 2002) had fought in Afghanistan, **Bosnia and Kosovo**. He had fled France for Spain in late 2001.

Abu Dahdah.

Dahdah recruited Abdairahman Alarnaot Abu Aljer, alias Abu Obed, from Syria, and dispatched him to Bosnia for training in Zenica, where an Arab battalion fought in support of the Bosnian Muslims Army. For the purpose of training new recruits, both Dahdah and Alarnaot worked with Mustafa Setmariyan Nasar, alias Abu Musab, an important Al Qaeda trainer and camp commander in Afghanistan. In Bassan Dalati Satut, alias Abu Abdo, the police found a diary containing the bank account number of Abu Musab. Amongst the others in the cell was Kamal Hadid Chaar alias Abu Nour, also Syrian, and like most others, he was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

Dahdah was trusted by the Al Qaeda core and penultimate leadership as well as the field commanders. Dahdah's work was appreciated by his masters, including Osama bin Laden. For instance, of 111 million pesetas (669,676 euros) provided by Al Qaeda for Islamist activity, Dahdah received 8 million pesetas (17,094 euros), Abu Ilias in Hamburg received 3 million pesetas (15,686 euros), Abu Salah in Yemen received 15,686 euros, Abu Khaled in Turkey received 107,457 euros, and Abu Zeinab in Belgium received 231,664 euros. Similarly, Dahdah's Madrid phone number appeared in an address book found in Atta's Hamburg apartment. On August 27, two weeks before the suicide hijackings, Dahdah engaged in a conversation with Shakur, a UK based Al Qaeda member, referring to a possible airline hijackings. Shakur said, "In our lessons, we have entered the field of aviation and we have cut the bird's throat" a statement interpreted by the intelligence analysts as attacking the Eagle, the US landmark.

[Volver](#)

Who financed Madrid terrorist attack?

Although only a few charities were infiltrated by the Islamist groups including by Al Qaeda, the Spanish police identified 10 charities that included organizations engaged in *bona fide* relief and rehabilitation activity. They were the International Islamic Relief Organization; Al Haramain Islamic Foundation; Ittehad-e-Islami, based in Afghanistan, the most subsidized charity by the Saudi government; Muslim Aid created in London by **Cat Stevens, alias Yusuf Islam, and was involved in Bosnia**; Afghan Support Committee that assisted Arabs expelled from Pakistan after a suicide attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad in 1995; **Al Kifah Refugee Center** led by Afghan veteran Kamer Eddine Kherbane. **Al Kifah Refugee supported all Osama bin Laden action and true Imam Omar Behmen, political party of Bosnian Muslim SDA**; Hizb-e-Islami led by Gubbudin Hekmatiyar in Afghanistan; Human Concern International, US based active in Pakistan in support of the Afghan mujahidin; **Global Relief Foundation** (Foundation Secours Mondial) led by Nabil Sayadi of Belgium; and Maktab-ul-khedamat (Afghan Support Committee), a known Al Qaeda front.

The widespread and well-connected nature of the Islamic terrorist network is illustrated by the fact that Saudi security agents killed Saudi Citizen **Saud al Otaibi** and Moroccan **Abdel Karim al Meyati**, whom they considered to be the top organizers of the terrorist attack in Madrid. The two were part of a 15-man Al-Qaeda cell that tried to infiltrate Saudi Arabia , because they were all wanted men elsewhere throughout the world.

Both al-Otaibi and al-Meyati fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, and afterwards frequented the triangle between Zenica, Sarajevo and Tuzla, under false identities.

One of the planning centers for terrorist attacks in Western Europe is the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan^[4]. According to operational intelligence, Milan was the point of contact for:

1. **Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani**, BH mujahedin, imam, Afghan veteran.
2. **Rabei Osman Ahmed**, Madrid terrorist
3. **Shaykh Abu Abdel Aziz**, BH mujahedin
4. **Wahiudeen al Masri**, one of the commanders of "El mujahid"
5. **Moataz al Billah**, one of the commanders of "El mujahid"
6. **Husaaumudeen al Masri**, mujahedin from Afghanistan and BH

All are members or linked to "Muslim brotherhood".

Most members of the aforementioned group, as well as others, who used the Milan cell, are linked to the Bosnian war. **Shaykh Anwar Shaban**, who ran the cell, was killed in 1995 in B-H, where he was a deputy commander of "El Mujahid" for religious matters. The main contact for this group with Bosnia-Herzegovina was **Awad Aiman**^[5] who ran the "Comunita Islamica Internazionale" branch of the Milan center in B-H, together with **Šefik Obodašić**. Better known as Ayman abu Abd'ul-Rahman, **Awad Aiman** was a high-ranking officer of the mujahedin in B-H. Currently he is presumed to reside somewhere in Western Europe. Also connected to this groups, is **Sheikh Salman al Al Awdah**, a Saudi professor. Closely cooperating with the group was the dangerous terrorist **Abu Ayyub al Masri**, whose whereabouts are currently unknown.

Bosnia is mentioned 300 times in the indictment issued by the Spanish investigators. Basically, the prosecutors claim that the indicted were part of a Spanish cell of the global Islamic terrorist network, which raised funds and recruited fighters for radical Islamic purposes in Bosnia , Afghanistan and Indonesia . One of the key "humanitarian organizations" listed in the indictment is the Global Relief Foundation. GRF had its offices in Europe and America (as Foundation Secours Mondial –FSM). The key person in the GRF is the secret Minister-counselor at the BH Mission to the UN, Safet Ibid Catovic.

The Case of Safet Catovic



This man held the rank of Minister-Counselor at the UN Mission until June 2001, until I cancelled his credentials, along with 8 others. There are questions as to who those eight were, when (if at all) they worked at the Mission, and under whose authority. However, there is no question that Safet Catovic, as a Muslim, could never be a Minister-Counselor, because the two posts were reserved for Serbs and Croats, under Foreign Ministry's staffing guidelines. Although his credentials were revoked, he never returned his UN identification; to the best of my

knowledge, he can enter the UN complex freely even today. Catovic continued to receive salary and insurance benefits until December 2001, with full knowledge and support of Ambassador Ivica Misic.

Why is this man important? In August 2001, Catovic organized a "Summer Jihad camp" in Pennsylvania, in the area where one of the 9/11 planes would crash (see attached evidence). Also, he was detained by the FBI on suspicion of involvement in "humanitarian organizations" propagating and supporting terrorism, namely the **Global Relief Foundation** and **Benevolence International**.

[Volver](#)

Al-Qaeda's modern organization based on the "Bosnia model"

The Western Balkans has been a region of interest to Islamic extremists for decades. Numerous Muslims living in the so-called "Green Traverse" represent both a recruitment pool and a springboard for attacks in Western Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Raska region (a.k.a. Sanjak) are frequently used as Jihad's gateway into the European heartland. The notion is not new, only more visible today than ever before.

One of the tactics the Islamic fanatics implemented in the Western Balkans is the so-called "Demographic warfare". When Muslims are a minority, they seek to increase their numbers through high birthrates – sometimes ten times of those of the non-Muslim populace. Once they attain a majority in a desired territory, they invoke the popular claim of Islamic fanatics: "Allah's law on Allah's land[6]". Thus in mid-1994, the top Bosnian Muslim cleric (Reis-ul-ulema) Mustafa Ceric issued a decree ordering Bosnian Muslim women to bear at least five children[7].

Studies of Islamic extremists' activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans in general, their international connections, and the consequences of their political, propaganda and terrorist activities (including war crimes) have provided valuable insights into the global Islamic terror network. According to the available information, the Al-Qaeda network seems to consist of several committees. Every committee is an important link in the chain, engaged at the local, national and international level. International activity includes the recruitment of individuals with substantial political power, which can be used to further Islamic fundamentalist objectives.

The Financial Committee has the task to provide the Network's funding. Fundraising methods differ from place to place, but rely mainly on accounts directly or indirectly available to Osama Bin Laden and the funds provided through the wide network of "humanitarian organizations" which use their charity as a cover for fundraising and recruitment of future terrorists. This committee is also in charge of money transfers[8]. One of its methods is the "hawala" system, where money and other commodities are transferred directly, without the involvement of banks. Such transactions are virtually impossible to trace. Basic funding derives primarily from the production and distribution of narcotics – specifically heroin, which is produced in Afghanistan, then distributed to Western European and US markets through a sophisticated network. One Kosovo Albanian was recently arrested (and it is more or less common that from time to time Albanians are arrested with large quantity of heroin[9]) at the Bajakovo border crossing between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, in possession of 48 kg of heroin. By and large, Kosovo Albanians are not Islamic fanatics, but as heroin smugglers, they are an important link in Al-Qaeda's chain. Profits from the heroin trade are also very difficult to trace.

Funds thus obtained are put to use in pursuit of Islamic fanatics' darkest aims. Al-Qaeda and other organizations act locally, but think globally. For example, the newly established Islamic terrorist organization, LIVO, whose striking fist is the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, is pursuing the plan for establishing Islamic states – and eventually, the Caliphate – in Central Asia, funded and aided by the Financial and the Military committees of Al-Qaeda.

The Law and Religion committee focuses on justifying terrorist activities. In conjunction with the Media committee, it promotes the view that everywhere in the world, Muslims are constantly victims, and even when they do commit atrocities, those are fully justified as self-defense and righteous Jihad. The ultimate aim is to foment conflict between all Muslims and the rest of the civilized world.

The Media Committee coordinates with the owners of pro-fundamentalist media and activists inside major media outlets to spread Islamic fundamentalist propaganda. The basic function of this Committee is to justify the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. The main weapon is to claim that Muslims are always and everywhere the exclusive victims of violence. Of course, truth is completely different, because the Islamic fundamentalists initiate violence for the purpose of establishing the pan-Islamic Ummah, a theocracy that excludes the existence of other religions. For example, in Kosovo-Metohia Islamic extremists among the Kosovo Albanians, with Al-Qaeda's help, have managed to create a perception that the Albanian majority was endangered by the Serb minority. Thanks to the work of the Media Committee, the secession and terrorism of Islamic fundamentalists among the Kosovo Albanians were presented as a "struggle for freedom." One of the main objectives of the Islamic fundamentalists' global network is to create a perception in the world public opinion that Muslims are always the victims, in order to justify conflict and conquest. Victim status is thus claimed for Kosovo Albanians, their co-religionists in Kashmir, Palestine, Russia (Chechnya), Sudan, Tanzania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Malaysia, East Timor, etc.

In addition to recruiting and training the Jihadi suicide bombers, the **Military Committee** also coordinates, plans, and commands terrorist activities throughout the world. It organizes logistical support for the attacks, sets the objectives and maintains communication with terrorist cells, all for the purpose of accomplishing the ultimate objective – a global Islamic state, Ummah, built by *jihad* and atrocities in the name of Allah. One of the first camps training the members of the global Islamic terror network was based in Iran, established by Imam Khomeini personally. The first commander of the camp was Sheik Abbas Golru, a prominent member of the Syrian-run Palestinian terrorist organization al-Saiqa[10].

The **NGO Committee** coordinates an entire network of NGOs connected by the shared ideals of Islamic fundamentalism and common funding. These organizations often have names that lack any Islamic identification. The goal of these organizations is to infiltrate the civil society of countries such as the US, UK, France and Italy, but also countries such as Tanzania and Nigeria. These NGOs have many purposes, but the main one is to raise

funds for Islamic fundamentalists and influence the public opinion of the host countries. Many of these NGOs are cover for Islamic countries' intelligence operations. Islamic countries used to have rudimentary intelligence operations, but that situation has changed. They have a defined goal – the creation of the Ummah. They have a defined enemy – all those who do not follow the Koran, non-Muslims, "infidels." They have a defined method of struggle – terrorism. This is truly a frightening danger to modern civilization, one the entire world should be concerned about.

The **Government Committee** recruits government officials of target nations, contributes financially and otherwise to the campaigns of recruited elected officials, and coordinates with intelligence services of terrorism-sponsoring nations[11]. This Committee pursues the goal of establishing the Ummah by working through government institutions both nationally and internationally. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is a typical example of how the Islamic fundamentalist network is protected internationally. The organization has over 60 members, and is currently the strongest international voting bloc in the United Nations

It is extremely important to note that every committee can function autonomously.

The model depicted above is a basic scheme of Al-Qaeda, which is defined as all organizations serving the cause of Islamic extremists. Al-Qaeda does not have a supreme command, but a supreme objective. Its instructions are what the Islamic extremists believe is contained in the Koran. All this makes Al-Qaeda unpredictable. Only observation and analysis of the committees' actions at all levels can explain the consequences of their activities. After several decades of activity worldwide, it is becoming increasingly clear who finances the terrorists, what sort of global propaganda they employ and with whose assistance, and how entire nations are being demonized at Al-Qaeda's behest. [Wartime Bosnian Muslim officials] Haris Silajdzic and Muhamed Sacirbey used to pay large sums of money to public relations firms, such as Ruder Finn LLC, to demonize Serbs. It is entirely clear today where this money came from.

The "White Al-Qaeda" in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Information available to experts on international terrorism indicate that B-H presently is one of the most dangerous countries in Europe, as it represents a nursery for potential Islamic terrorists – the so called "white" or "European" Al-Qaeda. Money from Islamic countries that is laundered through "humanitarian" organizations finances the religious education of at least 100,000 young Bosnian Muslims. In addition to such education, which follows the interpretations of Wahabby Islam, there is another type of "training" in various officially registered camps throughout the B-H Federation. There, the young and carefully selected Wahabby attend "additional courses" in marksmanship, explosives and martial arts. Organizations such as "Furqan," the "Active Islamic Youth," the "Muslim Youth Council" and others – differing only in name and primary donors, but otherwise interchangeable – teach young Muslims computer and Internet skills, so they could establish contacts with their coreligionists worldwide. Knowing all this, the former head of UN Mission in Bosnia Jacques Paul Klein openly said that some 200 mujahidin in Bosnia did not represent a danger, because they can be easily controlled.[12] Klein knew it would be a lot more difficult to stop the spread of young Bosnian Wahabbi throughout Europe, youths who consider Osama Bin Laden and the mujahidin as role models.

[Volver](#)

Al-Qaeda's Network: Iran to the Balkans, via Turkey

Investigation of the suicide attacks on British and Jewish targets in Istanbul has shown that some of the terrorists involved had been trained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, Iran has given a new identity to the spiritual leader of Afghan Taliban, Mullah Omar.[13] A few months ago, Iran released from prison several high-ranking Al-Qaeda members, and there are indications they were behind the terrorist attacks in Istanbul. The Iranian regime has long been known as a financier and sponsor of terrorists exported all over the world, especially in the Balkans. It is well known that Iran had sent a Republican Guard unit to B-H, and their secret service (VEVAK) has established and helped train the Bosnian Muslim secret service (AID). One of the key assets of the Iranian intelligence in B-H is Dzemal Merdan, who had undergone military and religious training and become loyal to the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini. His loyalty was rewarded by appointing him a liaison to foreign mujahidin. This man is responsible for hundreds of murders of ethnic Croats.[14] Early in the B-H civil war, several dozen Islamic extremists came to B-H with the help of Iran and Merdan's coordination. Together with the Cengic clan,[15] Merdan controlled Central Bosnia.

Iranian authorities and radical Turkish groups have worked on two fronts. The first was establishing a "green traverse" in the Balkans, and the second a similar corridor in central Asia, through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and – very importantly – the Chinese province of Xinyang. Cells of Al-Qaeda were established in all those countries and regions. Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden were involved in setting up the network in the Balkans, along with terrorists from Saudi Arabia. Even the Saudi government funded terrorism, notably through the High Saudi Committee for Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose representatives were granted the extraordinary privilege of diplomatic license plates (and the resulting immunity) for their vehicles, in clear violation of existing law. It is assumed that Bosnian authorities had also issued diplomatic passports to the same representatives, but such a contention is almost impossible to verify.

One notable link in that chain is Jusuf Halilagić, former Minister of Civil Affairs and Communications for B-H, and a former high-ranking officer of the 3rd Bosnian Army Corps, home of the notorious "El-Mujahid" unit. Halilagić was the one who drove Abu Hamza, one of the most wanted Islamic terrorists in the world, from Rijeka (Croatia) into Bosnia in 1992, in his private "Zastava 101" vehicle. Halilagic and other Islamic extremists in B-H had long prepared for the arrival of Islamic volunteers from the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, even Western countries, known as the "Afghans." After fighting in Bosnia, certain Arab intelligence agencies started calling these people "Bosnians," claiming they were far more dangerous than mere "Afghans." Muslim intelligence agencies in Bosnia, such as AID, usually refer to these men as the "AA factor," noting their African and Asian origin.

Since the beginning of their involvement in Bosnia , Abu Ma'ali (originally from Algeria) was one of the leaders of Islamic extremists, and the first commanders of the "El-Mujahid" unit. After the Dayton Peace Accords, it was demanded by Muslim authorities in Sarajevo that Abu Ma'ali should leave B-H, because of his connections to Al-Qaeda. According to the Croatian weekly "Globus," the celebratory farewell to Abu Ma'ali as he departed for Chechnya was attended by Bakir Izetbegovic, the son of former Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic. However, there are also indications that Ma'ali has simply assumed a new identity, with the help of high-ranking Bosnian Muslim officials, and continues to live in the B-H Federation. Abu Ma'ali is considered one of the closest associates of the notorious terrorist Abu Tala't [\[16\]](#).

The fact that Halilagic was a member of the Coordinating Task Force for combating terrorism in B-H speaks volumes about the involvement of the Bosnian Muslim leadership with Al-Qaeda. Halilagic was delegated to that post by the Party of Democratic Action, whose founder is the Islamic extremist and war criminal [\[17\]](#) Alija Izetbegovic. Immediately after his death in October 2003, ICTY prosecutor's spokesperson Florence Hartmann said that it had been a matter of days before an indictment was issued against Izetbegovic. It remains a mystery why the ICTY had not indicted Izetbegovic in his lifetime, as they had not lacked evidence. There is also a suspicion that this institution is under a strong influence of Islamic nations and interest groups. [\[18\]](#) Nonetheless, Izetbegovic directly participated in the cover-up and reorganization of Al-Qaeda in Bosnia . In the Dayton agreement there was a provision that all mujahidin would leave Bosnia . That never happened, thanks to the ties between the Islamic terrorist networks and the top leadership of the Bosnian Muslims.

Turkish authorities have established the link between the suspects in the Istanbul bombings and the global network of Islamic terrorists. A year before the attacks, the ICNA (Islamic Council of North America) website stated that the greatest enemies of Islam were "Jews, Crusaders" [i.e. Christians], and especially among those, "Russians and Serbs." Consider now the sequence of the attacks – first the synagogues (Jews), then the British consulate and bank ("Crusaders"), followed soon thereafter by a train in Russia . This has all the makings of a clash of civilizations, one that Islamic extremists are trying to impose on the world's Muslims.

[Volver](#)

The Al-Qaeda terrorist network in Bosnia-Herzegovina

It is little known that Islamic fanatics trained to fight against the Serbs in B-H in camps near Istanbul and Hamburg, Germany , particularly between 1993 and 1995. Notable Al-Qaeda members involved in this operation were: Ćupić Murić, Abu el Mani, Ahmed bin Muhamed, Harmas Sami, Abdulah Hadi, Imam Zilfili, Abu Hamza, Mustafa Kamel, Karim Atmani, Faruk Besić, and Abdul Hamid. Osama bin Laden's main Balkans liaison, closely connected to the Greek terrorist organization 17 November, is Omar Alawadi. According to some sources, Alawadi was in B-H, preparing for action with local extremists and fresh arrivals from Islamic countries. This is information that ought to alarm the Greek government, especially before Olympics.

The principle along which the terror network is established is very simple. Consider the example of Central Asia, where recently a terrorist organization "LIVO" was established with the help of Iranian and Turkish extremist groups. From Uzbekistan , young men were sent for training to Al-Qaeda camps in northern Afghanistan . After returning to their villages, in each one they formed a guerrilla unit. These groups were then sent to Afghanistan or Iraq to gain the necessary combat experience, so they would some day hopefully initiate an Islamic revolution at home.

The same exact pattern occurred in the Balkans. Young men from Kosovo went to Al-Qaeda camps in northern Albania , [\[19\]](#) which were visited by Bin Laden himself (according to reliable information). They returned to Kosovo and organized guerrilla bands in their villages. The same happened in Raska (Sanjak), where Muslim youths went to war in B-H, then returned home, and now present a threat to regional security. Given their international connections, that regional threat can easily become global.

The alarming fact is that a complete terrorist network exists in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro , ready to execute any order by the centers of Islamic extremism, whilst the disinterested Serbia-Montenegro authorities have behaved as if the problem did not exist.

An Islamic university was established recently. Some Serbian politicians who applauded that development obviously do not know what lies at the root of the Wahabby teachings: extremism, spreading of Islam by force. Will Serbia allow its children, Orthodox or Muslim, be taught the language of hate, no matter how attractively packaged?

Not so long ago, an association of citizens "Furqan" was registered in Sarajevo as a "non-governmental, non-political organization." Yet one of its goals, as the organization's charter says, is the "establishment of B-H as a state ordered under the Shari'a and true Islamic values." Headed by Nermin Karačić, "Furqan" has offices in Zenica, Zavidovići, Konjic, Visoko and Ilijaš, where the strictest religious (and political) indoctrination of the members takes place. Instructors are lecturers from Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Among the domestic instructors, one name stands out Nezim-effendi Halilović Muderis, imam of the "King Fahd" mosque and Islamic center in Sarajevo, and one of the Wahabby leaders in the B-H Federation. Halilović is considered responsible for war crimes his unit had committed against the Serb civilians in the municipality of Konjic [\[20\]](#). Interesting as well are the topics of the "lectures," or at least their titles: "The path of struggle for Islam"; "Obstacles on the road to Islamic revival"; "The Islamic state"; and "Allah's will be done, whatever the infidels do." The paths of "Islamic struggle" for Furqan's students often lead to a camp on Lake Jablanica. As the organization's document indicate, the camp attendees "as some of the best, should be proud they were chosen to attend the camp, and they need to justify that honor." Similar camps have been organized in the summer at Crni Vrh and Cerovac hill in Tešanj municipality, and on the Bosnia river island near the village of Nemila near Zenica. The same sources indicate that young Islamists have organized several "camping trips" near Sarajevo, Travnik, Konjic, Jablanica, Bugojno, Bihać, Cazin and Velika Kladuša. The "campers" occasionally become members of the "Active Islamic Youth (AIO), another NGO on the American blacklist.

The AIO was established in Zenica in October 1995 by the veterans of the notorious unit "El-Mujahid." The first president of the organization, which has offices in every Muslim-majority municipality in the B- Federation, was Nedim Haračić. Later that office was held by Ismet Fazlić, Adnan Pezo and Almin Fočo. Activists of AIO can be found among the returning refugees in the Serb Republic's border areas, especially in Kotorsko near Dobojo, where the AIO is headed by Tahir Halilović, Emir Lišinović, Muris Sivčević and Džemal Bečić. A strong AIO presence was also noted in the village of Kamenica in Teslić municipality (RS), where the organization is headed by Mithad Topovčić, Esad Stenaklić and Mehmed Cerovac. The current seat of this radical Islamic organization is in the Sarajevo quarter of Bistrik, which explains why the focus of the AIO's efforts has been on the Bosnian capital.

In 2000, AIO activists sent anonymous threat letters to representatives of the international community – demanding they leave B-H – and political opponents of the SDA. Because of the Russian Army's activities against the Chechen separatists and terrorists, AIO also threatened to attack the Russian Embassy in Sarajevo. AIO was one of the organizers of the mass Islamic protests in Sarajevo in May 2002. AIO was also behind the notorious protests against the New Year, and against the arrest of Imad al-Misri, who was extradited to Egypt along with El Sharif Hassan Mahmoud Sad in October 2001 by the FB-H authorities, on charges of terrorism.

After the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, AIO increased the pace of their activities, intent on creating anti-American sentiments among the Bosnian Muslims. The organization recruited volunteers and money for the Taliban in the regions of Tuzla and Zavidovići. But the peak of their activities was surely the protest against the extradition of six arrested Algerians to US authorities in January 2003, which was put together by the member of AIO's inner circle Jasmin Hardauš. Also notable were the posters attacking the then-Yugoslav president Vojislav Koštunica on the eve of the Sarajevo summit [Stability Pact Summit].

[Volver](#)

Humanitarian Terrorists

The "High Saudi Committee", "Al-Haramain" and other Islamic "charities" operating in B-H are the main source of funding for AIO and "Furqan." Most of these organizations are both donors and a cover for the international terrorists connected to Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden. One example is "Benevolence International Foundation" (BIF), an organization whose founder and director, Enam Arnaut, is on trial in the US for direct links Osama bin Laden. Proof of those links was found in 2003 in B-H, during a search of the "Bosnian Ideal Future" – the legal successor of the blacklisted BIF which even kept the same initials. BIF was led by former AID agent, diplomat and Alije Izetbegović's personal chauffeur, Munib Zahiragić. He is also on trial in Sarajevo, for espionage and illegal possession of AID documents.

BIF had offices in Sarajevo and Zenica till the end of 2001, when Arnaut managed to bail out worth \$1 million (of approximately \$5 million that was laundered by the organization), with the help of his representative Mohammed Anas Talawi. During the war, Arnaut used the money to organize mujahidin arrivals, their training in camps around Zenica and Tešanj, and their eventual transfer to other countries. It is believed that this channel was used for the escape of Abu Mali, a close associate of Bin Laden. Arnaut also helped an Al-Qaeda terrorist Mahmud Salim Mamdouh, a.k.a. Abu Hajr, to escape to Germany. Western sources indicate Mamdouh was in charge of procuring uranium for nuclear weapons. Abu Hajr was arrested in Germany in 1998, and extradited to the US. Arnaut also collaborated with Muhammad Halifa, a cousin of Osama bin Laden, as well as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, leader of the terrorist group "Hizbi al islami," which took part in the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, organized by Sheikh Omar abd-al-Rahman.

Two members of the "Algerian Group" also worked at BIF: Budellah Hajj, a.k.a. Abu Omar, and Mustafa Ait Idir. They were extradited to the US in January 2003. Hajj had arrived to B-H from Pakistan, and also worked for the Egyptian charity "Human appeal." Another BIF "activist" was Hamami Muwafaq, a Syrian convicted in his homeland of membership in the terrorist group "Muslim Brotherhood."

The "High Saudi Committee" (HSC) may be difficult to shut down, despite the explicit demands from the US. That organization is under direct patronage of the Saudi royal family, and its activists use the previously mentioned diplomatic privileges, including the 24 vehicles with diplomatic license plates. Furthermore, this is the organization that has channeled the most money into B-H, as the Saudis did not spare the expense of establishing a Shari'a state on European soil. In Saudi Arabia, the Committee is officially run by Naser el Saed. His student, Elfatih Hassanein, was a personal friend of Izetbegović and founder of the banned Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) in Vienna. The Bosnian Muslim leadership used the TWRA to "import" most of the mujahidin into Bosnia and fund their travel and stay. One of the directors of the HSC Zenica office was Abdul Hadiyu al-Gahtani, who was arrested in 1994 for the abduction of three and murder of one British citizen, employees of the ODA. Mujahidin, however, organized Gahtani's jailbreak and escape from Bosnia. He was later convicted, in absentia, to 10 years of imprisonment.

Ahmed Zuhayr, a.k.a. Handala, is another terrorist who worked for the HSC and managed to "escape" from the Bosnian Muslim authorities. Thus the Sudanese, who was mentioned previously, is considered responsible for the murder of UN mission worker William Jefferson in Tuzla.

The HSC employed two members of the "Algerian Group," Saber Lahmar and Mustafa Abdul Kadr. Lahmar was sentenced to five years for assault on Western aid workers near Zenica, but was pardoned in 1998 by a special decree signed by the Federation president Ejup Ganić. It is believed that Lahmar and Kadr, who later worked at the "King Fahd" Islamic center in Sarajevo and the "Taibah International" foundation, were part of the terrorist GIA's European network. In late 2001, a joint operation of SFOR and local authorities resulted in the arrest of Majed Karoub, another employee of the HSC, believed to have worked closely with Lahmar and Kadr.

The "Global Relief Foundation" (GRF), accused in the US of financing terrorist activities, was also active in B-H. The GRF in B-H had relatively modest funds, which did not stop the organization to spend \$100,000 for the camp

at Lake Jablanica.

Among the organizations of interest in the struggle against terrorism are also the Saudi charity "Igassa," which smuggled weapons and ammunition into B-H during the war, as well as "Al-Muwfaq," whose member Safiq Iyadi (of Tunisia) had made a \$.5 million transfer to an account at the SAB Bank in Sarajevo in 1996. Iyadi is on the American blacklist, and his accounts in the US and UK have been frozen. It is believed the money was approved by Salem bin Makhfouz, a relative of Osama bin Laden. Another suspicious organization is the "Charity of the Iranian People," which is under control of the VEVAK secret service, and had helped train Islamic terrorists and militants during the war and immediately after Dayton.

The aforementioned organizations are just the tip of the iceberg. The phony Islamic "charities" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the extremists and terrorists, have started to return into B-H after the victory of the SDA [21] in the October 2002 general election.

[Volver](#)

Other forms of terrorist organization in B-H

NGOs that have been clearly identified as conduits for terrorism have begun to reappear in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sometimes they change their names. Some of the most extremist NGOs are the already mentioned Saudi Relief Committee, then Global Islamic Relief, International Aid Organization, Egyptian National Aid, Saudi Islamic Committee and the Islamic Institute. All of these organizations are known to anti-terrorism experts.

An additional issue is with the orphans taken to Al-Qaeda's terrorist camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are videotapes, testimonies and documentary evidence for this. One example is the case of Ahmed Zuharir, a.k.a. Handala, whose main contacts in B-H are Omer Stambolic of the Federal police and Haris Silajdzic. This terrorist had the official ID card of the organization called "Charitable Community for Orphans".

Zuharir, a Sudanese citizen, is a member of the terrorist group "Gaama'a al Islamiyya," and a former member of the "El Mujahid" unit of the "Bosnian Army." He was convicted in absentia by the B-H Federation authorities for a car bombing in western Mostar in September 1997. Other participants in this terrorist attack were Ali Ahmadom al-Hamadom, a.k.a. Ubayda, of Bahrein; naturalized B-H citizen Saleh Negil Ali El-Hil, a.k.a. Abu Yemen; Abdullah ba'Aw, a.k.a. Husayfa; and Kal-al-Sheif, a.k.a. Suleyman. All are suspected associates of Osama bin Laden. Handala was never caught, because of the Bosnian Muslim authorities' connections to the global Islamic terror network. So, the Bosnian Muslim authorities – headed by the late Alija Izetbegovic – entrusted this notorious terrorist with the care of war orphans. Another issue altogether are mujahidin wives, trained for years in various terrorist camps.

Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina need assistance, because they cannot fight against these networks on their own. One should be careful to differentiate the extremists from the Muslim population in general; one of the extremists' goals is to foment conflict between all Muslims and modern civilization.

This is what the leaders of Al-Qaeda in Kosovo are doing. According to expert information, the top extremists in the area are: Ramush Haradinaj, Hashim Taqi, Ilaz Selimi, Ahmed Krasniqi (Haradinaj's enemy), Setmir Krasniqi (organized crime) Muxhar Basha, Snu Lumaj, Ismet Bexhet, Remi Mustafa, Nazmi Bekteshi, Xhimshit Osmani, Ramadan Dermaku, Luzim Aliju i Baylush Rustemi. All are connected to the Imam Omar Behmen. Their funding comes from various sources, but all have in common the Swiss enterprise called "Phoenix," owned by Qazim Osmonaj. Another man worth mentioning is Abdullah Duhayman, a Saudi citizen, the founder of the "Islamic Balkan Center" Zenica, Bosnia. Duhayman is one of the main contacts and financiers of Ekrem Avdiu of Kosovska Mitrovica, a veteran of the Bosnian war and the founder of UCK's mujahidin unit "Abu Bakr Sadeq."

The Turks for instance -who are regarded as secular Muslims- were capable of mounting suicidal terrorist attacks on Turkish soil, and one can only wonder what the Balkans Muslim extremists are capable of performing.

Europe and the world are wondering who the next target might be. New warnings keep coming of impending attacks in Europe and the US, although most terrorist attacks are currently limited to the "borderlands." Right now, the most endangered European nation is France, an unwilling host to a strong Islamic movement driven primarily by the Algerian GIA and its network of North African immigrants. France's commitment to freedom and tolerance has led it to extend tolerance onto some people who do not deserve it. Unless French authorities take preventive measures, the risk of attack is great. Even though France opposed the war on Iraq, many countries that supported the war have property and interests in French territory. Certainly, they have property and interests elsewhere – but what other European and particularly Mediterranean nation has such a widespread terrorist network?

Italy is in danger as well, as it also has a strong terrorist network, focused in Milan and nowadays elsewhere throughout Italy. This is confirmed by the recent arrest of four men who were recruiting Islamic militants for Al-Qaeda. Besides, some Italian politicians are supportive of terrorists as well. Emma Bonino, former EU Commissioner for Human Rights, used to be in the management of the NGO "No Peace Without Justice." This organization declared Bosnian Muslim militant, Islamist and war criminal Alija Izetbegovic as "peacemaker of the year" at one time, and has spread false information about the wars in the former Yugoslavia for years, supporting Islamic fanaticism. Unfortunately, Ms. Bonino is not alone in her delusions.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The international community is facing a major dilemma concerning the ways and means of combating Islamic extremists. One impediment is that Islamic terrorists use the very sensitive issue of religion to propagate their dark ideas. It is a fact that nations sponsoring terrorism, active terrorist cells and the widespread terrorist network – whose methods and activities are being described in this study – represent a serious threat to the whole of humankind. There is no cure for this kind of evil save for international cooperation, exchange of

information and preventive action.

Al Qaeda and the associate terrorist groups have openly declared that their goal is to conquer Europe by the year 2020. Is this just bluff or is it a representation of a real peril aimed towards the European and the Mediterranean security systems?

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[1] Islamic religious school;

[2] Yosef Bodansky, *Target America*, 1993. p 2-3.

[3] Secret advisor to the B-H mission to the UN, appointed by Muhamed Sacirbey and supported by Ivica Misis, until recently the deputy B-H Foreign Minister; together with Imam Siraj Vahaj, Catovic organized a Jihad summer camp in Pennsylvania, in August 2001, near the 9/11 Shanksville crash site. Catovic is alleged to have connections with Bin Laden's network inside the US .

[4] This center was instrumental in recruiting Islamic fundamentalist terrorists for organizations such as Al Gama'al Islamiyya, An-Hahda i GIA.

[5] Awad Aiman, son of Abdulrahmana and Khola, was born in Mneen, Syria on 01.04.1964, and was until 2001, a citizen of B-H.

[6] See Darko Trifunovic, "*Islamist Fundamentalist Global Network –Modus operandi-Model Bosnia . Part I.*" Unlike in places where Islamic fanatics are a minority, wherever they are a majority they impose the Sharia, oppress non-Muslims and make their lives unbearable, causing their mass exodus.

[7] Velko Miloev: "*Salata ot gluharceta, Bosna mezdru dve vojni,*" Sofia, 1999, pp.79-80.

[8] See the testimony of Matthew Epstein and Evan Kolmann before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation: "*Progress since September 11, 2001: US achievements in efforts to finance counter-terrorism; funding of Al-Qaeda by Arabian Gulf countries through US-based banks, corporations, and charities*"; March 11, 2003

[9] The XX century belong to Italian Mafia, but certainly XXI century is Albanian.

[10] Ibid. p. 10, 11

[11] I.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina was indicated as one of the 40 countries with active Al-Qaeda cells. The top Bosnian Muslim leadership, mostly belonging to the SDA party but including others, is involved with the Al-Qaeda network and receives funding from it. See Gregory Copley, *Defense Foreign & Affairs*, September 17, 2003: "*Bosnian Officials Links With Terrorism, Including 9/11, Become Increasingly Apparent as Clinton, Clark Attempt to Justify Support of Bosnian Militants*";

[12] This number is far greater. Klein probably cited the information he had available as the head of UNMIBiH. Yet in accordance with the Dayton Accords, not even those 200 should have been allowed to stay in B-H. Long have people such as Klein covered up the truth, mostly about their own professional failures, thus endangering the lives of all Bosnian citizens.

[13] According to recent reports of GIS – Defense Foreign & Affairs, Mullah Omar's new name is Abu Yazid. Omar and his wives and children are currently in Iran , where they enjoy the current government's patronage.

[14] ["Bosnian Croats vow to probe war crimes by Moslems," Agence France Presse, 5/12/95]

[15] Halid Cengic and his two sons are known Islamic extremists with special connections to Iran . He was convicted in 1983 of fomenting ethnic and religious hatred and imprisoned for several years together with Izetbegovic and Huso Zivalj.

[16] Abu Tala't or Talat Fuad Qasem, Algerian, uses the alias Ibrahim Yakob Ezzat or Ibrahim Yakubizet, and belongs to the "Gama' a al Islamiyya" terrorist group. He is also an Afghan veteran. He belonged the the group that assassinated Egyptian president Sadat in 1981, and the group that attempted to kill President Mubarak in 1995. Tala't was tried in absentia in Egypt , and sentenced to death.

[17] See the report of Serb Republic's Government Secretariat for Relations with the ICTY and War Crimes Research, especially the testimonies of raped Serb women from the Tarcin camp, often visited by war criminal Alija Izetbegovic.

[18] It is a fact that Malaysia is a major donor of the ICTY. Considering that in addition to Iran , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan , Malaysia is one of the most aggressive Islamic fundamentalist nations, then the ICTY's indifference and selective approach in certain instances is not surprising.

[19] Known camps in Bajram Curri, Tropoja and Kukës.

[20] Information available to the Serb Republic's Government Secretariat for Relations with the ICTY and War Crimes Research;

[21] SDA – Party of Democratic Action, a Bosnian Muslim nationalist party with an Islamic extremist and fundamentalist orientation. Its memers have worked on destruction of the former Yugoslavia and infiltration of Islamic extremists into B-H.

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Abstract

Countries of the Western Balkans have long been a target of Islamic fanatics aiming to create a corridor for radical Islam to expand into South East Europe, Western Europe and the US . Cross-border cooperation of Islamic terrorists and extremists reveals much about the structure of their organization, their goals, and their methods. Both the terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11/2001 and the 2004 Madrid bombings involved Islamic extremists directly or indirectly linked to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Keywords

Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamic extremists, humanitarian organizations, global network, Islamic fanaticism.

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¿EL TERRORISMO GLOBAL ES AMORFO O POLIMORFO?

Fernando Reinares

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- **Introducción**
- **Al Qaeda en continuidad y transformación**
- **Las extensiones territoriales de Al Qaeda**
- **Grupos y organizaciones que son afines**
- **Células independientes y bases sociales**
- **Conclusiones**

Introducción

Mucho se está especulando sobre la naturaleza del actual terrorismo global, es decir, del terrorismo que de uno u otro modo está relacionado con Al Qaeda. Se trata de una polémica muy extendida en los círculos académicos y en las comunidades de inteligencia, con implicaciones para el enfoque que ha de darse a las políticas nacionales de seguridad y a la cooperación internacional en dicha materia. Una polémica en torno a cómo ha evolucionado ese fenómeno tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001 y al tipo de amenaza que supone en nuestros días tanto para los países cuyas poblaciones son mayoritariamente musulmanas como para otras sociedades, incluidas por supuesto las del mundo occidental.

Como consecuencia de la reacción estadounidense a lo ocurrido aquel día en Nueva York, Washington y un avión que acabó estrellándose en unos campos de Pensilvania, la estructura terrorista liderada por Osama bin Laden perdió el santuario del cual venía disfrutando en Afganistán desde mediados de los 90 y quedó seriamente menoscabada. No pocos de sus grupos afines, que de igual manera contaban con campos de entrenamiento y otras infraestructuras al amparo del régimen de los talibán, se vieron asimismo afectados. Y las organizaciones directa o indirectamente vinculadas con Al Qaeda que tenían sus bases fuera de ese país surasiático fueron desde entonces objeto de una decidida represión por parte de los gobiernos con autoridad sobre las diferentes jurisdicciones estatales donde se encontraban.

Estos acontecimientos son suficientemente conocidos y no parece que respecto a ellos exista demasiada controversia entre los observadores atentos del fenómeno terrorista. Sin embargo, no pocos de estos concluyeron, a partir de aquellos hechos, que Al Qaeda había dejado de existir, transformada en una ideología o en un movimiento. Concluyeron también que el terrorismo global se había convertido en un fenómeno amorfo, carente de estructuración formal, de estrategia y de liderazgo. Concluyeron, finalmente, que la verdadera amenaza terrorista procede ahora de células locales informales, constituidas de manera más bien espontánea y compuestas por individuos radicalizados a sí mismos bajo el influjo de unas serie de ideas diseminadas sobre todo a través de Internet.

A esta visión de las cosas ha contribuido mucho la obra de un influyente doctrinario del terrorismo yihadista. Un individuo de origen sirio pero nacionalizado español que responde al sobrenombre de Abu Musab al Suri, miembro fundador de la célula que Qaeda consiguió establecer en nuestro país una década antes del 11-M y luego incorporado al círculo inmediato de Osama bin Laden en Afganistán. Abu Musab al Suri fue detenido en Pakistán en 2005, no sin que antes publicase su *Llamada a la resistencia islámica mundial*. Ahora bien, afirmar que aquella estructura terrorista, es decir Al Qaeda, ha desaparecido, que el terrorismo global es ahora un fenómeno amorfo y que la amenaza emana hoy de células locales surgidas espontáneamente no parece que se corresponda con la realidad.

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Al Qaeda en continuidad y transformación

Para empezar, Al Qaeda sigue existiendo. Se ha transformado en los últimos años, mostrando gran resistencia y una sobresaliente capacidad de adaptación. Reubicada en las zonas tribales de Pakistán fronterizas con Afganistán, está regenerada como estructura terrorista y su situación organizativa es en la actualidad de una relativa robustez. Aun cuando no pocos de sus miembros más destacados han sido detenidos o abatidos a lo largo de los últimos siete años, el núcleo de liderazgo se ha reconstituido en sucesivas ocasiones, en especial por lo que se refiere a los presuntos 10 miembros del consejo consultivo o *Majlis Shura*. Contarían en su nueva base de operaciones con entre algunos centenares y unos pocos miles de activistas propios.

Pero Al Qaeda dispone además de tramas y células, así como de agentes y colaboradores, fuera de aquella zona. En Asia Central y el sudeste asiático, Oriente Medio y la región del Golfo, el este de África o el norte del Cáucaso, por ejemplo. La presencia de miembros destacados de aquella estructura terrorista en esas regiones obedece en parte a que muchos de ellos se dispersaron tras la pérdida del santuario afgano a finales de 2001 y en parte a que en ellas residen personas que en la segunda mitad de los 90 recibieron adiestramiento en los campos de que Al Qaeda disponía en ese dominio. Durante 2006 y 2007 individuos con esas características fueron detenidos o abatidos en países como Rusia, Turquía, Líbano, Jordania, Yemen y Kenia.

Eso sí, Al Qaeda ha venido subsanando su estado previo, como remanente de la estructura terrorista que existía antes del 11-S, con una extraordinaria campaña de propaganda, diseminada sobre todo a través de Internet. Lo cual no significa que Al Qaeda haya dejado de ser una organización para convertirse en una ideología, como tan a menudo se sostiene. Se trata de una estructura terrorista sustancialmente recuperada, que mientras tanto ha optimizado sus activos simbólicos y aprovechado las nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación, dedicando una atención especial a tareas de producción y reproducción ideológica, para sí misma, para otros actores inmersos en la urdimbre del terrorismo global y, por supuesto, para su población de referencia.

Aunque las capacidades operativas de Al Qaeda no sean las mismas que en el pasado, han vuelto a ser considerables. Sus dirigentes continúan empeñados en tareas de financiación y reclutamiento, la formación de adeptos en los nuevos campos de entrenamiento establecidos al norte de Waziristán y alrededores, así como en la expansión de su presencia, la consolidación de alianzas y la difusión de tramas afines. Pero siguen también empeñados en la planificación de atentados dentro y fuera de las zonas tribales de Pakistán y Afganistán. En estas demarcaciones suelen actuar en colaboración con los talibán y colectivos foráneos de adeptos, además de grupos terroristas autóctonos en el caso de atentados cometidos en otros lugares del territorio paquistaní.

Fuera de ese escenario, el control que Al Qaeda ejerce sobre el planeamiento y la ejecución de atentados es mucho más limitado, aunque continúe aspirando a perpetrar algunos espectaculares, sobre todo pero no exclusivamente contra blancos occidentales. Desde el 11-S se han registrado distintos episodios en los que su concurso fue más allá de la instigación. Como los de 2002 en Yerba y Mombasa, 2003 en Estambul y 2005 en Londres, por ejemplo, además de numerosas tentativas fallidas. Al Qaeda puede implicarse bien para que en la realización de un atentado intervengan individuos bajo su mando directo, bien para que lo hagan otros insertos en sus extensiones territoriales o en grupos y organizaciones afines, que a su vez pueden movilizar células locales.

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Las extensiones territoriales de Al Qaeda

Y es que Al Qaeda parece haber reaccionado a la fragmentación producida en su seno tras la pérdida del santuario afgano en el otoño de 2001 y los problemas de gestión que ese estado de cosas suponía, tanto mediante iniciativas de descentralización como de extensión de su influencia dentro y fuera del mundo islámico. Por una parte, tratando de establecer extensiones territoriales de sí misma, lo que ha conseguido en algunos casos; por otra, dedicando especial atención al fomento de relaciones con una serie de grupos y organizaciones afines en distintos países o regiones del mundo. Asimismo, estimulando, cuando ha sido posible, la aparición de nuevas entidades yihadistas de base predisuestas al alineamiento con Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda ha conseguido establecer algunas extensiones territoriales. En ocasiones, a partir de su propia estructura y articuladas por destacados miembros que estaban dispersos en áreas geopolíticas concretas pero se mantenían en contacto con el núcleo central de liderazgo. Es el caso de la denominada Al Qaeda en la Península Arábiga, que inició su campaña terrorista en 2003. En otros casos, mediante acuerdos con grupos asociados de ámbito nacional o regional. Estas alianzas ponen de manifiesto que Al Qaeda encontró serios impedimentos para desarrollar por sí misma sus ramificaciones en zonas donde actuaba ya una organización armada de orientación islamista. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, incrementaron su proyección geográfica.

Es de este segundo modo como se constituyó, en otoño de 2004, la organización de Al Qaeda para la Yihad en la Tierra de los Dos Ríos, es decir en Irak. Tal fue la denominación entonces adoptada por Unidad de Dios y Yihad, formación existente desde el año anterior y liderada por el jordano Abu Musab al Zarqawi, quien se convirtió en máximo dirigente de la extensión iraquí de Al Qaeda hasta su muerte en junio de 2006. Fue sustituido por Abu Ayub al Masri, conocido como Abu Hanzla al Muhayir, con la aprobación expresa de Osama bin Laden, lo que, unido al hecho mismo de que se trate de un egipcio, pondría de manifiesto la ascendencia que los líderes de Al Qaeda ejercen sobre su rama iraquí.

A inicios de 2007 apareció la organización de Al Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico, resultante de una fusión entre Al Qaeda y el Grupo Salafista Para la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC). Este, de origen argelino y formado a finales de los 90, se había internacionalizado progresivamente, fomentando la creación de células y redes afines en otros países de la región norteafricana e incluso del Sahel. Su conversión en extensión norteafricana de Al Qaeda estuvo precedida de una estrecha interacción con la rama iraquí de esta misma. En la actualidad estaría amalgamando bajo una única dirección, a su vez dependiente del núcleo central de liderazgo de Al Qaeda, a elementos yihadistas en los países de la región y en sus respectivas diásporas fuera de la misma.

Entre el directorio de Al Qaeda y los líderes de esas extensiones territoriales cabe presumir que el contacto sea regular y hasta directo, aunque no necesariamente inmediato. Parece además verosímil que se produzca, entre otras cuestiones, sobre las modalidades y los procedimientos en la ejecución de atentados o sobre la selección de blancos en la evolución de campañas terroristas. Lo cual no es incompatible con márgenes de autonomía operativa, que seguramente no son uniformes para aquellas ramas territoriales y varían según los casos, ni impide que puedan darse posiciones encontradas entre la visión estratégica global que se tiene desde el centro de Al Qaeda y determinadas decisiones tácticas adoptadas por los responsables de sus ramas territoriales.

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Grupos y organizaciones que son afines

Tras perder el santuario afgano y reubicarse hacia el oeste, Al Qaeda se ha adaptado a las cambiantes circunstancias, fomentando también relaciones con grupos y organizaciones afines. En realidad, desde febrero de 1998 había ya algunas entidades formalmente afiliadas con Al Qaeda en el denominado Frente Mundial para la Yihad contra Judíos y Cruzados, creado a instancias de aquella. Pero será con posterioridad cuando se incrementaron en número e importancia dentro de la urdimbre del terrorismo global, adquiriendo predominancia operativa entre los distintos componentes de la misma. Estos grupos y organizaciones afines difieren notablemente entre sí en sus dimensiones, grado de articulación, composición interna y alcance operativo.

La naturaleza de las relaciones que esos grupos y organizaciones mantienen con Al Qaeda varía igualmente de unos casos a otros. Es frecuente que sus dirigentes hayan hecho público, a través de Internet, un juramento de lealtad a Osama bin Laden. A menudo basta con que asuman expresamente la doctrina y los métodos de aquella estructura terrorista. Pero los ligámenes de asociación suelen asimismo manifestarse en la presencia de individuos que compatibilizan funciones de liderazgo o mantienen vínculos personales de índole intergrupal, la transferencia de recursos económicos en uno u otro sentido, la asistencia mutua en el adoctrinamiento o la formación de individuos, e incluso la colaboración para planificar y ejecutar atentados.

No menos de 30 grupos y organizaciones activos en distintos lugares del mundo mantienen actualmente algún tipo de asociación con Al Qaeda. Esas entidades actúan por lo común sin que el núcleo dirigente de esta estructura terrorista ejerza funciones de mando y control sobre sus operaciones, aunque las mismas tiendan a llevarse a cabo de acuerdo con una serie de orientaciones generales proporcionadas por Osama bin Laden y especialmente por Ayman al Zawahiri. La ascendencia de uno y otro sobre los líderes de aquellas entidades directas o indirectamente relacionadas con Al Qaeda es en principio menor de la que tienen sobre los de sus extensiones territoriales, aunque no siempre ocurre exactamente así.

En 2006 y 2007 se atribuyeron actos de terrorismo a una serie de grupos afines a Al Qaeda entre los que destacan los talibán. Pero a cuya listado hay que añadir a los neotalibán paquistaníes de Tehrik e Taliban Pakistán (Movimiento Talibán de Pakistán), Lashkar e Tayiba (Ejército de los Puros) en la India, Abu Sayaf (Portadores de la Espada) en Filipinas, Yemaa Islamiya (Asamblea Islámica) en el sudeste asiático, Jund as Sham (Ejército del Levante) en Siria, Asbat al Ansar (Liga de los Seguidores) y Fatah al Islam (Conquista del Islam) en Líbano, o la Unión de Tribunales Islámicos y Harakat Shabab al Muyahidín (Movimiento de la Juventud Combatiente) en Somalia, además de las formaciones integradas en el Estado Islámico de Irak, donde asimismo opera Ansar as Sunna (Defensores de la Tradición).

Durante aquellos dos años fueron detenidos o abatidos miembros de esas y otras entidades afines a Al Qaeda, como el Movimiento Islámico del Turkestán Oriental en China, Lashkar e Yangvi (Ejército de Yangvi) y Jaish e Muhammad (Soldados de Mahoma) en Pakistán, Harakat ul Mujahedeen (Movimiento de los Combatientes) allí y en la India, Harakat ul Jihad ul Islami (Movimiento de la Yihad Islámica) en Bangladesh, el Movimiento Islámico de Uzbekistán o su escisión, la Unión de la Yihad Islámica, y el Grupo Islámico Combatiente Libio, recientemente absorbido por al-Qaeda. Sin olvidar al Grupo Islámico Combatiente Marroquí o al Batallón de Mártires Chechenos para el Reconocimiento y el Sabotaje Riyadus Salikhin, entre otros más de cuantos se han dejado sentir en el último quinquenio.

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Células independientes y bases sociales

Además de establecer algunas extensiones territoriales o de fomentar vínculos con grupos y organizaciones afines, Al Qaeda ha inspirado la formación y el desarrollo, en numerosos países del mundo, pero quizá especialmente en los occidentales, de grupúsculos o células independientes. Es decir, carentes, al menos en un principio, de ligámenes con alguno de los otros componentes del actual terrorismo global anteriormente descritos. Sin embargo, estos grupúsculos o células que se autoconstituyen, influenciados por los fines y los medios propugnados desde el núcleo de Al Qaeda pueden llegar a establecerlos, lo que previsiblemente incrementaría sus capacidades operativas o la posibilidad de que se impliquen en la ejecución de atentados.

En cualquier caso, esas redes y células autoconstituidas —muy raramente se trata de individuos aislados— no deben confundirse, como a menudo ocurre, con las que, durmientes o en activo, están bajo el mando directo de Al Qaeda, situadas en la periferia de sus extensiones territoriales o integradas en grupos y organizaciones relacionadas con esa estructura terrorista. Como tampoco debe exagerarse su importancia a expensas de los otros componentes del terrorismo global. No debe olvidarse que la inmensa mayoría de los atentados relacionados con Al Qaeda que se han perpetrado en los últimos siete años son obra de esta misma estructura terrorista y, sobre todo, de sus extensiones territoriales y de grupos u organizaciones afines.

Y estos tres componentes de la actual urdimbre del terrorismo global incluyen actores colectivos caracterizados en general por un significativo grado de articulación organizativa, con sus correspondientes normas internas de conducta, códigos de disciplina, especialización funcional, jerarquía entre sus miembros y dirección reconocida. Algo que, aunque varíe notablemente de unos casos a otros, no casa bien con la idea del terrorismo global como un fenómeno desorganizado que sería la suma de grupúsculos independientes y células espontáneas que en su conjunto carecen de liderazgo. Estos actores locales e independientes son parte indudable de la urdimbre del terrorismo global, pero no debe tomarse esa parte por el todo. Ni siquiera como su componente más sobresaliente.

Tanto Al Qaeda y sus extensiones territoriales, como los grupos y organizaciones afines, o los grupúsculos y células locales independientes, forman un heterogéneo pero definido entramado internacional. Una urdimbre que evoluciona a consecuencia de factores endógenos o exógenos a la misma, cuyos componentes están interconectados de diferentes maneras y pueden variar con el tiempo en importancia relativa. Igualmente, las entidades concretas que se corresponden con cada uno de esos componentes pueden oscilar en número, al desaparecer unas e incorporarse otras o al unirse mediante procesos de fusión o absorción. Cada una puede además modificar sus características propias o la naturaleza de las relaciones que mantiene con el resto.

A esta urdimbre terrorista le es común la ideología del salafismo yihadista y la finalidad última de instaurar un nuevo califato según esa creencia. En ausencia de patrocinio estatal, que persista depende de que los componentes de la misma movilicen suficientes recursos entre su población de referencia. Al Qaeda y los demás actores del terrorismo global mantienen un apoyo más que significativo en sociedades mayoritariamente musulmanas e incluso entre comunidades musulmanas de la diáspora. Sin embargo, parece que esos apoyos decrecen desde 2002, debido quizá a que las víctimas del terrorismo relacionado con Al Qaeda son sobre todo musulmanas y a que la legitimidad de esta violencia es contestada por autoridades religiosas con influencia en el mundo islámico.

Conclusiones

Al Qaeda sigue existiendo. Ha compensado su aminoramiento con la diseminación de propaganda, pero no es una mera ideología. Ha compensado su fragmentación mediante el establecimiento de extensiones territoriales o el fomento de ligámenes con grupos y organizaciones afines, pero no se ha diluido en un movimiento. Hasta hace siete años era sinónimo de terrorismo global y ahora es parte de una diversificada urdimbre a la que proporciona liderazgo y estrategia. Ha compensado sus restricciones operativas instigando o facilitando las actividades de otros actores del terrorismo global, pero dispone de un nuevo santuario en las zonas tribales al oeste del territorio paquistaní y cuenta con renovadas capacidades.

Conviene, claro está, no desdeñar el desafío que plantean grupúsculos y células locales aparentemente independientes, especialmente en el ámbito de las sociedades occidentales. Ahora bien, sin tomar esta parte por el todo, olvidando que Al Qaeda no ha dejado de existir, que la urdimbre del terrorismo global tiene otros componentes y que la mayoría de los atentados relacionados directa o indirectamente con esa estructura terrorista son en la actualidad obra de sus extensiones territoriales —como Al Qaeda en Irak o Al Qaeda en el Magreb— o de grupos y organizaciones que se encuentran en relación con la misma — con los talibán en el primer lugar de un nutrido elenco—. Los riesgos y amenazas que el terrorismo global plantea para distintos países o regiones del planeta dependen precisamente del modo en que se combinan esos distintos componentes.

Incluso los atentados del 11 de marzo de 2004 en Madrid revelan lo complejo de esos riesgos y amenazas. Aunque han sido y son presentados como ejemplo de lo que puede llevar a cabo una célula local independiente, lo cierto es que entre los implicados hay individuos que estaban integrados en la célula establecida por Al Qaeda en España a inicios de los 90 y hay también miembros prominentes del Grupo Islámico Combatiente Marroquí (GICM), así como otras personas con importantes conexiones internacionales en la urdimbre del terrorismo global, tanto en Europa y el Norte de África como en el Sur de Asia. A ello debe sumarse un colectivo de inmigrantes magrebíes con antecedentes delincuenciales que, según todo indica, fueron radicalizados con el propósito de incorporarlos a las acciones terroristas que se estaban planeando, pero una vez más sería equivocado tomar esta parte por el todo cuando hablamos de quién está detrás del 11-M.

En suma, el actual terrorismo global no es un fenómeno amorfo sino polimorfo. No es el modelo de Abu Musab Al Suri el que parece imperar, sino más bien el diseñado por otro ideólogo del yihadismo violento, Abu Bakar Naji, en su obra *La gestión de la ferocidad*. Todo lo cual tiene implicaciones en materia de prevención y respuesta para las democracias occidentales, pues debe atenderse no sólo a los desafíos que suponen las células locales o grupúsculos autoconstituidos en el seno de nuestras sociedades sino igualmente a los planteados por otros integrantes de la urdimbre del terrorismo global, como la reconstituida Al Qaeda, sus extensiones territoriales o los grupos y organizaciones afines a dicha estructura terrorista.

Más aún, es particularmente verosímil que se entremezclen uno o más de esos últimos componentes exógenos con otros surgidos a partir de procesos autóctonos de radicalización y reclutamiento terrorista. Puesto que los mayores y mejor articulados actores del terrorismo global tienen sus bases de operaciones fuera del mundo occidental, es obligado insistir en la importancia de complementar los avances en inteligencia y seguridad interior con el mantenimiento de altos niveles de cooperación internacional, especialmente con países priorizados según la valoración que se haga tanto sobre los orígenes de los riesgos y las amenazas para una determinada sociedad como acerca de sus conexiones transnacionales. Riesgos y amenazas que, siete años después de los atentados del 11-S, no son menores para el mundo occidental, aunque sí más complejos. Como los atentados del 11-M pusieron de manifiesto.

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Resumen

La urdimbre del terrorismo global incluye, siete años después de los atentados del 11 de septiembre, tanto a una al-Qaeda reconstituida y a las extensiones territoriales que ha conseguido establecer, como al heterogéneo conjunto de grupos y organizaciones afines a la misma, al igual que a células locales independientes e informales constituidas de manera espontánea. Sería un error tomar esta última parte por el todo y afirmar que el terrorismo global es un fenómeno amorfo, cuando en realidad es polimorfo. Los riesgos y amenazas que el terrorismo global plantea para un determinado país o región del mundo dependen precisamente del modo en que se combinan sus distintos componentes. Para las sociedades occidentales, esos riesgos y amenazas no son ahora menores, aunque sí más complejos. Los atentados del 11 de marzo en Madrid constituyeron un ejemplo.

Palabras clave

Terrorismo global; Al Qaeda; extensiones territoriales de Al Qaeda; grupos y organizaciones yihadistas; individuos y células independientes; riesgos y amenazas terroristas.

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Estados de la cuestión

HEZBOLLAH: BETWEEN THE I.D.F.'S WITHDRAWAL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEBANESE UNITY GOVERNMENT --ANOTHER STEP ON THE WAY TO AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN LEBANON

Eitan Azani

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

- **Hezbollah and the Lebanese System: Common Influences from the I.D.F.'s Withdrawal in 2000**
- **The struggle within Lebanon to continue the Resistance – Shaba Farms as a case study.**
- **The Internal Lebanese Debate on the disarmament of Hezbollah.**
- **Hezbollah and the Lebanese Political System from 2000-2008.**
- **Conclusions.**

Hezbollah and the Lebanese System: Common Influences from the I.D.F.'s Withdrawal in 2000

Without any final agreement, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 created a new reality. Initially, the primary issue facing the movement was the preservation and development of its armed capabilities – the Resistance and blocking any attempt to disarm it. After withdrawal however, this argument – used by Hezbollah to justify its prior activities and in training the Resistance – became passé. Nasrallah not only needed to develop new grounds to justify an armed Resistance, but also had to find a way to sell those grounds within the ethnic group and the Lebanese system.

On the eve of withdrawal, Nasrallah made it clear that his movement would act to thwart any normal commercial ties with Israel and would assist the Palestinians in their struggle to liberate Jerusalem. [1] At the same time however, senior officials in the Lebanese Shi'ite sector, including Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shams Al-Din and Nabia Berri, called for Hezbollah to disarm, just like other groups. [2]

After withdrawal, the tensions already plaguing the movement during the early 1990s only worsened. Nasrallah's interest in the ultimate destruction of Israel was an unlikely prospect, while, on the other hand, the possibility of utilizing the victory to advance the goal of transforming Lebanon into an Islamic Republic was perceived as attainable. These competing interests and tension, in addition to the realization that his support base for activities against Israel had weakened, led Nasrallah to rely on his characteristic brinkmanship strategy, pushing an already dangerous situation even further in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome. He created new arguments to justify the existence of the Resistance, downsized direct attacks against Israel, expanded indirect activities via the Palestinian terror organizations, and defined new rules against Israel. This position garnered the support of Syrian President Bashar Assad, who agreed that the Resistance should keep its arms as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unresolved. [3]

The struggle within Lebanon to continue the Resistance – Shaba Farms as a case study

The unilateral withdrawal without an agreement allowed Hezbollah to claim that demands for the organization to disarm were irrelevant, since the Resistance's role had not yet ended so long as Israel still controlled Lebanese land. Several days before the withdrawal, Hezbollah attacked the Shaba Farms and announced its intention to continue its Resistance in the region. [4]

From this point onwards, Hezbollah, headed by Nasrallah, diligently worked to instill within the Lebanese public a perceived need to liberate the Shaba Farms region. [5] Israel's rejection of the Lebanese claim served as pretext for Hezbollah to continue its Resistance activities in the region after the withdrawal. The Syrians aided this effort and used the strategy of "holding the stick from both ends." They declared that the farms were Lebanese but refrained from defining them as under Lebanese sovereignty. In fact, in the period between withdrawal and the Second Lebanon War (July 2006), Hezbollah activists carried out dozens of attacks against Israel Defense forces in the Shaba Farms sector.

Securing the pretext of Shaba Farms was important to Nasrallah. He highlighted the need to liberate the area and categorically refused any compromise proposals allowing temporary control over the Farms by international forces. The Farms issue provided Nasrallah justification for the organization to remain armed, as it continued to protect Lebanon from Israeli aggression. [6]

The Farms position was discussed at the National Lebanese Dialogue Forum in 2006. All participants of the forum agreed that the Farms belonged to Lebanon and that the government should demand that the U.N. confirm its sovereignty over the Farms. [7]

Lebanese pressure proved effective and a U.N. team was sent after the Second Lebanon War to investigate the Farms issue once again. Unlike its first investigation, which led to the I.D.F.'s withdrawal from Lebanon, U.N. team members validated Lebanese claims and recommended reopening the debate on the matter. Israel rejected

the proposal and demanded that the Farms issue be discussed only within the framework of a final agreement. Lebanese and Syrian proposals to transfer the area to the custody of the U.N. were also rejected. [8]

At the Ashura Parade in Beirut in January 2007, Nasrallah called for the establishment of a united national front for the liberation of the Shaba farms. He demanded that the government apply its sovereignty over all Lebanese territory including the Farms. [9] A month after, Walid Jumblatt referred to this matter, arguing that the Farms were in Syrian territory but that a written Syrian agreement to transfer the Farms to Lebanon would help facilitate a speedy and simple solution to the problem. As far as Hezbollah was concerned, he stressed that the movement had found a pretext in this issue, and that even if it were resolved, Hezbollah would find another excuse to continue the Resistance. [10]

In reviewing Hezbollah's statements in the years after withdrawal, it is clear that the Shaba Farms issue is only one of many pretexts used by the movement to justify their choice not to disarm. Hezbollah has made it quite clear that even if the Shaba Farms issue were resolved, additional areas of dispute between Israel and Lebanon would necessitate continued measures, including seven villages in Israel's territory near Kibbutz Manara, the penetration of Israeli aircraft into Lebanese airspace, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.

Hezbollah has succeeded in placing the Shaba Farms issue at the center of internal and external debate regarding the Lebanese system. This matter, inter alia, was on the agenda at Doha in May 2008. [11] It was also referred to by senior Syrian officials (August 2008) [12] and by the incoming Lebanese President, who stated that he would not hesitate to use any means available, including violence, in order to liberate the Farms (July 2008). [13] Nasrallah has also succeeded in influencing the Lebanese unity government's guidelines, which determine the movement's right, alongside the Lebanese army, to completely liberate Lebanese lands, including Shaba Farms. Its inclusion in the government's guidelines virtually neutralizes any internal Lebanese attempt to demand that the movement disarm, further weakening indirect pressure on the movement via the Lebanese government. [14]

Volver

The Internal Lebanese Debate on the disarmament of Hezbollah

The withdrawal of the IDF in May 2000 opened a new era in Lebanon and new areas of influence among the regional players. The area under I.D.F. control was evacuated and the S.L.A., headed by General Lahad, was dismantled. None of the necessary steps were required of Syria and Lebanon because of the unilateral withdrawal without an agreement. Israel expected, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 and the Taif Accord, that the Lebanese government would enforce its sovereignty over south Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah. However, the Lebanese government did not dispatch its army to the south, allowing Hezbollah to move into the newly created vacuum.

Taking control of the south was relatively easy; most of the inhabitants of the area are Shi'ites and others were afraid of the movement's strength. Hezbollah benefited directly from the Israeli withdrawal in elections for Lebanese Parliament held that year. Their strength increased from ten representatives to twelve representatives in the incoming Parliament. [15]

In June 2000, Nasrallah referred to the movement's activities before the elections. He stressed that Hezbollah was an Islamic movement that functioned as a national Lebanese political party, and he called for national unity, support of the Resistance and all possible efforts to free Lebanese prisoners incarcerated in Israel. In regards to the Resistance's arms, Nasrallah anticipated that Israel and the U.S. would make an effort to disarm the movement, and he stated that he was preparing for such a possibility. He reiterated that he would not use the Resistance's arms within the Lebanese arena but rather for the defense of the country. The debate over disarmament, he declared, would occur only when it became clear that the country no longer required the Resistance's weapons. [16]

The debate over disarmament deteriorated toward the end of 2004, following a Security Council decision that called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and the disarming of the militias. Clashing opinions within the opposition, along with the Lebanese government's obligation to the Resistance, combined to transform the debate into a non-issue. Those who supported disarming the movement, claimed that the government was obligated to fulfill its duty and exercise its sovereignty, basing Lebanon's defensive strategy on its army and not on the Resistance. Lebanese columnists, who joined in the call to disarm the movement, argued that Hezbollah was adopting a Syrian-Iranian policy that would hurt Lebanon.

On the other hand, the Lebanese government and senior Lebanese officials rejected the demand to disarm the movement. The government adopted Hezbollah's stance, declaring the movement to be a "Resistance party" and partner in defending Lebanon. The government said that the debate should be held in cooperation with Hezbollah, without pressure or international interference. Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt shared this perspective. Hezbollah rejected the United Nations resolution, deeming it foreign interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and claiming it would resist any attempts to disarm. [17]

Yet such attempts continued both before and after the Lebanon war. Still, Hezbollah was able to take full advantage of the political situation in order to maintain that the Resistance still had a role to play. A number of factors supported this position: namely, Syrian and Iranian support to continue the Resistance, as well as the weak Lebanese political system, which avoided dealing resolutely with the implementation of the U.N. decision even after Syrian withdrawal (2005). As a result, the movement was not disarmed. [18] In fact, it doubled and tripled its military capabilities compared to the 1990s, and, with Iranian and Syrian aid, built thousands of Katyusha rockets, missiles and advanced anti-tank missiles in Lebanon, all utilized during the Second Lebanon War. While Hezbollah's military capabilities were significantly damaged during the Second Lebanon War, they have since been renewed and reinforced. The Lebanese government has not made any real effort to thwart Hezbollah's procurement of weapons. [19] In addition, in May 2008 – upon being elected – the Lebanese President called for calm dialogue with Hezbollah and the integration of the movement into the Lebanese army as

part of a national unity program.[\[20\]](#)

Such statements expose the true essence of the Lebanese establishment's approach to Hezbollah. For various reasons, the government does not truly intend to disarm the movement, instead opting to spin the issue from one debate to another as part of a never-ending internal dialogue mixed in with bursts of violence, disagreement, and escalation.

[Volver](#)

Hezbollah and the Lebanese Political System from 2000-2008.

Hezbollah's independent activities in Lebanon and the region often embarrassed the Lebanese government, influencing their relationship throughout the eight-year period. Despite the apparent support provided by the government on an external level, relations between the government and Hezbollah were often tense and characterized by ups and downs. Hezbollah's involvement in issues outside of Lebanon undermined the government's assertion over the Resistance's Lebanese identity and exposed the government to criticism and internal and external pressure.[\[21\]](#) Amidst the background of Hezbollah's independent activities, there was an increase in public demands for the government to assume responsibility and rein in the movement by sending the army south.[\[22\]](#)

The support that the movement enjoyed from the Lebanese Prime Minister al-Hus, a palpable pro-Syrian, between 1998 and 2000, was lost with the victory of Rafik Hariri, an old Hezbollah adversary who returned to serve as the Lebanese Prime Minister in September 2000.[\[23\]](#) Hariri's political agenda, which called for peace between the Arab nations and Israel, was in direct opposition to Hezbollah's goals. In his opinion, the movement's operations after the I.D.F.'s withdrawal from Lebanon damaged efforts to rehabilitate Lebanon's international image and its economy.[\[24\]](#) Yet despite Hariri's political agenda, he avoided taking action against Hezbollah due to the movement's military strength, Syria's objections, and Hezbollah's popularity among Shi'ites and other members of the Lebanese population. Outwardly, the government, headed by Hariri, supported Hezbollah and rejected calls to disarm it.[\[25\]](#)

In October 2004, Hariri and his government resigned in protest of Syria's flagrant interference in Lebanese governmental affairs and the extension of the Lebanese President's term for a third period of office. In February 2005, Hariri was killed by a car bomb in Beirut, and Syria was accused of being responsible. Wide scale protest and international pressure led to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, (April 2005), the resignation of the Lebanese government, and the development of a new balance of power between Syria and its opponents in Lebanon.

The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon created a new reality, a new balance between Lebanese power bases and local players. The withdrawal was accompanied by an increase in international involvement in the Lebanese system and the formation of a new political order. Three blocs of players operated side by side in the resulting internal Lebanese system:

The first player – "Forces of March 14th" – a Sunni-Druze Christian coalition, led by Saad Hariri and Fuad Seniora, which included the Sunni sect, most of the Druze sect headed by Walid Jumblatt, and parts of the Christian camp, headed by Samir Jaja and Amin Jamil. This coalition is pro-western and is supported by the Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Jordanian Sunni states.

The second player – the camp of the allies of Syria and Iran – includes the Shi'ite sect, Hezbollah and Amal and parts of the Christian camp, led by Michel Aoun and Emil Lahoud, and since May 2008, Michel Suleiman, the elected President of Lebanon. This camp is supported by Syria and Iran.

The third player – Global Jihad organizations.

In May 2005, elections were held for the Lebanese Parliament, at which point the anti-Syrian camp, headed by Saad al-Hariri, won 72 seats out of 128 in the Parliament. The Hezbollah movement and Amal won 35 seats, of which Hezbollah won 15 seats. Fuad Seniora, the Sunni who formed the government, won Parliament's total support. Upon taking office, Seniora began addressing two primary issues: one, the investigation into Rafiq Hariri's murder, and two, the question of the Hezbollah movement. The structure of the ruling system, the multi-sect character of Lebanon, and the government's weakness, made it difficult for Seniora to make any significant progress on either issue.[\[26\]](#)

The structure of Seniora's government in 2005 reflected the rise in strength of the Shi'ite sector, particularly in regards to Hezbollah. This was the first government in which two Hezbollah ministers, as well as Shi'ite ministers from Amal, were able to serve together and act as one bloc. Hezbollah's entry into the government provoked a serious debate within the movement. Those in favor of the move argued that it was necessary to be at that decision-making junction at that particular moment in time, in order to safeguard the interests of the Resistance and prevent any international efforts to force the Lebanese government into disarming the movement.[\[27\]](#) From thereon, the movement's activists, together with Amal, made every effort to torpedo decisions and create difficulties for the government on issues tied to the investigation of Hariri's murder and the application of Resolution 1559. In fact, the five Shi'ite ministers protested the government's decision to invite the U.N to investigate Hariri's murder in December 2005 when they refused to attend Government sessions. Almost one year later, in November 2006, they resigned, attempting to destroy Seniora's government by portraying it as unlawful.

Since November 2006, the government has encountered great difficulties running the country, unable to even assemble Parliament in order to elect a President. For the second time in its history, Lebanon has again been caught in a constitutional crisis without a President.[\[28\]](#)

Although the Lebanese government sought to disarm Hezbollah, it feared that efforts to carry out Security Council Resolution 1559 would deteriorate its relations with the movement. A debate on the matter was held in

2005, and the government decided to support Hezbollah's position and reject demands to disarm the movement. In most instances in which the demand to disarm the movement was categorically rejected, opposition claimed that the matter was an internal Lebanese affair that would be discussed in Lebanese forums in conjunction with the movement and with its agreement. This position was unfortunately tolerated by the international community and, in practice, no significant steps were taken to enforce the Security Council's decisions. [29]

The government's position toward Hezbollah strongly criticized. The loudest critic was Jubran Tweini, a Christian Lebanese member of Parliament and Director of the Lebanese newspaper "Al-Nahar." In a series of published articles and speeches that he gave after Israel's withdrawal, he called for Hezbollah's disarmament and demanded the government take responsibility and exercise its sovereignty over all the country's mechanisms. He claimed that Hezbollah was applying an independent policy inside Lebanon that served the interests of Syria and Iran. Tweini's criticism was not welcomed by Syria and its allies in Lebanon, and he was assassinated in Beirut in December 2005. [30]

Tweini was not the only one who saw Hezbollah as a danger to Lebanon. Lebanese and Arab reporters identified the dangerous characteristics of the movement throughout its years of operation in Lebanon. Some of them were unimpressed by Nasrallah's claims of integrating the movement into the Lebanese political system and joining the Lebanese government. For example, after the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Shaker al-Nabulsi, an American-Jordanian liberal, warned that Hezbollah intended to establish a Shi'ite Islamic republic in Lebanon, much like the Shi'ite Islamic Republic in Iran. Nabulsi also quoted sections of an interview with Syed Ali Akbar Mohtashami, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon and one of the founders of the Hezbollah movement in the 1980s. Against the background of the Second Lebanon War, Mohtashami summarized the essence of the ties between Hezbollah and Iran in three sentences:

Hezbollah is part of the Iranian government. Hezbollah is a basic element within the Iranian security and military establishment. The ties between Hezbollah and Iran are far greater than the ties of a revolutionary government with a political party or a revolutionary organization outside the borders of its country". [31]

A similar description was published in "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat" in May 2006. The newspaper quoted an Iranian figure who told a group of Western statesmen in London that Iran attributes great importance to Hezbollah and that the organization is "one of the elements of our strategic security. It serves as an Iranian form of defense against Israel. We do not agree that it needs to be disarmed...." [32]

In May 2006, during celebrations of the 5th anniversary of the I.D.F.'s withdrawal from Lebanon, Nasrallah gave a speech stressing the importance of the Resistance and the need for it to remain armed. He claimed that Israel was a hostile country and that a national defense strategy must be formulated to include the entire Lebanese population. To deal with this threat, he proposed that Hezbollah be integrated into Lebanon's defense strategy. He argued that the movement has the operational ability and experience to act as a deterrent against Israel. In his speech, Nasrallah detailed some of the movement's military capabilities and claimed that it was in possession of missiles that could reach deep inside Israel territory, as well as sufficient operational capabilities to liberate Shaba Farms. [33]

The Second Lebanon War exposed the loaded relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. The March 14th camp leaders accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon into an unnecessary war, serving the interests of Syria and Iran. There were those who believed that an armed Resistance posed a threat to Lebanon itself. [34]

Hezbollah and its allies did not accept such criticism without a fight. At the "Divine Victory Celebration," organized by Hezbollah in August 2006, Nasrallah declared that Seniora's government, which he accused of corruption and betrayal, could not continue to run the country. He demanded that a national unity government be established to defend, rehabilitate and unite Lebanon. This Hezbollah demand was rejected outright. [35]

In November 2006, the five Shi'ite ministers resigned from the Lebanese government. The immediate pretext for the resignation was Hezbollah's failed attempt to coerce the government into including a representative of Michel Aoun's party. There were those who believed that this was part of a Syrian attempt to thwart the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the murder of Hariri, bring down Seniora's government, and establish a national unity government. In a speech Nasrallah made after the resignation, two conflicting messages emerged. The first was that he was not afraid of a civil war and the second was a promise to safeguard Lebanon's stability. He denied the legitimacy of the government and called for its resignation. The Lebanese President, Emil Lahoud, informed the United Nations Secretary General that he could not confirm the government's decision regarding the international tribunal. It was therefore illegitimate and unbinding. [36]

At the same time, the movement's leaders continued to apply its independent policies in Lebanon, including the rehabilitation of civil and military structures damaged during the Second Lebanon War. They also worked to absorb advanced weapons in quantities larger than those in their possession on the eve of war. These activities were carried out despite the presence of the Lebanese army and the U.N. multi-national force in the South.

In September 2007, the Lebanese Army prevented a truckload of armaments from reaching Hezbollah, but this was merely "a drop in the ocean." Following the confiscation of the truck, Nasrallah demanded the return of the truck's contents, declaring that it was the movement's right to retain its arms as a means of defending Lebanon from Israeli aggression. [37]

The truck incident provoked several declarations and statements by the movement's senior officials, echoing a similar message that Hezbollah had created a new deterrence balance against Israel, which was even more qualitative and effective than before. These statements were reiterated by Israeli security sources. In October 2007, the U.N. Secretary General's report on Resolution 1701 was published. The report was based, inter alia, on Israeli sources that claimed Hezbollah had regained its strength and tripled the number of ground-to-sea missiles in its possession. It also had acquired new missiles capable of reaching targets as far as Tel Aviv from South Lebanon. [38]

In November 2007, close to the time that the I.D.F. was scheduled to carry out wide-spread maneuvers in the north of Israel, Hezbollah revealed that it had carried out a large-scale three-day exercise in southern Lebanon. The exercise was held under the supervision of Nasrallah. By revealing the exercise at that particular moment in time, Nasrallah intended to send a deterrent message to Israel and to the organization's opponents in Lebanon; the movement had regained its capabilities and was now ready to cope with an Israeli attack. [\[39\]](#)

Rivalry and tension between the government and the pro-Syrian camp headed by Hezbollah reached a new peak in November 2007, when President Emil Lahoud ended his term in office. The parliament's inability to agree on an acceptable candidate dragged Lebanon through a serious constitutional crisis, further paralyzing the government's ability to lead the country. The government's attempts to find a candidate that would be elected with a majority in Parliament were constantly rejected by the pro-Syrian coalition. Nabih Berri, the Shi'ite Chairman of Parliament and Nasrallah's partner in creating the political crisis, abstained nineteen times from assembling Parliament to elect a new President. The crisis ended in May 2008 after a wave of violence broke out in Lebanon. The crisis was settled through the intervention of outside Arab states and the eventual signing of the Doha Agreement. [\[40\]](#)

The Doha Agreement favors Hezbollah; its demand to have a veto vote in the cabinet was met, and the Seniora government terminated its term of office immediately after the election of Michel Suleiman as President. In its place, Seniora was given a mandate to establish a national unity government, as demanded by Hezbollah, with 30 ministers - 11 from the pro-Syrian camp, 16 from the anti-Syrian coalition, and three to be appointed by the President (who is also pro-Syrian). The Lebanese government was instructed to declare its support for the Resistance. It was also agreed that the Elections Law would be amended, giving Hezbollah an advantage in the forthcoming elections for Parliament in 2009. [\[41\]](#)

In July 2008, Seniora declared the establishment of a national unity government in accordance with the Doha Agreement. Soon after, the government declared its support for the Resistance. In August 2008, the Parliament approved the formation of the government and its platform, ending 22 months of political crisis that began with the resignation of Shi'ite ministers in November 2006. Hezbollah, which had left the Seniora government, returned as the main winner of the Doha Agreement in July 2008. [\[42\]](#)

The Doha Agreement is another example of the Lebanese government's inability and unwillingness to deal with Hezbollah. It serves too as a reminder of the worthiness of using violence in order to achieve political goals. As mentioned above, Lebanon has been in a state of "cold civil war" for a number of years. This situation erupts, from time to time, in violence, political murders, car bombs and mass demonstrations. This "state of nature" degenerates following the interference of regional players – Syria, Iran and Israel – whether through encouragement and support of Hezbollah's activities or via diplomatic and military attempts to eliminate or disarm the movement.

From the moment Hezbollah entered the political arena in 1992 – and even more so from Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon – Nasrallah continues to promise his Lebanese listeners that the organization's arms are not intended for internal use in Lebanon but only for use externally against Israel. While he has said that his movement would act within the framework of the Lebanese political system's basic rules and would refrain from using violence in this arena, his declarations have not been consistent with events on the ground, as demonstrated in May 2008.

Hezbollah responded with violence when the Lebanese government decided that: the independent telephone network set up by Hezbollah was illegal and to dismissed the head of airport security services for collaborating with Hezbollah. Hezbollah activists attacked Sunni's neighborhoods and installations in Beirut and took control of western neighborhoods in the city. The Shi'ite-Sunni confrontation threatened to ignite a civil war as incidents spread to other areas of Lebanon. It became evident through the scores of fatalities, Hezbollah's control of central areas in western Beirut, and the inability of Sunnis to respond, that Hezbollah held the real power in Lebanon. [\[43\]](#)

Rejecting the government's authority, the Lebanese army refrained from becoming involved in the incidents to impose order. Only after five days of battles and scores dead did the army increase its patrols in Beirut. Yet it still did not interfere physically in order to remove Hezbollah roadblocks and enforce government decisions. [\[44\]](#) The Lebanese army's behavior is just one more sign of the government's weakness and inability to enforce its decisions.

The Shi'ite – Sunni confrontation in Lebanon caused great concern among the Sunni population in the Middle East, which had traditionally supported the Seniora government. They therefore took hasty steps to contain the events and bring them to an immediate halt, even with the high price of concessions demanded by Hezbollah. In actuality, the Doha Agreement served as an apparatus to temporarily stabilize the Lebanese system – until the eruption of the next crisis.

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Conclusions

The Doha Agreement and the establishment of a national unity government in Lebanon brought Hezbollah one step closer to achieving an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Today, it is an irrefutable fact that the movement has a stronger military capability than any other player in the Lebanese arena, including the Lebanese army. This power is in Nasrallah's hands, and he does not see himself as bound by Lebanese government's policies. Rather, he is intent on advancing Hezbollah's interests and goals, even at the risk of sparking significant tension or even violence against the Lebanese government. Nasrallah does not operate within an environment lacking internal or regional constraints but walks a fine line between violence and pragmatism. He invests considerably in the Shi'ite population, in education and welfare, as a means of obtaining this population's support of the movement.

So long as the balance of power and reciprocity between the three Lebanese power forces and their patrons continues, it can be assumed that the cycle of "violence – calm" will continue. Short-to-medium term solutions that do not prioritize disarmament, such as the Doha Agreement, could actually serve to aid the movement in

achieving its goal of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon .

Integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese political system in order to encourage moderation and domestication was long ago proven to be a totally misguided approach. In fact, the opposite occurred; Hezbollah used and is using the political system in Lebanon to expand its internal control over the country – whether through legal measures or violence – and advance its Jihadi terrorist arm, which is operating both inside and outside of Lebanon by launching terror attacks and supporting terror organizations.

[Volver](#)

[1] Al Hayat 21 February 2000

[2] Al Ahram 14.2.2000, 15.2.2000

[3] Al Quds 13.06.2000 14.06.2000 quoted http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?language=Hebrew&enttype=4&entid=868#_ftn1

[4] <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo65.pdf>

[5] Al-Safir, 18 December 2000

[6] Al-Ayyam 26 June 2000

[7] http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/sheba_farms.htm
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/01/shebaa_farms_ar.php

[8] Haaretz 19 October 2007

[9] http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/01/nasrallah_calls_1.php

[10] http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/02/walid_jumblatt.php

[11] <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/736/551.html>

[12] <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1011767.html>

[13] <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/759/439.html>

[14] <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?more=1&itemNo=1007978&contrassID=2&subContrassID=21&sbSubContrassID=0>

[15] Hurriyet, May 30, 2000

[16] Al-Safir, 28 Jun 2000

[17] http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/memri/june_d_05.htm

[18] Al-Nahar, August 10, 2005

[19] http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/nasrallah_20feb07.htm

[20] <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/986792.html>

[21] Al-Nahar, 14 March 2002

[22] Al-Nahar 10 April 2002, 04 July 2002

[23] Sobelman Daniel, New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbullah after the withdrawal from Lebanon, Jaffe Strategic Center, Tel Aviv University, p.47

[24] Al Hayat 21.7.2001. http://www.meib.org/articles/0107_ld1.htm. Al-Nahar 22 February 2001. Al-Safir, 7 July 2001

[25] Al Safir 7 September 2002. Al-Nahar 09 September 2002. [Http://www.meib.org/articles/0402_ld.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/0402_ld.htm)

[26] <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2992589,00.html>. <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3091696,00.html>. http://www.omeia.co.il/Show_Article.asp?DynamicContentID=1635&MenuID=726&ThreadID=1014017

27 As-Safir, 11 June 2005. Al-Nahar, July 11, 2005

28 The Daily Star, December 13, 2005

<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/objects/pages/PrintArticle.jhtml?itemNo=812517>.

<http://www.lebanonwire.com/0705/05071901LINEUPLW.asp>

[29] http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/memri/june_d_05.htm

An excellent example is the statement of the Spanish Foreign Minister Mauratinus during his visit to Lebanon in September 2008 at the press conference which he held. He stressed that Hezbollah's arms were an internal matter to be discussed in a Lebanese national dialogue

http://www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?ID=107345_memri

=he&act=show2&dbid=articles&dataid=1747

[30] <http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?enttype=4&entid=1260&language=Hebrew>.
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=790866>

31
<http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/ElaphWriter/2006/8/170391.htm>.<http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/ElaphWriter/2006/8/171932.htm>

[32] [Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 11 May 06](#)

[33] http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/pdf/hezbollah_0506.pdf

[34] <http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?enttype=4&entid=2056&language=Hebrew>

[35] <http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?enttype=4&entid=2056&language=Hebrew>

[36] [Haaretz Yoav Stern, Nasrallah: We have no reason to fear a civil war, 15 November 2006](#)

[37] [See Memri re Hizbullah's standing in Lebanon from 24 Feb. 2007](#)

[38] [Haaretz Barak Ravid Israel to U.N.: Hizbullah tripled its land to sea missiles and rehabilitated its strength north of the Litani, 1 Nov. 2007](#)

[Haaretz Yoav Stern, Amos Harel, Hizbullah, we will take concrete steps against the IDF's flights over Lebanon 3rd Aug. 2008](#)

[39] http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/hezbollah_1107.htm

40 <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3478262,00.html>.

<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/986792.html>

41 <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=985697>

42 [Roya Nahmias, Hizbullah gained a veto in the government and a change in the election regions 21.05.08](#)

[43] <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/736434.html>

[44] <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/732/879.html>

<http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/732/558.html>

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Abstract

In July 2008, Fuad Seniora established the National Unity Government in Lebanon which was comprised of 30 ministers. With eleven of these ministers belonging to the opposition headed by Hezbollah, Nasrallah earned the right to veto government decisions. This development, brought Nasrallah one step closer to his organization's goal of establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon .

An analysis of the processes in the Lebanese arena and of the power structure between various players, since the 2000 withdrawal until the unity government, demonstrates that Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon has improved despite the Second Lebanon War. In addition, Nasrallah has systematically advanced along the path of turning Lebanon into an Islamic Republic, characterized by two parallel efforts: (1) from inside the political system, in order to gain positions of power and influence; and (2) from outside the system, by establishing a military power.

The Lebanese government has no choice but to acquiesce to the movement's demands, support the resistance and its goals, and avoid carrying out U.N. Resolution 1701, which requires the country to dismantle the movement's arms capabilities. The balance of power falls significantly in favor of the movement, as it stands strong relative to a weak government and a divided society of many ethnic groups, unwilling to pay the price of a confrontation with Hezbollah.

So long as there are no significant changes in the balance of power within Lebanon , Hezbollah will continue to retain control over the Lebanese system.

Keywords

Hezbollah. Middle-east, Lebanon , terror, Nasrallah.

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Estados de la cuestión

JIHADIST TERRORISM IN TURKEY

Guido Steinberg

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1. Introduction: Terrorism in Turkey

Turkey is probably the country with the most diverse terrorist scene in Europe and the Middle East. The main threat remains the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. Since the early 1980s, it has fought an insurgency in southeastern Turkey which subsequently escalated into a civil war. Its aim was to gain independence for the Kurdish people. Although it has never come close to achieving its goals, it has been able to hinder a stabilisation of Turkish rule in the eastern provinces and – mainly from its bases in Iraqi Kurdistan – remains a threat today.

Although dominant, the Kurdish insurgency is only one among several terrorist problems. Turkey was and is home to several left-wing militant groups like for instance the Revolutionary Left (Devrimci Sol) and its successor organisation, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi, DHKP-C), which have lost some of their former relevance, but have remained active in Turkey and among the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

Islamist groups have been active since the 1980s as well, with the Turkish Hizbullah (which is not in any way affiliated to the Lebanese Hizbullah) and the Great East Islamic Raiders' Front (İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi, IBDA-C) being the most important until today. Their aim remains to establish an Islamic State in Turkey. Nevertheless, instead of fighting in Turkey, some individuals took part in the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s, while others chose to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s in order to receive terrorist trainings in the camps of al-Qaida. [1] Ever since, a distinct Turkish Jihadist scene has developed in Turkey and among Turks in the European diaspora which has adopted a more internationalist ideology than their predecessors did. There are indications that the number of Turks travelling to Pakistan to join al-Qaida and the Taliban and receive training there is growing. Turkish jihadists pose a growing threat to Turkish and European security.

2. A History of Islamist Terrorism in Turkey

Islamist terrorism in Turkey emerged in the early 1980s, partly in response to three developments in the Middle East: the rise of Islamist movements in the Arab (and Muslim) worlds from the 1960s, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the beginning of the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey in 1984. Although Islamist movements in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s remained focused on their home country, developments abroad did have a lasting impact on the situation. While the Turkish Hizbullah was rather a phenomenon connected to the Kurdish struggle and (in its formative period) the impact of the Iranian revolution, the IBDA-C has rather been an Turkish (non-Kurdish) phenomenon.

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2.1. The Turkish Hizbullah

The Turkish Hizbullah is a primarily Kurdish organisation which has its social base in the predominantly Kurdish Eastern part of the country and among the Kurdish populations of the major cities in the West like Istanbul and Izmir. It emerged in Diyarbakır, the largest city in the Kurdish southeast, in the early 1980s under the leadership of Hüseyin Velioğlu (1952-2000), but soon split into two factions called "İlim" (lit. knowledge, science) and "Menzil" (lit. way station). [2] The İlim branch was led by Velioğlu and was responsible for most of the organisation's terrorist activity. The İlim demanded immediate violent action while the Menzil argued for a step-by-step, propaganda-based strategy of winning over supporters before embarking on holy war. [3] Differing strategic thoughts led to a bitter power struggle within the organisation. The groups finally split in 1987 and fought each other bitterly in the early 1990s. From 1994, the İlim faction gained ground and became the

dominant branch.

From 1987, the Hizbullah posed as a competitor to the PKK among Turkish Kurds in Eastern Anatolia and tried to win the loyalty of those Kurds who opposed the PKK's Marxist ideology on religious grounds. A violent struggle between the two groups developed which escalated in the early 1990s. The clash between Hizbullah and the PKK prompted many observers to suspect the involvement of the Turkish security forces. They claimed that the Hizbullah was created in order to fight the PKK on behalf of the Turkish government and armed forces. In fact, on a local level, the security forces and Hizbullah cadres seem to have cooperated closely in their fight against the PKK. It was a common phenomenon in the Middle East of the 1970s and 1980s, that governments cooperated with Islamists in order to weaken their secular adversaries. It is rather unlikely, however, that the Turkish army founded the Hizbullah in order to use it as an instrument in the civil war.

The Hizbullah was also suspected of entertaining close links with Iran. The founders of the movement in the early 1980s were in fact clearly inspired by the Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran. This was a common phenomenon in the Middle East after 1979, as Sunni Islamists felt encouraged by the success of their Iranian brethren in toppling a pro-Western ruler. Members of Hizbullah frequently travelled to Iran and received training and other kinds of support by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.^[4] However, the Ilim faction was reputed to be more distanced towards Iran than Menzil. Relations between the Hizbullah and Tehran seem to have cooled down after the Islamic Republic gave up its revolutionary foreign policy in the 1990s.

Even if there had been some cooperation between the Turkish army and the Hizbullah in the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish state successfully fought the organisation from 1999. In the meantime, Hizbullah had expanded its activities towards the big cities in Western Turkey where it tried to attract Kurds who had migrated in large numbers from Eastern Anatolia. In January 2000, Turkish police raided a house in Istanbul and killed Veliöğlu. It then came out that the group had kidnapped and executed several dozen businessmen, Islamist and secular intellectuals and journalists. As a result, it quickly lost support among its Kurdish sympathizers. When it tried to retaliate by assassinating the chief of police in Diyarbakır, the government cracked down on the organisation. Many of the top leaders were arrested while others fled the country to Europe.^[5]

In recent years, the Hizbullah has reorganised in Turkey and in the diaspora, with its leader, Isa Altsoy, living in Germany.^[6] It spectacularly reemerged as a non-violent group and has focused on legal public activity. In fact, it now followed the strategy originally propagated by the Menzil group. For instance, in 2006 it organised mass rallies of tens of thousands in Diyarbakır, protesting the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. After having shunned any public activity until 2000, it has begun to publish books and magazines and has increasingly relied on the internet to spread its message.^[7] However, the new Hizbullah has not explicitly broken with its violent past, and it seems that – just like the Menzil group in the late 1980s and early 1990s – it sees propaganda activity as merely a phase in a struggle that will ultimately lead to a violent jihad.

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2.2. The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C)

The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front or IBDA-C was founded in 1984 by Salih Mirzabeyoğlu (Salih İzzet Erdiş, born 1950). In contrast to the Hizbullah, IBDA-C members are in their majority (if not all of them) Turks rather than Kurds, although its leader is alleged to come from a Kurdish family. Mirzabeyoğlu had first joined the Islamist National Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi, MSP) of former Prime Minister Erbakan, but then left in order to build a more radical, militant group. He was deeply influenced by the writings and personality of the Islamo-nationalist poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), who – in a book entitled *The Ideological Network of the Great East (Büyük Doğu İdeolojya Örgüsü)* – had propagated the idea of a supranational Islamic state. This state called "Great East" would have to comprise the territory of several Middle Eastern states and be ruled by a caliph from Istanbul. In fact, Kısakürek followed quite a peculiar mix of Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism, which is typical for some Jihadist organisations in Turkey until today.

Mirzabeyoğlu set out to fulfil Kısakürek's vision by fighting the Turkish state and Turkish secularism as the main obstacles on the way to an Islamic state. The IBDA-C is strongly sectarian and therefore does not share Hizbullah's strong connections to Iran. It is anti-Shiite, anti-Alevite, anti-Christian and anti-Jewish. During the 1990s, the group perpetrated numerous attacks on prominent secularists, but also Jews, Alevites, and Christians. It frequently attacked banks and governmental installations as well as churches, bars, brothels and nightclubs.

IBDA-C was and remains a relatively small organisation with no more than a few hundred supporters. Its resources are limited so that its activities have never been very effective. Furthermore, it is highly fragmented. The group has, however, followed a strategy that was later termed "leaderless jihad". The IBDA-C cells normally consist of not more than three to five members and the organisation relies on cells forming independently after having been convinced by the IBDA-C's propaganda activities.^[8] Therefore, arrests of individual members and cells did not damage the organisation as much as in cases of more centralised structures.

As a consequence, the IBDA-C heavily relied on the dissemination of its ideas. Mirzabeyoğlu himself wrote more than 50 books, in which he expounded the ideology of his group. Even after he was arrested in late 1998, Mirzabeyoğlu continued his propaganda efforts in Turkish jails. His followers continued these activities. From 2001, they published a journal called *The Awaited New Order ("Beklenen Yeni Nizam")*. In 2005, the IBDA-C started publishing a journal called "Kaide" ("al-Qaida") in which the authors openly supported Usama Bin Laden's organisation.^[9] IBDA-C activists increasingly published their materials on the internet.

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3. al-Qaida and the Istanbul Bombings

From its inception in the mid-1990s, al-Qaida has been an Arab organisation, dominated by the Egyptians and Saudi-Arabians around its two leaders, Aiman al-Zawahiri and Usama Bin Laden. Until 2001, the organisation had not been able to fully integrate the national or regional groupings into its hierarchy. North Africans, Syrians, and Palestinians still tended to organise in nationally or regionally homogenous groups. Some, like the Palestinians and Jordanians under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006), refused to join the organisation and preferred to build their own, which was first called al-Tawhid („Monotheism“) and then al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad („Monotheism and Holy War“).^[10]

Although no reliable numbers are available, Turkish nationals seem to have been a small minority among the volunteers trained in the Afghan camps. Only after the attacks on Jewish and British targets in Istanbul in November 2003, more detailed information was made available to the public. However, Afghanistan was only one among several destinations for Turkish Jihadists in the 1990s. Turks first seem to have developed a keener interest in the situation of Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus. This was due to historical reasons: both regions had at least partly been ruled by the Ottoman Empire and there were strong relations between Islamists there and their Turkish brethren. An unknown number of Turks took part in the wars in Bosnia and Chechnya.^[11] Among those Turkish nationals who then went to Afghanistan, Kurds seem to have formed a majority. As Kurds in their majority live in southeastern Anatolia bordering on Syria and Iraq, and through their contacts to the Kurdish minorities in the neighbouring countries, they have been more open to influences from the Arab world than the Turks. Some Kurds from Iraq also joined the Jihadists in Afghanistan. This might explain the dominance of Kurds among „Turkish Afghans“ in the 1990s.

Turkey itself was an important logistics hub for al-Qaida and a way station for Jihadists travelling to Pakistan and Afghanistan. One important route led Europeans, North Africans and Middle Easterners to Turkey, in most cases to Istanbul first, and thence overland to Iran and Pakistan. In the 1990s, al-Qaida personnel based in Turkey assisted the volunteers. The most important operative seems to have been Muhammad Bahaiah (Abu Khalid al-Suri) a Syrian.^[12] To what extent Turkish operatives have been implicated in these activities has not been established yet. However, it seems as if the Turkish dimension was more important than hitherto known.

The American war against Iraq 2003 became an important turning point for the Turkish Jihadists. The invasion and the subsequent emergence of an Iraqi insurgency have in general fostered Turkish Anti-Americanism and have prompted even formerly more nationalist inclined Islamists to target the US and their allies.^[13] A first result of this trend were the Istanbul bombings in November 2003.

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3.1. The Istanbul bombings, November 2003

Turkey was first hit by al-Qaida in November 2003. On November 15, car bombs exploded targeting the Neveh Shalom and the Beit Yisrael synagogues in central Istanbul. On November 15, suicide bombers in trucks targeted the local branch of the British HSBC bank and the British consulate. 62 persons were killed and more than 650 injured. These were the most devastating terrorist attacks in Turkish history and subsequently dubbed Turkey's „September 11“.

At least some of the perpetrators had absolved courses in al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. During the investigations, suspects stated that they had discussed possible targets with the al-Qaida military commander, the Egyptian Abu Hafs al-Masri (d. 2001). According to these reports, the al-Qaida leadership had ordered the culprits to attack Western and/or Israeli targets. Their discussion had centred on an attack at Incirlik, a Turkish air base in southern Turkey and the most important American base in the country. Because of tight security around the airport, the group had decided to look for more vulnerable targets. The final decision to attack Jewish and British targets in November seems to have been taken by the attackers after the invasion of Iraq by American and British forces in spring 2003. In October 2003, Usama Bin Laden published an audio tape in which he called upon his followers to perpetrate attacks on countries which had provided troops to help the US stabilise Iraq, most prominently Britain, Spain, and Italy.

Shortly after the attacks, the IBDA-C and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a group of online activists not related to al-Qaida, claimed responsibility for the attacks. However, in the course of the investigation it became clear that the plot was hatched by a local group which had trained in Afghanistan and had entertained links to al-Qaida and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. Several perpetrators had been members or closely related sympathizers of the Turkish Hizbullah and IBDA-C in the past, but the organisations as such do not seem to have been involved.^[14] They rather defined the intellectual and political environment in which their radicalisation had taken place.

The group which perpetrated the attacks were in their majority Turkish citizens from the southeastern part of the country – they were in fact Kurds from towns where Hizbullah commanded a large following. The largest single group came from Bingöl, a remote predominantly Kurdish town in Eastern Anatolia, where unemployment rates are high and the devastating repercussions of the civil war of the 1980s and 1990s are all too visible.^[15] Others came from Malatya, Mardin, Batman, and Van, all towns and cities in similarly miserable conditions like Bingöl and centres of Kurdish opposition to the Turkish state for decades.

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3.2. The Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese connections

In the course of the investigation, it became clear that the plotters did not only entertain relations to al-Qaida in Pakistan, but also to terrorist organisations in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, which belonged to the larger network of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Jama'at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (which later pledged loyalty to Usama Bin Laden and

changed its name to al-Qaida in Mesopotamia). Directly before and after the attack, some surviving members of the cell fled to Syria, among them Habib Aktas, a leading personality. He and other members of the group later joined Zarqawi in Iraq and some were killed there. [16] Furthermore, in late 2003, Syria deported 22 Turkish suspects to their home country.

However, close links to Zarqawi's organisation became obvious when it was discovered that the perpetrators themselves claimed to be members of a group called "Beyyat al-Imam" or "Oath of allegiance to the Imam". [17] This was the turkified version of the name of the Jordanian group Bay'at al-Imam, which had been founded in the early 1990s by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi's spiritual mentor, and which was later taken over by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. The choice of a name which was strange even to the Jihadists' ears was obviously aimed at emphasising the link to Zarqawi and Maqdisi. [18]

The link between Zarqawi and the Istanbul plotters became even clearer when news about the financing of the plot were made public. The Syrian al-Qaida in Iraq operative Luayy Saqqa was named (and later convicted) as the mastermind of the Istanbul bombings and was said to have financed the attacks. Saqqa's (b. 1974) family – which is most probably of Kurdish descent – had lived in Eastern Turkey until 1960, but then emigrated to Aleppo, the most important Islamist stronghold in Syria. He had first joined "al-Qaida central" in Afghanistan and built up a close relationship with Abu Zubaida, an important logistics official based in Pakistan and a close associate of Usama Bin Laden. In 1997, Abu Zubaida sent him to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan and later to Turkey in order to build structures there. When he returned to Afghanistan, however, in 1999, he moved to Herat with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. [19]

Zarqawi had just been released from jail in Jordan in early 1999, when he returned to Afghanistan, where he had been staying in the late 1980s already. He gained permission to establish his own training camp in Herat close to the Iranian border and far from al-Qaida's headquarters in Kandahar. It was a camp established exclusively for Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese, who formed the core of Zarqawi's "Tawhid"-organisation. Among the first group of activists, which consisted of only five men, was Luayy Saqqa. Zarqawi rejected to be incorporated into Usama Bin Laden's organisation. Rather, he asserted his independence and stuck to his original goal, namely the fight against the Jordanian regime and the "liberation" of Palestine rather than join al-Qaida's program of global jihad. [20] In late 2001, Zarqawi fled to Northern Iraq via Iran. When it became clear that the U.S. would attack Iraq, Zarqawi took the chance to reorganise his network and redirect it for the fight against the Americans in Iraq, and, increasingly, against representatives of the new Iraqi government. He relied on a growing number of Iraqi personnel in his network and co-operated with former regime loyalists. [21] Most of the suicide bomb attacks in Iraq since summer 2003 have been perpetrated by Zarqawi's group.

In order to rebuild his organisation and fight U.S. forces in Iraq, Zarqawi had to rely heavily on new Iraqi recruits, so that he could not stick to his former agenda, focusing exclusively on Jordanian and Israeli targets. According to one of his followers, Zarqawi adjusted his strategy to the new situation: First, the militants would have to expel the Americans from Iraq, where they would install an Islamist regime and whence they would extend their *jihad* to the neighbouring countries, with the final aim to liberate Jerusalem. [22] As it turned out in 2003 and later, Zarqawi targeted Turkey as well as the Arab neighbouring countries. Luayy Saqqa was to execute his strategy in Turkey.

In the late 1990s until 2001, Saqqa seems to have become an important personality in the network. He undertook several dozen journeys between Syria, Turkey and Jordan, and spent time in Afghanistan and Germany. [23] He later joined Zarqawi in Iraq and seems to have been an important node in his network in Syria and especially Turkey. After his arrest in 2005, he claimed to have fought for Zarqawi in Iraq and that he had taken part in kidnappings and executions. Most importantly, however, he seems to have provided the perpetrators of the Istanbul bombings with up to 160.000 Dollars.

Saqqa was arrested in August 2005, when he planned attacks on Israeli cruise ships in the southern Turkish port city of Antalya. The plot failed in its early stages, when parts of the explosives caught fire in an apartment in Antalya. Saqqa was subsequently caught in Diyarbakir, carrying 120.000 Dollars in cash. [24]

4. Turkish Jihadists and the Turkish Diaspora

As there is a sizeable Turkish diaspora in Western Europe, and parts of this diaspora have joined the Jihadist movement, the interplay between Turkish Jihadists in Turkey and (especially) Germany – home to about two and a half million Turks and Turkish-origin Germans – seems to have intensified in recent years, possibly due to the usage of new media, especially the internet. For many Turkish Islamists since the 1970s, Germany has been the favorite refuge, as their activities were widely tolerated by the German authorities and as they were able to act freely among a strong Turkish minority. All Turkish terrorist groups had (and still have) a strong basis in Germany, among them the Kurdish PKK. Only after September 11, 2001, the German authorities cracked down on some of these movements, without, however, erasing the problem. In recent years, there seems to be a strong trend towards Jihadist radicalisation among young Turks in Germany.

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4.1. The Kaplan Family and the "Caliph State Organisation"

Turkish Jihadists had one important precursor in Germany, namely the "Caliph State Organisation" of Cemalettin and Metin Kaplan. Cemalettin Kaplan (d. 1995) a theologian, had been an employee of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey and Mufti in Adana. After the military coup in 1980 and the ban of Erbakan's Party of National Salvation (Milli Selamet Partisi), Kaplan fled to Germany and became active in an Islamist organisation close to the Party, the Islamic Union Europe. He soon provoked heated debates within the organisation, because – although a Sunni – he posed as a staunch admirer of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In November 1984, Kaplan founded his own organisation, the Federation of Islamic Associations and Communities (Islam Cemiyet ve

Cemaatler Birliđi (ICCB)), with its headquarters in Cologne. In its heydays in the late 1980s, his organisation had about 7000 members.

Kaplan, who was nicknamed the "Cologne Khomeini" by the German press, aimed at the revolutionary foundation of an Islamic state in Turkey and the restoration of the caliphate. In 1994 he proclaimed himself as caliph and called his organisation the "Caliph State" (Hilafet Devleti). By the time of Cemalettin Kaplan's death in 1995, the Caliph State organisation was a highly centralised, authoritarian movement which had lost its charismatic leader. Already from the end of the 1980s, Kaplan had reorganised the movement which had begun losing its support among the Turkish population in Germany. He and his remaining supporters increasingly isolated themselves from their co-religionists, so that the organisation adopted a sectarian, almost cult-like character. This trend continued after Cemalettin's death, when his son Metin (b. 1952) followed his father as head of the organisation. Metin lacked his father's charisma, intelligence and talent, so that the organisation nearly disintegrated. A rival caliph, Ibrahim Sofu, emerged among the movement's supporters in Berlin. After Metin Kaplan demanded his death in the organisation's mouthpiece, Ümmet-i Muhammad, Sofu was assassinated in 1997. As a result, in the late 1990s the numbers of the organisation's members shrank to less than 1000 from about 3800 in 1995. In 2000, Kaplan was convicted to four years in jail because he had called for the murder of Sofu. In December 2001, the Caliph State was banned and in 2004, after his release from jail, Kaplan was extradited to Turkey. There, he was convicted to life imprisonment because he had allegedly ordered a terrorist attack on the mausoleum of Kemal Atatürk in Ankara. [25]

In 2001 and 2002, the Caliph State was considered to be a possible terrorist threat in Germany. However, its members showed no inclination to perpetrate terrorist attacks and rather focussed on what they considered an exemplary Muslim personal life. Whether the Kaplan's supporters really planned to destroy the Atatürk mausoleum is highly dubious. Be that as it may, the Kaplan movement was reduced to insignificance after 2005, although it still has supporters and continues some clandestine activities.

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4.2. The "Sauerland" plot and its Turkish dimension

For years after the imprisonment of Metin Kaplan, German authorities argued that the threat of Jihadist terrorism was smaller in Germany than in France, Britain or Spain because Germany's Turkish migrant community was less prone to Jihadist radicalisation than the Arabs were. This assessment proved wrong, however, in the course of 2007, when a Turkish-Kurdish-Arab-German group of Jihadists planned to attack American and possibly Uzbek targets in Germany. In September 2007, two German converts and a Turk were arrested in a small town in the Sauerland region in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia.

The "Sauerland cell" as they were subsequently called, was part of a larger group of about 30 or more young Jihadists in Germany, most of them ethnic Turks or Kurds living in Germany and some Arabs and several converts, who had been part of a Jihadist network. For the first time, German Turks in larger numbers were radicalised and joined a Jihadist organisation. The nucleus of the group seems to have been formed in the Salafist scene in Ulm and Neu-Ulm in southwestern Germany. From 2001, the Multikulturhaus in Neu-Ulm had become a rallying point for young Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and German converts alike. As a result of their radicalisation, at least 10 to 20 of them went to terrorist training camps in Pakistan from 2006. [26]

The training took place in North Waziristan, in the camps of a small Uzbek group called Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). [27] The IJU is a splinter group of the larger and older Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is also based in Waziristan. However, the IJU split from the IMU because the latter refused to internationalise its ideology and join the (Afghan) Taliban and al-Qaida in their fight against Western forces in Afghanistan. The IJU on its part entered a close alliance with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Since 2006, it has increasingly recruited ethnic Turks and seems to aim at increasing its attraction among Turks in Germany and in Turkey itself. The reason for the IJU's success is simple: Turks from Turkey and Uzbeks are related Turkic peoples and speak similar languages. An Uzbek organisation that operates transnationally and takes an internationalist line is therefore ideally suited for recruiting Turks – either from Turkey itself or from the European diaspora. [28]

The planned attack in Germany was an attempt to support the struggle of Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The IJU leadership was mainly concerned with influencing the German debate on extending both Afghanistan mandates. They evidently calculated that attacks just before the Bundestag votes in October and November 2007 could prevent an extension and force the withdrawal of troops. [29] The Taliban and al-Qaida had long regarded Germany as the weakest link in the chain of the major troop providers and wanted to exploit growing criticism of the campaign in Afghanistan among Germans.

Besides training future Jihadists, the IJU has aimed at increasing its attraction among young Turks by using a Turkish language website, which was hosted in Turkey in 2008. Obviously, parts of the group's infrastructure were based in Turkey itself. From September 2007, the IJU started posting an increasing amount of propaganda messages and videos on www.sehadetvakti.com ("Time for Martyrdom"). [30] Most spectacularly, in early March 2008, the IJU posted a video showing Cüneyt Çiftçi, a Turk born and living in Germany training for, preparing and perpetrating a suicide attack on American and Afghan troops in the Afghan province of Paktika. [31] Ever since, reports of young Germans and Turks joining the ranks of the IJU, Taliban, and al-Qaida, have increased in number.

The Sauerland plot itself did have another Turkish dimension, showing the emergence of an Uzbek-Turkish-German network. Members of the network in Turkey sent the detonators for the Sauerland cell to Germany.

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5. Conclusion

Jihadist Terrorism in Turkey has developed from an isolated phenomenon mainly embodied by two obscure groups, which were a minor threat compared to the PKK's insurgency, to a major terrorist threat to the country. From nationalist groups, the Turkish Islamist terrorists have developed into parts of larger transnational networks, increasingly transcending national affiliations, without however giving these up. Instead of targeting Turkish secularists and moderate Islamists, they increasingly attack Western targets like the Israeli cruise ships in August 2005 and the American consulate in Istanbul in July 2008. The anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli dimension of their activities is partly due to their strong connections to Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

There are hints as to an accelerating trend towards internationalisation. This trend was foreshadowed on the Jihadist internet, where Turks in recent years have developed a profound interest in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and further afield. Subsequently, it has allowed for greater cooperation with Uzbek, Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Jihadists. If this trend continues to unfold, the terrorist threat in Turkey and in those countries where sizable Turkish diaspora communities live, is likely to grow.

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- [1] Several members of the group which perpetrated the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 had been trained in Afghanistan before 2001.
- [2] Both were named after bookshops, which the respective leaders of the group had opened in Diyarbakır in the early 1980s and where the group had formed. Fidan Güngör opened the Menzil bookshop in 1981, the İlim bookshop was opened by Hüseyin Veliöğlu in 1982.
- [3] Rusen Cakir: The Reemergence of Hizballah in Turkey, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2007 (Policy Focus #74), p. 8.
- [4] Rusen Cakir: The Reemergence of Hizballah in Turkey, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2007 (Policy Focus #74), pp. 11f.
- [5] Ibid., p. 13.
- [6] Altsoy was arrested in December 2007 and remains in jail.
- [7] Rusen Cakir: The Reemergence of Hizballah in Turkey, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2007 (Policy Focus #74), p. 13-15.
- [8] Lawrence E. Cline: From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey, in: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 321-335 (p. 325); Gareth Jenkins: Turkey's Islamic Raiders of the Greater East seeking ties with al-Qaeda?, in: Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol. IV, No. 40 (December 5, 2007), p. 6.
- [9] Kaide (Al-Qaeda) Magazine Published Openly in Turkey, Memri Special Dispatch Series No.905.
- [10] Tawhid, „the profession of the unity of God“, is the core concept of Muslim theology. Islamists argue that this principle has been neglected by their adversaries.
- [11] Chechnya remains an important interest of Turkish internet activists and the leaders of the Chechen jihad like Khattab and Shamil Bassajev have cult status among Turkish Jihadists.
- [12] On this person, cp. Brynjar Lia: Architect of Global Jihad. The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, London: Hurst 2007, pp. 189-193.
- [13] Gareth Jenkins: Turkey's Islamic Raiders of the Greater East seeking ties with al-Qaeda?, in: Jamestown Terrorism Focus, Vol. IV, No. 40 (December 5, 2007), p. 6.
- [14] Lawrence E. Cline: From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey, in: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 321-335 (pp. 322f.).
- [15] New York Times, November 27, 2003 (Turkish town's despair breeds terrorists, residents fear).
- [16] Habib Aktaş and Gürcan Baç died in Falluja in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
- [17] The Turkish press erroneously translated this term as "İmamlar Birliği" or "Union of the Imams".
- [18] On Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi cp. Guido Steinberg: Der nahe und der ferne Feind: Die Netzwerke des islamistischen Terrorismus, München: Beck 2005, pp. 135f.
- [19] Der Spiegel (Hamburg) 34, 2005, pp. 114-115.
- [20] Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 2004 (How terror groups vied for a player).
- [21] *al-Hayat*, November 8, 2004 („The Arab *Mujahidin* in Iraq are 2000 ... (in Arabic)).
- [22] *al-Hayat*, September 10, 2004 (al-Zarqawi: An Islamic government in Iraq ... (in Arabic)).
- [23] Saqqa's two sisters are married to two German converts. He first met Christian K. in Khalden in 1997. From September 2000 to July 2001, he was based in the southwestern German town of Schramberg. Der Spiegel (Hamburg) 34, 2005, pp. 114-115.
- [24] Der Spiegel (Hamburg) 33, 2005, pp. 108-109
- [25] On the history of the movement cp. Werner Schiffauer: Die Gottesmänner. Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland. Eine Studie zur Herstellung religiöser Evidenz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000.
- [26] These are the numbers of cases currently known to the author. The actual numbers might be higher. In an interview with a German newspaper, Wolfgang Bosbach, a prominent conservative parliamentarian and specialist

for domestic affairs, stated that more than 50 Germans (among them an unknown number of Germans of Turkish origin) were at that time trained in Pakistani camps. The number of known cases keeps rising.

[27] For a detailed discussion of the plot cp. Guido Steinberg: A Turkish Al Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism, in: Strategic Insights 7, No. 3 (July 2008) (<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Jul/steinbergJul08.asp>).

[28] In the al-Qaida and Taliban camps, recruits either have to speak Pashtu or Arabic. Most Turkish recruits do not speak more than their mother tongue and possibly Kurdish, Turks from Germany in most cases do not speak any foreign languages either.

[29] This has in the meantime been corroborated by "Der Spiegel".

[30] The website has changed its address to www.sehadetzamani.com

[31] İslami Cihad İttihadi Basın Açıklaması (http://www.sehadetvakti.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1889), accessed 7 März 2008.

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Abstract

In the 1980s and 1990s, Jihadist terrorism in Turkey remained an isolated phenomenon represented by two organisations, the Turkish Hizbullah and the Great East Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C). The first was a Kurdish, the second a predominantly Turkish group. Both were nationalist in outlook and strategy. From 2001, however, many Turkish Jihadists have integrated themselves into larger transnational networks, increasingly transcending national affiliations. Instead of fighting Turkish secularists and moderate Islamists, they rather attack Western targets. They have developed a new interest in Jihadist causes worldwide and have broadened their cooperation with Uzbek, Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Jihadists. The Turkish diaspora in Europe is an important element in this development. If this trend continues, the terrorist threat in Turkey and in countries where sizable Turkish diaspora communities live, is likely to grow.

Key words

Jihadist Terrorism; Turkey; Turkish Hizbullah; Great East Islamic Raiders's Front; Al Qaida; Turkish diaspora; Istanbul bombings; Caliph State Organization; Sauerland plot.

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Estados de la cuestión

EL TERRORISMO DE TIPO ISLAMISTA EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO

Abdallah Saaf

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

1. Perfiles y tratamiento
 2. Una oportunidad
 3. Una gran dificultad
 4. Una desestabilización con perspectivas inciertas
 5. Escenarios
- Notas

Sobre el terrorismo de tipo religioso, especialmente, de tendencia islamista radical, dos definiciones pueden ser destacadas de las prácticas de los actores en el contexto del Mediterráneo. El fenómeno puede referirse a la designación, la auto-percepción, o por inhabilitación de parte de los opositores de diversas formas de resistencia y de oposición a una política nacional, regional o internacional del sistema, visto como despótico, injusto o ilegítimo, objeto de elogio o de penalización de sus modos de acción, su *modus operandi*, el mínimo hasta el máximo, desde la publicación de la información o la desinformación, hasta el hombre-bomba, desde el elogio o la denuncia, o la auto percepción o percepción desde el exterior, las intenciones y las motivaciones, causas, valores, vocabularios, etcétera. (1)

También puede referirse a una categoría específica de uso de la violencia indiscriminada, colectiva, absoluta, bárbara, que no distingue entre los objetivos, y no escatima los civiles. En esta guerra de percepciones y maniobras donde cada uno es el terrorista del otro, y donde el debate incluye todos *topos*, lugares, las circunstancias, las injusticias y desigualdades en términos de la naturaleza y el grado mismos del fenómeno, del sufrimiento, de la ruptura de la comunidad, las fascinaciones y los rechazos, la legitimidad de las medidas adoptadas, la presentación de la agresión, las fronteras son relativas, los límites son problemáticos.

La condenación de la violencia ciega, de la toma de rehenes, de masacre de los civiles e inocentes, es ciertamente bastante compartida por los sociedades y estados de la orilla del sur del Mediterráneo. Sin embargo, no se asiste al mismo consenso que se observa en el norte sobre el terrorismo.

La cuestión de las respuestas a los ataques terroristas, al menos desde el 11 de septiembre está al orden del día. La sostenibilidad del fenómeno y sus extensiones reales y potenciales plantean todavía problema sobre el plan científico. Es evidente que los "fragmentos de la información recogidos por los agentes de respuesta de seguridad, militar, policial y judicial, son, sin duda, útiles. Pero no pueden limitar el alcance de los análisis cuantitativos, ni los conceptuales"(2). Por supuesto, demasiado culturalismo y unilateralismo predominan en el análisis y los planteamientos operacionales del fenómeno del terrorismo islámico en la región del Mediterráneo.

La cuestión que involucra más, hoy, es la verdadera naturaleza de esta violencia sin precedentes que se ha adjuntado, no tanto material, porque las muestras conocidas anteriormente forman el potencial del fenómeno, y también de sus contenidos y sus límites. Detrás de este intento de definición en la luz de los acontecimientos de la última década, se plantea a la vez la cuestión de su impacto y de la eficacia de los esfuerzos de erradicación. Al mismo tiempo, se plantea la cuestión de su realidad actual y de sus perspectivas.

También es importante desarrollar aproximaciones distintas en términos maniqueos o envases de lapidación previas donde las sentencias demasiado unánimes de condenación ponen fin al debate antes de que este empiece: evitando este escollo, son más grandes las posibilidades de acercamiento a la realidad y de maduración del pensamiento. Sin que tales maniobras de *seguridad comprensiva* signifiquen una adición, los debates sobre el fenómeno terrorista parecen solicitar un cambio cualitativo.

El terrorismo es visto como una oportunidad para alcanzar unas ventajas, uno de los principales premios que moviliza y estructura las maniobras de los actores en la región, una gran desconocida vinculada a la búsqueda permanente de la asimetría por los opositores.

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1. Perfiles y tratamiento

Las declaraciones son a veces más amplificadas que las operaciones en el terreno. La inflación de discursos, de declaraciones, de comunicados y de predisposiciones es alta en comparación con las acciones reales.

En Marruecos y en otra parte, los disturbios, pre-posicionamientos parecen desproporcionados en relación con las explosiones del 16 de mayo de 2003 y de abril de 2007. En Túnez, Egipto y en Jordania, el exceso de los discursos de tendencia triunfalista contrasta con la incertidumbre que inspira el terreno y que despiertan sospechas y dudas acerca de la amenaza terrorista. Prevalece la impresión de que se quiere mostrar que las cosas son tomadas firmemente en la mano, mientras que parece difícil operar dicho control.

El mapa de los lugares de disolución anunciadas de las células llamadas terroristas interpela. El hecho de que la alerta temprana de amenazas, que presuntamente fueron identificadas y enmarcadas, también parece

sospechoso.

De este punto de vista, el caso de Marruecos es sintomático: los elementos de las redes jihadistas han sido tal vez conocidos o "infiltrados": de acuerdo con una literatura mediática insistente los que más tarde fueron identificados como "talibanes de Marruecos" habrán recibido sus pasaportes lo más oficialmente posible, de las mismas manos de las autoridades nacionales, probablemente en el marco de un acuerdo saudi-americano-marroquí. En esta ola de "talibanes", ciertas trayectorias individuales se han autonomizado, deslizado, perdido, pero en general el conjunto de la ola habría quedado algo informal. Sus detenciones en masa se llevaron a cabo en el marco de la campaña de después del 16 de mayo, después del cambio del contexto de seguridad, y del cambio de los administradores de DST. Antes de esa fecha, la Ley contra el terrorismo no pudo pasar. Después de los atentados de mayo de 2003, un nuevo período ha comenzado: la aprobación de la Ley contra el terrorismo pasa rápidamente y por unanimidad los 19/20 del mismo mes, es decir, en dos o tres días después de las acciones terroristas, si bien que se enfrentaba a serias resistencias hasta la fecha, en un contexto de mayor apertura política y de afirmación de una mayor voluntad de respeto de los derechos humanos. Muchos activistas fueron detenidos. El número de detenidos superó, según unas evaluaciones creíbles, la cifra de unos 3500, con la pronunciación de unas 23 condenaciones a muerte.

Los contenidos particulares de este fenómeno se refieren a sus dimensiones nacional e internacional tal como lo demuestran los perfiles individuales (tales como Fikri Yousef, o de Al Khattab). Cada caso requiere distinguir entre los objetivos locales y los objetivos externos: en el caso de los reclutas jihadistas para Iraq, el fenómeno de los mártires "nómadas" se ha convertido gracias a la guerra de América, en el principal componente de la guerra terrorista y, en este contexto, los países de todo Al Magreb se han convertido en su conjunto en un terreno de movilización, con la excepción de Argelia, una zona que ya está bien arraigada en su propia guerra. Lo que reduce la contaminación argelina, lo que reduce las ataques terroristas en los países vecinos de Argelia, es más el cierre de las fronteras el carácter cerrado y autarcio del régimen argelino. De repente la exportación de la violencia proveniente del interior se pone difícil.

Una cierta renovación, últimamente, de la guerra islamista explica probablemente la aparición de Mauritania, frágil eslabón en la región, como un nuevo campo de confrontación. Muchos signos y actos recientes atestiguan de la actualidad del terrorismo en este país, especialmente en el norte del país, tradicionalmente conocido por ser una zona de contrabando. Esta zona tiene similitudes con otra zona del Magreb considerada ayer como una zona de riesgo, constituida por el oeste de Argelia y el este de Marruecos, y entrecortada por el eje de la comunicación Casablanca Fez-Nador.

Una entrada significativa consiste en aprehender el fenómeno terrorista en la región del Mediterráneo en su desarrollo general como un periodo distinto de la trayectoria de Al Qaeda, una serie de tercer momento.

El primer fenómeno hubiera sido constituido por el episodio de Afganistán y Pakistán. Esta primera etapa no se superó todavía el día de hoy. La dirección de la organización, la Central de Al-Qaeda, en el caso de su existencia según varios informes, se habrán fortalecido hoy y habrán logrado reconstruir su red maltratado por la invasión de Afganistán. Después de la invasión americana, el Central habrá actuado rápidamente para reorganizar sus filas mediante la promoción de fieles que habían servido de largo junto a bin Laden. La misma Central comenzó a recaudar fondos, contratar y capacitar a los combatientes. Ha consolidado su brazo mediático, y se convertiría en una eficaz máquina de propaganda jamás creada por una red terrorista.

La segunda etapa es la masiva erupción de la organización Al Qaeda aprovechando de la situación creada por la guerra por la administración Bush en Iraq, además del desarrollo de cadenas internacionales de la organización islamista. La guerra contra el terrorismo ha actuado en contra, como un impulso para las organizaciones terroristas.

El momento propiamente mediterráneo, el actual, aunque no se refiera solamente a los países del Magreb como lo demuestran los acontecimientos ocurridos en España el 11 de marzo. Sin embargo, la ampliación del alcance de los más notables es la del Magreb. En el Magreb, hay factores locales específicos, que consisten en el hecho de que las estructuras articuladas de El Qaeda, siguieron las antiguas estructuras, amplificándolas e incorporándolas de unas dimensiones internacionales (3). Y mientras que la retórica en Iraq está relacionada con la ocupación, en el Magreb, son a los nuevos cruzados, los que más son apuntados, con una especial atención a los objetivos situados en el sur de Europa.

Cabe señalar la ausencia de una adecuada agenda propiamente Magrebí, como lo demuestra claramente la falta de una cooperación estructurada entre Argelia y Marruecos. El resto de la cooperación parece insignificante, a la luz de las políticas llevadas a cabo y que tienen un contenido internacional. El problema político consiste en definir mejor las particularidades del puesto de Europa. Mientras que la agenda americana se centra en la dimensión unilateral, la europea se centra en de participación en términos de información. Los dos enfoques se distinguen también en razón de los cambios en el sistema internacional en general. Para los estadounidenses, Afganistán e Iraq siguen siendo prioritarios, mientras que para los europeos las prioridades siguen siendo España y Bélgica.

Los principales cambios del momento actual del terrorismo se refieren también a la respuesta a la pregunta de lo que es Al Qaeda hoy en día. Se basa en una simple idea a la disponibilidad de personas movilizadas para hacerse explotar sin necesidad de una larga formación, pudiendo bastar una simple preparación.(4)

Desde el punto de vista de la eficiencia, una organización como Al Qaeda no necesita grandes maniobras militares. Dispone del arma absoluta que es el uso del suicidio o del mártirio, el hombre bomba, el hombre instrumento, permitiendo atacar masivamente (5), en cualquier lugar y en cualquier momento (6), con un posible recurso a la toma de rehenes, todo ello apoyado en una profundización de la comunicación, reafinando y sistematizando los usos de la tecnología de información (7).

Por otro lado, otra característica importante de la fase actual, es el surgimiento de un gran cambio. Si bien el primer Zawahiri se dirigía a todas las facciones, este último es más "ubicado" dentro de los sunitas y chiítas, hoy se dirige bastante a los sunitas del mundo.

Hasta el entorno islamista que también ha cambiado, según los contextos nacionales. Hoy En Marruecos, se destacan tres grandes tendencias que constituyen el mundo natural de los islamistas radicales, o de sus antecedentes: 1) los moderados arraigados y extendidos en el medio institucional partidario y sindical, 2) los Sufis que ocupan la extensión; 3), pero también los jihadistas que difieren entre los que han construido un discurso inspirado por la violencia y quienes recurren a la violencia.

También debería incluir en este cuadro los cambios considerables introducidos por los duros acontecimientos de los últimos dos decenios en las mismas sociedades en cuestión: la sociedad civil parece ir más allá de las posiciones del Estado. Los argumentos de las luchas anti-terroristas han provocado cambios sustanciales en el mapa político. Uno de los ejemplos más notables es proporcionado por el comportamiento de los actores más visibles de la defensa de los derechos. En cuestiones de terrorismo, de hecho, el cuerpo de abogados, temerario por lo general en los asuntos políticos difíciles, parece haber disminuido. No podemos encontrar las estrellas de abogacía, como en los juicios políticos en los años de plomo. Ahora son los abogados de segunda o tercera categoría, que han tomado la defensa de los acusados en los casos de terrorismo en curso. Los abogados famosos o renombrados se distancian cada vez más de estos casos.

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2. Una oportunidad

El uso oportunista de la coyuntura anti terrorista, situación ya perceptible en la inflación semántica del término "terrorismo" a causa del peso de esta coyuntura y de los efectos de los medios de comunicación, especialmente después del 11 de septiembre.

La guerra global contra el terrorismo de la administración estadounidense ha, desde el principio, representado, a la vez, unas oportunidades y constituido unos riesgos para ciertos estados Arabes (8). La misma guerra ofrecía una serie de beneficios relacionados con la ayuda americana y con sus condicionalidades (financieras, económicas, acuerdo de libre mercado, diversas instalaciones), y con la cooperación americana en términos de seguridad (el acceso al equipo militar, programas de formación), sino también al apoyo político (legitimidad externa, programa más flexible de reformas, y según los casos, tolerancia de dosis de autoritarismo). Si la guerra contra el terrorismo ha sido una verdadera bendición para las formaciones políticas de distinto nivel de autoridad a fin de mejorar sus capacidades coercitivas, las puso también delante el riesgo de alejamiento de sus respectivas opiniones públicas.

Todo el enfoque ha sido la de tomar ventaja de estas nuevas circunstancias y reducir al mínimo el riesgo, a través de la construcción de un concepto oportunista de seguridad. Esta cuestión se ha convertido en un eje fundamental para cualquier tipo de maniobras. Algunos de ellos han obtenido ambos equipos militares, ciertamente limitados, el estatuto de mayor *non Nato ally*, mientras que otros han podido elaborar una justificación continua para mantener el estado de emergencia y han hecho aceptar a Estados Unidos de América el argumento según el cual, ciertos gobiernos han sido solos frente a los terroristas durante más de una década; algunos estados, tanto del Magreb como del Mashreq, señalados con el dedo por el poco caso que hacen de los derechos humanos, se han convertido por ejemplo en los centros activos de grandes proyectos de democratización y difusión de los derechos humanos, tal como el proyecto del Gran Oriente Medio y sus múltiples versiones. La lucha contra el terrorismo ha justificado también la producción de leyes y reglamentos enrayando la tendencia hacia la liberalización y la democratización.

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3. Una gran dificultad

Sin embargo, la tendencia a hacer del terrorismo la máxima prioridad no se basa solamente sobre la maniobra, lejos de ello. Se trata realmente de un apremio objetivo. Este fenómeno de carácter político, económico, social, cultural, policial y militar representa una pesada tendencia que afecta durablemente los países árabes. El terrorismo constituye, en efecto, un momento clave de una naturaleza especial en los edificios de seguridad en la región.

El mismo oblige estos países a replantearse nuevos vínculos entre *Hard security* y *comprehensive security* y entre unas nuevas percepciones de amenazas, a unas nuevas jerarquías entre ellas, a unos nuevos acontecimientos políticos, económicos y sociales, integrando las preocupaciones de seguridad.

Y si bien el fenómeno del terrorismo está cambiando, el conocimiento parece haber permanecido inmóvil, con pocos cambios. Por lo tanto, nos dimos tardíamente cuenta de que tanto en 2007 resultó ser la evidente debilidad y las limitaciones de nuestro conocimiento del terrorismo. Los conceptos, teorías y enfoques no parecen haber sido capaces de desarrollar un concepto convincente del terrorismo y lo que tiene relación con la cuestión. Grandes problemas epistemológicos son planteados por la cuestión rápidamente reducida a la lógica del problema que requiere una solución. La lucha contra el terrorismo se resume por el momento a una aprehensión más o menos racional. No hay ninguna razón que permite de pensar el fenómeno. Hay pocas herramientas que facilitan el control político del problema terrorista. Es difícil controlar la cuestión: se trata de dimensiones incontroladas. La incertidumbre reside en la dotación de la soberanía tal como lo demuestra la densidad de interferencias entre los planos nacional e internacional. También hay que añadir la especificidad de las distintas formas de radicalismo islamista, las variedades de formas de violencia política (Al Qaeda, el GSPC, Salafiya Jihadia...) no son tal, como la presentan ciertos análisis reductores idénticas a Hezbollah, a Hamas, a la resistencia iraquí y sahawate. El proceso de estudio de los expedientes pone de manifiesto las grandes contradicciones. No es coincidencia que la lucha no ha obstaculizado la perpetuidad, incluso el desarrollo del fenómeno y su ampliación.

Las fuerzas policiales, la inteligencia han conocido una nueva etapa en su historia: una reestructuración de los servicios, un cambio de personal, una nueva logística, nuevos recursos humanos (aumento del número de partidas presupuestarias, el sub-tema de entrenamiento de seguridad de la población), la apertura de los servicios de seguridad, antes opacos, sobre los medios de comunicación, la revisión de los programas de

formación de institutos especializados, incluida la integración de cursos sobre el Islam radical. Asimismo se han más adoptado los límites del enfoque de seguridad en el sentido clásico del término, y la importancia de otros aspectos que no son estrictamente de tipo militar o policial instigada y la búsqueda de adiciones como la seguridad espiritual (9), Económica y social, la privatización del sector de la seguridad, la dimensión migratoria del fenómeno, etcétera.

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4. Una desestabilización con perspectivas inciertas

Además de los disturbios causados por los ataques y su cuota de víctimas, detenciones, lo que es notable de los últimos años son constituidos por las manifestaciones significativas de las fracciones de la organización islamista radical Al Qaeda. Las acciones del último período pusieron de manifiesto la importancia de cada estado árabe en la estrategia de la red Al Qaeda, que no consiste únicamente en buscar reclutas de zonas calientes como el Iraq, a menudo considerados como los verdaderos campos de batalla. En las estadísticas de Oriente Medio los actos de violencia política, la presencia de Magrebinos es al menos tan importante como la de los Machreqinos. Listas, no de combatientes, pero de mártires dispuestas a sacrificarse, han sido publicadas por diversas prensas locales. Fuera de Iraq, los países del Magreb parecían también implicados como los del Mashreq por lo que se llama el "terrorismo". Si bien el interrogatorio de lo que ahora reside detrás del nombre genérico de Al Qaeda, a veces utilizado para referirse a las amenazas a la seguridad de tipo islamista, es importante cuestionar las teorías, las doctrinas, las ideas, que siendo sujetas a una presión mundial de todo tipo, parecen evolucionar sin parar.

Hoy en día, el fenómeno del terrorismo se ha convertido en un fenómeno nómada, cuyos objetivos son en Palestina y en Iraq. La lucha encabezada por las organizaciones islamistas que predicán la violencia política es ahora una guerra por poderes externos concentrada en unos objetivos exteriores. Sobre la cuarentena de detenidos actualmente en Tetuán, el cargo concierne el reclutamiento de jóvenes para Iraq. La mayoría de los casos de células terroristas desde 2006 están vinculados a la guerra en Iraq (10). En este contexto, la particularidad de la violencia política en Argelia es quedar marcado por la lógica local. La cuestión actualmente conoce un proceso de conversión, donde es difícil sentirse excluido, y donde la negociación juega un papel inevitable como lo demuestra el ejemplo de los informes en Egipto entre el Gobierno y las organizaciones islamistas radicales.

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5. Escenarios

Tres oportunidades por lo menos son disponibles para el análisis:

1) Después de la administración Bush, la continuidad de la situación actual es, probable, no tanto debido a la limitada influencia de los cambios en la nueva administración de EE.UU., sino porque los programas locales lo requieren. La fabricación de los Estados aceptables parece haber fracasado por ahora en Afganistán, en Iraq y en Somalia. La guerra contra el terrorismo sólo ha aumentado los flujos en todo el mundo.

De hecho, las prioridades de la administración americana parecen llamadas a cambiar. Sin que el terrorismo desaparezca, las prioridades consistirán de ahora en adelante en el cambio climático, China, las amenazas económicas, las políticas sociales. Pero la guerra contra el terrorismo revestirá otros aspectos: la ilusión de una central del terrorismo, productora de ideología, de decisiones, de órdenes, puede declinar. La idea ya era demasiado cómoda para la lucha contra el terrorismo centro en términos de logística, red de circuitos, puntos de conexión. Si la lucha contra el terrorismo se racionaliza y relativiza las cosas, a contrario puede ser necesario ajustar el discurso del terrorismo, y adaptarlo a las condiciones locales, y a los usuarios obedeciendo a las lógicas territoriales muy diversas. La tendencia probable es la de la apropiación por las organizaciones locales del terror.

2) Cuando los estados capitalistas se declaran a la altura de sus fuerzas, la actividad terrorista era continúa. Hoy en día con la crisis financiera, ¿no tienen más razón para hacerlo? En las condiciones actuales de debilitamiento de las economías, el grado de peligro ¿no parece superior? El terrorismo era también fuerte por la anarquía de los movimientos de capitales. Ha beneficiado también en gran medida de la globalización del comercio y de la filosofía del libre mercado mundial. La adopción del sistema de control parece reducir el margen de maniobra de dichas organizaciones terroristas.

3) Tanto los mismos desafíos persisten, la disminución del terrorismo de inspiración islamista parece poco probable en el Mediterráneo. Y si no se trata por el momento, de negociar con Al Qaeda, muchos signos indican que los estadounidenses no son reticentes a negociar con los talibanes. Los mismos americanos, han integrado, reclutado y empleado a los Sahawate en Iraq. También la pregunta ¿cómo terminaran los grupos terroristas? De los 648 grupos que utilizan la violencia y llamados terroristas, los 43% han negociado políticamente y fueron finalmente incorporados en el proceso institucional, 40% de estas organizaciones fueron integradas a través de las políticas de seguridad aplicadas por La policía, los servicios de inteligencia o del ejército; 7% de ellas han sido derrotadas por la fuerza militar, mientras que el 10% alcanzaron sus objetivos.(11).

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NOTAS

(1) Ver por ejemplo la bibliografía imponente de Gérard Chaliand, *Les guerres irrégulières. XXIème-XXIIème siècles*, Folio Actuel, Gallimard, Paris, 2008, pp930-940

(2) François Burgat, Sobre el terrorismo islámico y el campamento de las democracias. Algunos hitos en el "futuro de Al Qaeda", *Confluencias Mediterráneo*, Nº49, printemps 2004.

(3) Ibid.

(4) En algunos países de la región, por ejemplo, se señaló, los aprendices matriculados en las escuelas de conducción para aprender a conducir automóviles, pero no completa su aprendizaje mediante la obtención de licencias de conducción, el objetivo era de preparar más actos de violencia. Además, la demostración de fuerza las manifestaciones en las calles como hemos visto en algunas ciudades en el Iraq sigue siendo excepcional. Esto realmente no es el estilo del terrorismo.

(5) La izquierda de George Habash ha inaugurado el género

(6) Intervenir en las elecciones como fue el caso durante las elecciones los EE.UU. y en España

(7) El gran problema para el oeste de la violencia armada, y los civiles.

(8) La dualidad de liderazgo en el gobierno barba: la competencia entre el Ministerio de los asuntos religiosos y el Ministerio del Interior.

(9) Discurso de Mohamed VI, julio 2008.

(10) Véase el caso de *al tajdid*.

(11) Como los grupos terroristas terminan? Implicaciones para la lucha contra al-Qaeda, en www.rand.org

Resumen

Tras discutir dos definiciones del terrorismo islamista, el autor plantea que el conjunto de los países del Magreb se ha convertido en un terreno de movilización para dicho fenómeno. Este debe ser entendido, en la región del Mediterráneo, como un estadio distintivo en la trayectoria de Al Qaeda. Se describen las tres grandes tendencias que actualmente constituyen el mundo natural de los islamistas radicales o de sus antecedentes en Marruecos. Al mismo tiempo, se critica el uso oportunista de una coyuntura antiterrorista y se reflexiona sobre unos escenarios futuros en los que la disminución del terrorismo de inspiración islamista en el ámbito mediterráneo parece poco probable.

Palabras clave:

Terrorismo islamista, Magreb, Al Qaeda, islamismo radical, Marruecos.

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Estados de la cuestión

TARGETING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: EXAMINING THE THREAT IN NORTH AFRICA AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS

Jennifer Giroux

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

Introduction

A changing scenario

Grasping the trends

Conclusion: Indications and Counter-Measures

"Energy security is among the most serious security and economic challenges, both today and in the future. As the economies of the World grow and societies develop, so does the importance of energy. And so does the importance of the infrastructures that produce and supply this energy."

Dr. Raphael F. Perl, Head of OSCE Action Against Terrorism Unit. [\[1\]](#)

Introduction

In the last decade, major terrorist attacks such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US) and the Madrid train bombings have catapulted international terrorism to the top of national security priorities around the globe and bring to light the massive devastation, civilian losses and fear that terrorism can cause. Moreover, images of civilian casualties in these dramatic attacks have influenced our perception of the targeting choices of today's terrorist groups where civilian targets are largely associated with nearly all terrorist attacks. This view, however, is not supported by the available data on terrorist attack where, according to the United States (US) National Counterterrorism Center's WITS terrorism database and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), many non-state violent groups carry out attacks that commonly avoid civilian targets. In fact, a significant and in fact increasing number of attacks are on energy infrastructure (this includes oil, gas, and electrical infrastructure as well as energy sector employees).

Examining this trend more closely shows that in 2003, roughly 25 per cent of terrorist attacks were aimed at the energy sector. Notably, this number has jumped to 30 and 35 per cent between 2003 and 2007 - the long-term trend revealing more attacks aimed at energy infrastructure (EI) occurring annually. With oil accounting for nearly "40% of the world's energy and 96% of its transportation", the protection of EI has thus become a top priority for most industrialized nations. [\[2\]](#) Efforts have been made to enhance the protection of these assets throughout North America and the European Union (EU) but the most significant sites of oil and gas exploration and production are increasingly located in politically unstable countries that are marred by poor economic and social conditions. [\[3\]](#) Additionally, the benefits that come with attacking the energy sector have risen considerably in the 21st century as such events generate widespread media attention and can create broad economic turbulence – translated into higher global energy costs - due to the energy market's interconnected nature, growing demand, and short-term supply shortages.

The African continent – which retains 10 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves and 12 per cent of the proven gas reserves – contains twelve countries that are currently net exporters of oil; the top producers being Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Angola. A closer look, however, reveals that Africa's web of oil and gas pipelines and critical facilities are oftentimes built within hostile regions that are home to domestic conflicts and transnational terrorist groups. North Africa (NA), specifically, is an important source of energy – mainly gas - for European nations, particularly Spain, Italy, and France who are dependent on NA gas supplies to meet much of their energy needs. However, in line with the trend described herein, resources in this region are threatened by ongoing conflict and politically motivated violent groups, such as Al-Qa`ida of the Islamic Maghreb, who have begun to threaten and/or attack the energy sector in this sensitive region. In light of these developments, this paper sets out to examine the changing global scenario within the energy security environment and highlights the threat to EI in Northern Africa and the implications this has for its European neighbors.

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A changing scenario

Since the 1980s, energy infrastructure (EI) has been used as a strategic weapon and symbolic economic target by various non-state armed groups operating in many largely fragile countries. But while targeting EI is not an entirely new phenomenon, the 21st century has opened the door to a world where local events have global consequences, communication and information move rapidly through a variety of media, financial systems are intertwined, and developing nations that once struggled now compete for vital natural resources to feed their burgeoning economies. According to the US State Department, between 1996 and 2004, there were at least 80 terrorist attacks against oil companies worldwide that resulted in kidnappings, casualties, damages, and large monetary losses. [\[4\]](#) As seen in Figure 1, however, attacks aimed at energy resources are on a steady incline over the long-term and have jumped considerably in the last five years. [\[5\]](#)




Figure 1[6]

The trend further reveals that not only are such resources being targeted both inside and outside of conflict zones,[7] but the energy sector is increasingly sensitive to any disruptions, whether perceived or real, due to a number of factors that relate to the 'peaking' of supply. Such factors include increased demand by growing developing economies as well as continued robust demand from developed countries, short-term supply shortages, tight production characteristics (little spare capacity for oil production) and lack of growth in OPEC production between 2005 and 2007, accelerated speculation, higher costs for oil exploration and development (much of which is being conducted in deepwater, offshore locations), a weaker US dollar, and increased commodity prices. In short, higher energy costs have been a result of market fears that rising demand will eventually outgrow available supply.[8] These concerns are reinforced by threats to energy supplies. The current climate where crude prices have dropped beneath US\$40 per barrel[9] due to circumstances arising from the global credit crunch, largely decreased demand that have led to oversupply, is temporary. OPEC has already begun to make cuts to its supply so to create tighter supply characteristics, in an effort to keep oil prices around US\$40-50 per barrel during this downturn. Once the global economy recovers, however, and demand resumes its ascension, oil prices will rise most likely to new heights.[10] Hence in the long-term markets will continue to be sensitive to disruptions.

While market-related factors, such as tighter supply chains and changes in demand, are the primary areas that dictate global energy costs, other events such as geopolitical turbulence and threats of any kind to the oil infrastructure create uncertainty and also weigh into pricing.[11] Such uncertainty results in a security premium being placed on oil prices. According to international energy consultant Dr. Gal Luft, "whether perpetuated for political or criminal reasons, assaults on oil infrastructure have added a 'fear premium' of roughly US\$10 per barrel of oil." Thus a single energy 'event' can create "shockwaves through the world energy order, push prices up or down, and set off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power." [12] Thus, while the EI has been targeted for many years in various countries, the effects of attacks have only recently generated more attention.

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Grasping the trends

Elements of EI, such as oil pipelines and electrical pylons, are oftentimes easily accessible and present the perfect "soft" target that can result in economic damage and losses if attacked.[13] A global snapshot of recent EI events reveals that various armed groups have incorporated EI into their attacks. Within Asia, since the 1980s the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has threatened and carried out sporadic attacks on oil and gas pipelines in Turkey and northern Iraq – the most recent of which was the bombing of the newly constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. In Pakistan, Baloch militias have also carried out numerous attacks against power transmission lines and gas installations resulting in disruptions to electricity in the Punjab region, whereas in nearby India the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have claimed credit for a series of pipeline attacks in 2006. Russia is not immune from such events as demonstrated in 2004 when Chechen terrorists attacked several pipelines near Moscow, Volgograd, and Stavropol. A half a world away in North and South America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) have carried out repeated attacks on Colombia's Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, which transports on average 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Arauca province to the Caribbean coast. The most recent attack occurred in June 2008 and resulted in a temporary suspension of production activities. Further north in Mexico a string of oil and gas pipeline attacks carried out during 2007 by EPR militants resulted in supply shortages, economic losses, and damages, while news of the attacks caused natural gas futures to increase.

But turning to the threat posed by violent Islamist groups reveals the increasing appeal of EI attacks. In February 2003, members of a violent Muslim extremist group who had realized the value of attacking the EI published an online call to the "mujahideen of all Arab and Muslim countries in which the West has military bases or are involved in the energy industry, to rise against these interests in the name of the Muslim Ummah." Al-Qa`ida (AQ), which had previously opposed targeting oil in the Middle East, followed suit and announced a major shift in the group's strategy in late 2004 by calling on members to "Do everything you can to stop the biggest plundering operation in history – the plundering of the resources of the present and future generations in collusion with the agents and the aliens [...] Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf." [14] Such a statement is stark contrast to previous ones made by Osama bin Laden who acknowledged the strategic importance of the energy sector. In the 1996 "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" bin Laden rejected EI attacks and called on followers "to protect this (oil) wealth and not to include it in the battle as it is a great Islamic

wealth and a large economical power essential for the soon to be established Islamic state, by Allah's Permission and Grace."^[15] However, it should be noted that AQ had begun exploring attacks on energy infrastructure in 2002 when it attacked the *Limburg*, a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen carrying 397,000 barrels of crude. In its statement claiming credit for the attack, AQ made sure to point out that the incident "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but [...] on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word."^[16]

By 2005, a jihadist website featured the report the "Map of Future Al-Qaeda Operations," which essentially called for more attacks on EI and stated that such targets should be a priority for AQ. ^[17] With the presence of such a strategic resource in their own neighborhood, AQ and other violent groups realized that they did not need to carry out all attacks in Europe or North America in order to generate global attention and cause economic damage to these regions. This change in strategy and call for more attacks against EI coupled with increased volatility in the Middle East and elsewhere, has resulted in a jump in security premiums from US\$2 to \$15 per barrel depending on event. ^[18] For example, following an April 2008 attack on a Japanese oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, sweet crude rose to a record US\$117.40 per barrel. ^[19] Shortly after, another attack in May 2008 on an oil refinery in Aden, Yemen resulted in prices increasing to US\$122.80 per barrel. When al-Qaida attempted to attack the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia in February 2006, the attempt alone drove oil prices up by US\$2 per barrel. ^[20] More recently, AQ affiliates have carried out attacks on oil installations in Yemen, including a June 2008 attack on the Safir oil refinery and a subsequent video of the attack posted online. ^[21]

Al-Qa`ida's shift in targeting selection has implications for the Northern African energy security market. As briefly noted NA provides much needed energy resources to its European neighbors as the EU receives 30 per cent of its gas needs from Algeria alone. Thus even the threat to such resources can create future market insecurity and, in a worst case scenario, disrupt supply. With AQ affiliates, such as AQIM, operating throughout the region and other politically motivated armed groups seeing the value in EI attacks, the threat to the energy sector is real and in many cases has already been articulated through attacks aimed at the energy sector in Algeria and Sudan. The following section begins by examining the situation in Algeria and the growing jihadist threat that has taken aim at the energy sector. Sudan will also be discussed as it highlights another regional case where armed groups have attacked EI as a platform to air their grievances to a larger audience.

Algeria

From 1991 until 2002, civil war raged in Algeria between the government and several Islamic insurgent groups, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Foreign workers were killed during the war, and Muslim extremist rebels warned foreign companies investing in the oil sector to withdraw from the country or face serious damage to their installations. Nevertheless, until 1995, the "government-owned Sonatrach hydrocarbon company had escaped the violence that has killed an estimated 30,000 Algerians in three years of strife, largely because its oil and gas operations represent the economic lifeblood of all sides in the conflict. Both the government and the Muslim extremists trying to topple it acknowledge that 95 percent of Algeria's foreign exchange earnings come from the petroleum sector."^[22] Another group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), had little chance of threatening EI, since at that time it did not control the territory through which pipelines ran. Starting in 1995, however, rebels began to attack energy infrastructure assets. As one Western oil executive at the time commented on the insurgent groups: "Something has changed [...] It could be they are trying to raise the stakes."^[23] Despite a seeming increase of attacks against energy infrastructure and production sites, Algeria's hydrocarbon industry grew rapidly. As the Financial Post observed, Sonatrach had signed more than a dozen lucrative exploration agreements with international oil companies, which have already spent roughly US\$400 million on these projects. ^[24]

Heavy protection of pipelines and facilities and the location of oil and gas fields have largely provided much of the buffer needed to dissuade attacks and/or limit damage. With the stream of revenues provided by Algeria's hydrocarbon resources and the political volatility, the government was quick to learn that extensive protection of infrastructure was needed and worthwhile. Also, most of the oil and gas is found far south of Algiers in the Eastern Sahara, whereas most of the fighting took place in the north and the government controls travel to the oil and gas producing region by requiring a special permits. As Porter notes, "Unlike southern Iraq or Nigeria's delta states where insurgents attack those countries' important oil sectors in order to call attention to their grievances and advance their political agenda, the key oil and gas producing areas in Algeria are in the south of the country and are far from population centers."^[25] However, much vulnerability continues to exist at ports - located in heavily populated areas such as Algiers, Oran, Arzew and Skikda - where oil and gas is lifted for transport and Algeria's main gas liquefaction installation is located in Skikda.

The 2006 merger of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) with Al-Qa`ida, now known as Al-Qa`ida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), marked a revival in the Algerian Islamist militant movement. In 2006 and 2007, respectively, suspected AQIM militants bombed a natural gas pipeline - with the earlier attack temporarily cutting off supply through that line. Other EI related attacks have involved bombing buses carrying employees for the oil sector. Overall, this points to an emerging trend within Algeria to target the energy sector by attacking soft, mobile targets and puts this strategy in harmony with AQ's call to attack energy resources. However, the attacks on EI are relatively few compared to campaigns in other states and analysts suspect that this may be due to a split within the group between those that "want to bring the group's objectives into line with the broader global al-Qaeda movement and those who want to retain the group's "Algerianist" orientation."^[26] In the short-term it appears that while sporadic EI attacks will occur, mainly on softer targets, most attacks will focus on government targets.

Yet as energy supply channels tighten and global demand surges, the threats aimed at Algeria's energy sector have great potential to create the perception of vulnerability which will in turn influence pricing. In addition, non-state armed groups, like AQIM, continue to change, innovate and prove their ability to circumvent security measures by carrying out asymmetric attacks. The Nigerian-based Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has carried out repeated attacks (an estimated 60 to 70 annually) on EI in Nigeria since 2006, gaining international notoriety and causing production to be cut by 20 to 25 percent (around 4-600,000 barrels per day). The Northern African groups, who operate within this energy rich region, may see the effects of such

attacks and in turn step up and launch more organized and systematic blows to the energy sector. As noted in a 2007 Rand Corporation report, "Chaos and anarchy could threaten production or give rise to short-term strategies of disruption, including terrorist attacks on production facilities and pipelines." [27] Algeria's increasing significance as a European and U.S. energy supplier makes such threats even more concerning.

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Sudan

Since its independence in 1955, Sudan experienced intermittent civil war as a result of economic and political inequalities that were fueled by the divisions between the dominant Arab-Muslim population to the north and a non-Arab, mostly Christian population to the south. Temporary peace in the 1970s, which allowed oil development and exploration to commence, was followed by a resumption of hostilities in 1983 that quickly halted production activities. [28] The discovery of oil, while not the root cause of conflict in Sudan, added another conflict dimension to a volatile region that is torn over economic resource distribution. As Kot aptly noted, "Since oil, like all strategic resources, is a source of power, it illogically becomes an important element in the conflict (1992: 104)." In the case of the conflict in Sudan, the oil region lies in the coveted territory dividing the north and south of the country. Due to the civil war, oil development was suspended until 1997 when peace, albeit a temporary one, was reached. However, it did not take long for conflict to resume, and the energy sector took center stage and soon became a valuable target for the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the main rebel group based in the south that fought the government until 2005.

Compared to the campaign of violence in Nigeria, attacks on Sudanese EI have been modest, primarily due to a concerted effort to protect facilities situated in the midst of the conflict zone. But while armed groups have not been able to cause major disruptions, they have managed to limit exploration and development activities through a sustained campaign to destabilize the oil-producing southern region. The first EI attack was recorded in September 1999 – shortly after Sudan began exporting oil – when SPLA rebels bombed a large pipeline that carried oil to a Red Sea coastal facility. [29] While this attack did not cause major damage, it was meant to "deprive the Sudanese government of funds with which to keep itself in power and to finance its war effort against rebels in the south of the country," according to an SPLA spokesman. [30]

Following the initial attack in 1999, the SPLA continued to carry out smaller EI attacks, all of which were either unsuccessful or resulted in little damage. Between 2000 and 2001, the SPLA managed to launch five successful attacks on installations in the Western Upper Nile. Following a June 2001 warning to oil companies advising them to withdraw from the region, the SPLA ambushed a government-escorted convoy that was carrying oil company equipment. [31] Shortly after this attack, the SPLA claimed credit for a raid on the Heglig oil field, stating that "extensive damage was inflicted [...] the production and flow of the oil came to a complete halt. The main central pumping station and fuel stores were destroyed." [32] While the government denied this event, Talisman confirmed the attack but noted that little damage had occurred.

From 2001–2004, the SPLA continued its campaign with an intensified effort to cause disruptions to the energy sector by firing rockets, bombing pipelines, kidnapping oil workers, and ambushing convoys. In one attack, the SPLA had reportedly blocked the route between Juba and Malakal, "making the eastern area of Unity State non-operational [...] to all traffic, whether oil companies or government of Sudan security." [33] In a 2004 attack, Sudanese rebels targeted an oil field and stated that they "chose the oil fields because this is the wealth of Sudan, which this government is not sharing with all of its people." [34]

The SPLA has also repeatedly accused the central government in Khartoum of using oil revenues to finance the war; however, in response to this claim, Sudan's first vice-president, Ali Osman Taha, stated: "We do not use the proceeds from petroleum in the civil war," instead claiming that the government was "directing those revenues towards development and services." However, in 2000, a government official in the south resigned over the mismanagement of funds and the lack of resources to address development needs, noting that the "oil revenues were intensifying the war in the south." [35] Today, Sudan is once again attempting to maintain peace. However, such efforts are incredibly sensitive and in many regions violence continues – especially in Darfur. The oil industry is still a major target as demonstrated in an October 2008 attack when Darfur rebels abducted nine Chinese oil workers at an oil field, operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company near Abyei in southern Sudan. [36] The rebels, who have accused China of indirectly helping the central government fund military operations with oil revenues, demanded a share in the oil wealth. [37] The oil resources will continue to be a major issue in this region and drive the region back into war if the socio-economic situation does not improve.

Conclusion: Indications and Counter-Measures

Terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamist groups within the EU borders are a concern and measures to prevent future catastrophic attacks must continue. However, as North Africa becomes a more significant supplier of energy to Western Europe, threats to the energy infrastructure in this region must also be considered. As discussed, due to the 21st century energy picture EI attacks, or the threat of, can lead to uncertainty amongst market players and overall insecurity that raises global energy costs – thus placing additional budgetary pressures on states and consumers. The worst case scenario being that attacks can affect supply along a key route. The natural gas found within the Maghreb is of particular importance to its European neighbors as gas is a regional commodity – thus disruptions that originate in the Maghreb will affect the regional supply chain. The events in Algeria show that there is an interest by AQIM to attack the energy sector; however, there has not been a broader campaign as seen in Sudan or in more extreme cases such as Nigeria or Iraq.

To counter this trend and the inflexibility of the current energy environment, states need to adopt a multifaceted approach. In the long-term, the EU needs to make a concerted effort to diversify its energy portfolio, develop domestic energy sources and invest in alternative energies so not to rely so heavily on oil and gas from unstable neighborhoods. In the short-term however, not only should states address the issue of disruption to energy flows by assisting in the fortification of facilities, but they must also work with the media and financial markets that react to such threats. Energy security can also be improved by increasing global strategic stockpiles in

consumer countries[38] and hence the international community – lead by North America and the EU – must press for capacity increases to mitigate the consequences of disruptions.[39]

In addition, oil and gas importing countries can allocate much-needed aid to producing countries – such as Sudan and Algeria– who struggle with securing energy resources. European countries, for instance, could provide funding for costly technology to enhance the security of pipelines and facilities. Other assistance can come in the form of military training, funding police and community patrols, and strengthening capacity and facilities.[40] In Iraq, the US helped fund 14,000 security guards that were placed in critical locations along major pipelines and at facilities. Similar efforts are underway in the Gulf of Guinea and off Somalia's coast where NATO, the EU and the US Navy, respectively, have provided assistance in maritime security. Southern Europe, who relies on gas supplies from Northern Africa, may also require the assistance of NATO to help protect key installations in the Maghreb. While important, military support may suppress violence aimed at EI but it will not take it completely out of the equation therefore community engagement is also a key element. For example the Algerian extremist groups rely heavily on community support to continue their violent campaign. Should EI attacks be deemed unfavorable within the community then AQIM may continue to avoid serious attacks on EI. Communities can also serve as the eye's and ear's for intelligence officials and alert them when such attacks are being planned or, in some cases, who perpetrated the act. In closing, with many new energy sites being discovered offshore and oil tankers traversing over uncertain waters, such external state support will continue to be an important element in securing supplies located in unstable regions.

Volver

[1] Perl, R.F. 2008. Protecting critical energy infrastructures against terrorist attacks: threats, challenges and opportunities for international co-operation. Reinforced NATO Economic Committee Meeting. September 22

Available at: http://www.osce.org/documents/atu/2008/09/33084_en.pdf.

[2] Luft, G., 2005. Pipeline sabotage is terrorist's weapon of choice. Institute for Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) Energy Security. 25 March. Available at: .

[3] The world's most significant sites of oil and gas exploration and production are located in increasingly politically unstable locations, such as Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela.

[4] Lindsay, M., 2005. The Security Threat to Oil Companies in and out of Conflict Zones, Business Briefing: Exploration and Production: The Oil & Gas Review, 2.

[5] Iraqi Pipeline Watch ; Nigeria: oil infrastructure, delta militants and increased attacks. Stratfor. 30 July 2008. Available at: <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/nigeria_oil_infrastructure_delta_militants_and_increased_attacks>.

[6] This data was compiled using data gathered from the Global Terrorism Database. Additional monitoring was performed to capture attacks that may have not been included in the GTD. The data for 2007 is still being gathered and thus 2007 attacks may be slightly higher than currently listed. Indeed, many of the attacks between June 2003 and March 2008 occurred in Iraq. There have been 469 attack aimed at Iraqi energy infrastructure (2003 = 37; 2004 = 148; 2005 = 100; 2006 = 101; 2007=59; 2008 = 4). However the sustained attacks in Nigeria and EI attacks in other regions during this period have also contributed to the dramatic rise. The recent attacks in Yemen and increasing piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia (which have targeted oil tankers) have also contributed to the increase.

[7] Attacks by Kataeb Jund al-Yemen (Soldiers of Yemen Brigades – an affiliate of AQ) against oil facilities in Yemen and attempted attacks on Saudi facilities, both non-conflict zones, are indications that non-state armed groups can achieve global energy disruptions by targeting installations in their home territory where they can take advantage of security deficits and more local support. Zambelis, C. 2006. Attacks in Yemen reflect al-Qaeda's global oil strategy. Terrorism Monitor 6(17). Available at: .

[8] The International Energy Agency has noted that oil could peak as early as 2020. Macalister, T. & Monbiot, G. 2008.. Global oil supply will peak in 2020 says energy agency. The Guardian, 15 December. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/15/global-oil-supply-peak-2020-prediction>

[9] At the time of publication, crude prices were slowly climbing and hovering around US\$40 per barrel.

[10] IEA 2005: Oil Market Report. International Energy Agency. 12 April. According to the IEA, between the 1980s to 2003/04 oil demand rose consistently and thus pushed oil inventories to lower levels. This tight supply coupled with the geopolitical uncertainties and the increased market speculation related to these uncertainties that have characterized the last decade have been the chief reason why prices have increased so dramatically.

[11] For example, a war in an oil-producing country, poor weather conditions (such as tropical storms) in oil-producing region, or direct attacks on the EI all create uncertainty in the market that can result in price volatility.

[12] Roberts, P. 2005. The end of oil. The decline of the petroleum economy and the rise of the new energy order. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 93.

[13] Nuclear facilities, which are typically located in relatively stable and developed nations, have not been targeted. In addition, these facilities are 'hard' targets that are operationally challenging to attack. Hydroelectric facilities, on the other hand, were targeted by Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) in Peru and caused a city-wide blackout in 1983. The vast networks of interrelated facilities in the petroleum and natural gas industries, however, are more accessible targets and require less investment.

- [14] Website Posts Full Version of New Audiotape Attributed to Bin Ladin, FBIS Report - FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.
- [15] PBS Online NewsHour. 1996. Bin Laden's Fatwa. Available at www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.
- [16] Daly, J.C.K. 2006. Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda's Next Target? Terrorism Monitor vol. 4, no. 4. 23 February 2006. Available at: .
- [17] At-Taqwa, Z. Al Qaeda and the Battle for Oil. Available at: <http://www.alqimamah.net/showthread.php?t=1226>.
- [18] Zambelis, 2008.
- [19] Fackler, M. 2008. Oil market rattled by attack on Japanese tanker. International Herald Tribune. 21 April. Available at: <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/04/21/asia/22tanker.php>
- [20] BBC News Online. 2006. Saudis foil oil facility attack. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4747488.stm. It should be noted that such attacks have little chance for success with Saudi Arabia spending between US\$1.2 to 1.5 billion annually to protect its oil and gas industry; however in this case we see that even the threat to supplies resulted in a jump in prices
- [21] "Saudis foil oil facility attack". BBC News. 24 February 2006. Available at: . Video available at: .
- [22] United Press International. 1995. Algeria facing increased sabotage. May 12.
- [23] Ibid.
- [24] The Financial Post. 1995. Algeria's hydrocarbon industry grows despite unrest. August 4: 37.
- [25] Porter, G. 2007. Islamist terrorism and energy sector security in Algeria. The Terrorism Monitor, 5 (12). June 21. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_005_012.pdf.
- [26] Ibid
- [27] Rand Corporation. 2007. Persian Gulf Security. Improving Allied Military Contributions. P.24.
- [28] In 1978, Chevron discovered oil near Bentiu and Heglig, in southern Sudan
- [29] Muir. J. 1999. World: African rebels attack Sudan oil pipeline. BBC News. 21 September. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/453552.stm>
- [30] Ibid.
- [31] Blanche, E. 2001. Sudan: oil fuels internal unrest. The Middle East. Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_2001_Oct/ai_n25037107/pg_2?tag=artBody;col1
- [32] Ibid.
- [33] Ibid.
- [34] Luft, 2005.
- [35] Blanche, 2001.
- [36] BBC News. 2008. China workers abducted in Sudan. October 19. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7678829.stm>
- [37] Ibid. At the time of writing, the fate of the victims was not known.
- [38] Schmid, A.P. 2007. Targeting oil and other energy resources and infrastructure. MIPT.
- [39] Ibid. Capacity increases can help cushion market sensitivity. For example, despite continued turmoil in Nigeria's oil-producing region, the price of oil has been declining steadily since August 2008 due to decreased demand from a slowing global economy. Even with OPEC cutting production down in addition to instability in oil-producing regions, the market is cushioned by the, perceived, healthy supply.
- [40] Such security measures can involve: burying pipelines, hardening the pipeline against corrosion, increasing patrols and security forces for facilities, security cameras, etc. Technology is another important investment that can provide better protection. Developments using seismic sensing of underground vibrations can identify whether unauthorized personnel are near a pipeline – thus preventing sabotage.

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Abstract

This article examines terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure in the 21st century energy security environment where tighter supply channels have created a market that is more vulnerable to disruptions. In addition, most new discoveries of oil and gas are found in uncertain neighborhoods where conflict and instability threaten production. As northern Africa is a significant source of natural gas for western European nations, this analysis will focus on events in Sudan and Algeria where energy infrastructure – chiefly oil and gas resources – have been targeted. Statements made by al-Qa`ida (AQ) in regards to targeting energy infrastructure will also be discussed as they may point to an emerging strategy in northern Africa where AQ affiliates operate. Concluding remarks will highlight short and long-term strategies needed to protect energy resources and deter groups from carrying out attacks that can either affect key supply channels or, rather more likely, cause markets to respond

by raising energy costs due to – perceived – vulnerability in supply.

Key words

Islamic terrorism, energy infrastructure, Sudan, Algeria.

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Estados de la cuestión

EL TERRORISMO ISLÁMICO EN FRANCIA

Jean-François Daguzan

[Resumen-Palabras clave](#) / [Abstract-Keywords](#)

- **Etapas del terrorismo moderno en Francia**
- **Raíces ideológicas del terrorismo islámico francés**
- **Orígen de los yihadistas**
- **Redes, conexiones internacionales y enlaces**
- **Las amenazas directas**
- **Sociología de los grupos**
- **Modos terroristas**
- **La acción policial y judicial**
- **Conclusión**

Durante los primeros años después del 11 de septiembre de 2001, los análisis se centraron sobre la red global conocida bajo el nombre de al-Qaeda, a la que se atribuía ramificaciones múltiples y un plan para la conquista de Occidente o, por lo menos, la liberación definitiva del *Dar al Islam*, el territorio del islam. Siete años más tarde, el papel de al-Qaeda –como “órgano central”– se limita al terreno ideológico más que al operativo, aunque las relaciones entre Asia Central y los grupos transnacionales siguen siendo reales. Como precisa el Libro Blanco francés sobre la seguridad interior frente al terrorismo: “Al principio, al-Qaeda era una estructura conspirativa de reclutamiento limitado y de carácter ‘pequeño-burgués’, fruto de la conjunción de wahabíes del Golfo arábigo-pérsico con yihadistas egipcios (...) el núcleo inicial perdió con el exilio forzado fuera de su santuario afgano, un número significativo de sus cuadros dirigentes así como su capacidad de ejercer el papel de centro único de mando. En cuanto a los combatientes de base, fueron obligados a dispersarse entre los militantes locales. Contribuyen a dibujar un paisaje crecientemente heterogéneo, sin precedente a escala global. El modelo más apropiado para definirlo es la red de Internet: los terroristas forman parte de una gran red interconectada, donde la neutralización de una parte tiene poco efecto sobre el resto”. [1] Nosotros utilizaremos el concepto de “rizoma”, que califica a un conjunto de raíces sin centro. [2]

En la actualidad, los grupos islamistas yihadistas operan de forma autónoma, unidos de modo simbólico bajo la bandera de al-Qaeda, en lo que se puede denominar “terrorismo de franquicia” (*franchising*, inspirado en el marketing, de modo que cada voluntario de la yihad utiliza el nombre más destacado a efectos publicitarios). [3] Esta situación estratégica crea particularidades que pueden ser interpretadas como la emergencia de grupos yihadistas nacionales, conservando cada uno de ellos sus propias especificidades (aunque todos vinculados por un fondo político-religioso común y más o menos ligados con el órgano central). En este sentido, el descubrimiento el martes 16 de diciembre de la colocación de explosivos en un gran almacén (*Le Printemps*) de París por un grupo hasta ahora desconocido (el *Front Révolutionnaire Afghani*) puede ser interpretado –con gran prudencia– como una de sus numerosas mutaciones.

El caso francés es la ilustración de una historia y una relación específica con el mundo musulmán-árabe.

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Etapas del terrorismo moderno en Francia

Todos los países europeos han sido, en determinadas épocas de su historia, víctimas del terrorismo. A diferencia de países como España, el Reino Unido y Alemania, Francia ha sido en varias ocasiones víctima de un terrorismo internacional o, al menos, no local. Esta historia peculiar le ha otorgado al país una posición y una experiencia especial más como víctima que como combatiente contra esta amenaza.

Las etapas experimentadas por el terrorismo en Francia desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial son:

- 1954-1964: *terrorismo durante la guerra de Argelia*. La independencia de Argelia hizo caer en el olvido la lucha sin piedad desarrollada sobre el territorio metropolitano durante los 10 años (incluyendo la batalla contra la OAS) del conflicto. Durante esta época, 13.500 actos terroristas fueron perpetrados en Francia (en los cuales se registraron 4.000 muertos y 9.000 heridos en acciones de la policía contra el FLN, del FLN contra otros independentistas y de los anti-independentistas de la OAS). [4]
- 1964-1984: *terrorismo de extrema izquierda*. Grupos como *Action Directe* practicaron durante este período una “lucha armada” contra el Estado.
- 1984-1993: *terrorismo de Oriente Medio*. Este terrorismo fue producto de la conjunción de la guerra del Líbano con discrepancias entre Francia e Irán y Libia y provocó un gran número de víctimas. Se puede definir como la primera época de la internacionalización del terrorismo, cuya figura emblemática sería Carlos Ramírez Sánchez. Durante la misma época, Francia fue uno de los “campos de batalla” predilectos en la lucha entre

israelíes y palestinos.

- **1992-1997: terrorismo islámico fruto de la guerra civil argelina.** En enero de 1992 la interrupción autoritaria del proceso electoral argelino provocó una guerra civil (término rechazado por las autoridades), que llegó a unos niveles de violencia nunca antes alcanzados. El apoyo indirecto de Francia al gobierno argelino condujo a grupos argelinos a desplazar el combate hasta Francia para tratar de convencer al gobierno francés de que abandonara su ayuda. Los grupos ligados a los *Groupes Islamiques Armés* (GIA) cometieron varios atentados en el metro de París (Saint-Michel, el 25 de julio de 1995, y Port Royal, el 3 de diciembre de 1996) y en las calles, con diferentes artefactos explosivos. Muchos otros explosivos fueron desactivados por la policía y los servicios de seguridad y varios grupos terroristas fueron desarticulados.

- **El persistente terrorismo independentista.** Finalmente, es necesario destacar un terrorismo persistente en el tiempo y nacido a finales de los años 60: el terrorismo autonomista y/o independentista, que en Francia se manifestó en Bretaña –ahora casi desaparecido–, en Córcega y en el País Vasco –tanto local como en apoyo al terrorismo de ETA).

- **1995-2008: terrorismo islámico transnacional.** El terrorismo islámico transnacional se cruzó con la vertiente del terrorismo magrebí a mediados de los 90. La derrota global del islamismo radical de carácter nacional coincidió con el nacimiento de un nuevo terrorismo desterritorializado y elaborado a partir del concepto expresado por el número dos de al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri: "enemigo próximo, enemigo lejano". La idea principal de esta teoría fue la de desplazar el campo de batalla desde los territorios árabes hasta los territorios del enemigo, principalmente EEUU, pero también sus aliados occidentales u otros. Muchos de los antiguos miembros de los GIA pasaron a integrarse a la red de al-Qaeda o, más directamente, al *Groupe de Combat pour la Prédication et le Salut* (GSPC), que proseguiría la lucha en el Magreb (adoptando el nombre *Al-Qaida au Magreb Islamique*). A finales de los años 90, islamistas de todos los países magrebíes y algunos musulmanes franceses de la tercera generación (como Moussaoui, último superviviente del grupo del 11 de septiembre) se comprometieron en la nueva yihad.

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Raíces ideológicas del terrorismo islámico francés

El islamismo radical tiene sus raíces en la ideología salafista (de *salaf*, "la huella de los padres"). Pero es preciso distinguir entre el islamismo radical legalista o *quíetista* (es decir basado en la oración) de los yihadistas (partidarios de la guerra santa).

Samir Amghar distingue entre tres modalidades de salafismo en Francia:[\[5\]](#)

(1) La *tradicionalista* de la *Dar al-ifta* de origen saudí. Esta corriente es la más numerosa en Francia. Su ideología se caracteriza por una visión pacífica y no-violenta del islam. Una rama importante es la del grupo de origen paquistaní *Tabligh*.

(2) Las *políticas*, que defiende el principio de un islam político pero que acepta el resultado de las urnas y el debate público. Esta corriente "fisista" (del partido argelino FIS) está representada en Francia por el líder islamista argelino Ali Benhadj. La estrategia de esta corriente es intervenir en todo tipo de actos públicos –a través de grupos de presión (*lobbies*, asociaciones representativas)– y participar en debates sobre temas como el velo, etc.

(3) La *yihadista*, que aboga por el combate por medios violentos. Estos grupos están influidos por el pensamiento político de ideólogos radicales islamistas –esencialmente los egipcios Sayyid Qobt, Choukri Mohamad y Abdel Salam Farag, el paquistaní Abu al-Ala al-Mawdoudi y otros partidarios del *Takfir* (combate sin merced contra los enemigos del islam y los "malos musulmanes")–.

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Origen de los yihadistas

El yihadismo en Francia está marcado por las estrechas relaciones entre este país y las naciones del Magreb, de modo que los problemas políticos del otro lado del Mediterráneo influyen tanto sobre la minoría musulmana francesa como la comunidad inmigrante. Pero este aspecto geográfico se entremezcla con otros aspectos de carácter sociológico.

- **El Magreb como fuente primordial de reclutamiento.** La crisis de los sistemas políticos en el Magreb ha favorecido el desarrollo de un pensamiento islámico en parte de la población inmigrante en Francia así como en franceses de origen norteafricano y en un pequeño número de inmigrantes del África negra. Por supuesto, los depositarios de la ideología yihadista son una minoría dentro de la minoría salafista, pero es precisamente su reducido número el que hace que su identificación y neutralización sea muy difícil.

- **Los lugares de culto clandestinos como "oficinas de empleo".** El gran desarrollo de la práctica del islam a partir de los años 80 en Francia impulsó el surgimiento de locales de oración incontrolados. Animados por imanes autoproclamados, dichos locales fueron espacios privilegiados para, primero, el adoctrinamiento y, después, el reclutamiento de combatientes en la yihad.[\[6\]](#) Francia ha tratado de bloquear este fenómeno mediante el desarrollo de un "islam francés" con el apoyo de organizaciones musulmanas representativas.

- **Los conversos, el reclutamiento carcelario.** La cuestión de los conversos es uno de los más graves problemas a los que se enfrentan los servicios de seguridad.[\[7\]](#) Los primeros conversos surgieron en el marco de las operaciones exteriores en la ex Yugoslavia. Otros siguieron la más tradicional ruta de la conversión clásica. Pero el problema real es el del reclutamiento en las cárceles. Según el *Atlas de l'islamisme radical*, la población musulmana en las cárceles representa el 69% del total de detenidos.[\[8\]](#) Esta cifra puede explicarse por razones sociológicas, pero la sobrepoblación juega un gran papel en las conversiones en la cárcel.[\[9\]](#) Los últimos estudios muestran que los islamistas dedican un inmenso esfuerzo en influir sobre jóvenes desfavorecidos y aislados sin

referencias morales o religiosas. Se considera que ya hay entre 30.000 y 50.000 conversos en Francia.^[10] La mayoría son totalmente pacíficos pero se considera que el riesgo está en los convertidos en las cárceles (alrededor del 4%, según un informe del Ministerio del Interior de 2005).^[11]

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Redes, conexiones internacionales y enlaces

Los terroristas buscan por todos los medios perfeccionar sus habilidades. Las zonas de crisis en las que hay musulmanes implicados son los lugares perfectos para la movilización y la formación técnica e ideológica, las "tierras del yihad":^[12] Bosnia, Chechenia, el Cáucaso septentrional y Afganistán, por supuesto, pero también Cachemira y Somalia.

- *Red afgana.* La red afgana o paquistaní/afgana es la "madre" del nuevo terrorismo globalizado. Una primera ola estuvo implicada en la yihad contra los soviéticos, muriendo muchos de ellos en los combates de Argelia, Bosnia y Chechenia. Se considera que la nueva generación formada en Afganistán entre 1995 y 2004 podría llegar a los 300.^[13] Según Pierre de Bousquet, ex jefe de la DST, podría haber unos 10 jóvenes en los campos de Afganistán.^[14]
- *Red argelina.* La más antigua y más numerosa de las redes terroristas islamistas. En esta red todavía se encuentran los sobrevivientes del GIA y/o los antiguos militantes del FIS. La nueva generación forma parte de *Al Qaida du Maghreb Islamique* (GSPC).
- *Red chechena.* En 2002 fue desmantelada una red chechena o "red Benchellali". Todas las personas detenidas estuvieron en campos de entrenamiento en las gargantas de Pankissi en el nordeste de Georgia. Se considera que unos 10 jihadistas franceses pertenecen a esta red.^[15]
- *Red bosnia.* El conflicto en Bosnia fue un potente foco de atracción para jóvenes desorientados –tanto jóvenes musulmanes de las *banlieues* como jóvenes militares sirviendo en Bosnia–. La denominada "banda de Roubaix" fue desarticulada en 1997.
- *Red iraquí.* Ligado a la guerra de 2003 y la invasión norteamericana, esta red cuenta con pocos miembros (estando nueve de ellos muertos y 30 detenidos en Francia). Es muy difícil de evaluar su importancia pero la red se considera muy peligrosa dada la larga experiencia de sus componentes. Tiene vínculos con el GSPC.
- *Red paquistaní.* La red paquistaní es la más reciente y la más pequeña de todas las redes islámicas radicales en Francia. Sin embargo, se está desarrollando, favorecida por la situación geo-estratégica en Pakistán y la frontera con Afganistán. Actualmente, el movimiento político con más fuerza es el *Lashkar-e-Taiba* de origen paquistaní. Se ha detectado una influencia negativa de los atentados en el Reino Unido dentro de ciertas corrientes radicales. No obstante, la red paquistaní sigue siendo más una organización de tránsito y logística que una red operacional.^[16]

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Las amenazas directas

Los líderes de al-Qaeda han amenazado a Francia varias veces a causa de sus posiciones diplomáticas o políticas sociales:

- 10 de mayo de 2001: Osama Bin Laden invita a Abul Qasem (GSPC) a atacar Francia.
- Marzo de 2004: amenazas a propósito de la cuestión del velo en las escuelas francesas.
- Octubre de 2004: Abdelmalek Droukdal, jefe del GSPC, escribe al famoso terrorista (ya fallecido) al-Zarkawi denunciando la cooperación con el gobierno argelino y señalando a los franceses como objetivos prioritarios de secuestros y tomas de rehenes en Irak.
- 23 de febrero de 2006: Bin Laden afirma que Francia "representa al mundo católico ante la ONU".
- 15 de mayo de 2006: al-Zawahiri realiza amenazas a causa de las caricaturas del Profeta.
- Julio de 2006: el mismo al-Zawahiri, amenaza a todos los signatarios de la resolución 1701 a propósito de la "guerra de treinta días" entre Israel y Hezbollah.
- Mayo de 2006: Abu Yahya al-Libbi ("líder" de al-Qaeda) apunta a Francia como "enemiga del velo y del pudor".
- 11 de septiembre de 2006: llamamiento al GSPC a "castigar a los cruzados franceses";^[17] en respuesta el GSPC señala a Francia como "enemigo número 1 del islam".

Sociología de los grupos

Hasta el año 2006 la policía francesa ha detenido a 400 presuntos terroristas y encarcelado a 152. En 2007 se detuvieron 89 presuntos terroristas y 65 hasta fines de octubre de 2008.^[18] Se han identificado numerosas células, pero existen muchas inactivas o individuos aislados y dispersos. El problema actual es la auto-radicalización y las células auto-formadas (muchas veces con familiares). Hay también varios lugares de culto bajo sospecha y que están sometidos a vigilancia. En total, el Ministerio del Interior ha expulsado a cerca de 100 personas, que han sido deportadas a sus países de origen.^[19]

Respecto a la tipología de los grupos en Francia, se pueden destacar dos grupos: (1) los yihadistas, esencialmente grupos de origen familiar, muy pequeños y de difícil penetración; y (2) los criminal-yihadistas, como la "banda de Roubaix", en los que la dimensión religiosa puede ser algunas veces un pretexto para el crimen más que una fuente de financiación del terrorismo. Estos últimos se componen generalmente de jóvenes,

sin empleo, que han pasado por la cárcel y que encuentran en el yihadismo una motivación en la vida o simplemente una diversión.

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Modos terroristas

El terrorismo islámico en Francia no presenta ninguna característica especial frente a los modelos operativos del terrorismo global. El aspecto más destacado es que hasta ahora no se ha producido ningún ataque suicida desde la tentativa fallida contra el Airbus de Argel en 1994, que se planeaba estrellar contra la Torre Eiffel.

Los servicios de seguridad han detectado un incremento en el uso sofisticado de Internet (como se confirmó por el incidente de las caricaturas danesas).^[20] Este uso comprende la circulación de información, propaganda yihadista, avales religiosos para la yihad, apoyo ideológico, movilizaciones sobre cuestiones islámicas o supuestas agresiones al islam o países islámicos, la denuncia de complotos judíos y/o americanos, adiestramiento y formación virtual, y, por fin, el reclutamiento vía Internet.^[21]

La práctica terrorista más desarrollada sigue siendo la colocación de explosivos, incluyendo la posibilidad de atentar en el metro, con coches bomba o cualquier otro método (bombas en cubos de basura, por ejemplo).

El uso de modelos clásicos de atentado no debe hacernos ignorar las prácticas delictivas. Los grupos, para financiarse, han llevado a cabo robos y atracos a bancos, siendo la "banda de Roubaix" y ahora el *Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain* (GICM) un buen ejemplo de estas prácticas.

En cuanto al riesgo de terrorismo no-convencional (NRBC), sólo se conoce un caso de tentativa de uso de gas de cianuro. Sin embargo, las investigaciones llevadas a cabo en Francia indican que ciertas redes se muestran dispuestas a usar materiales no convencionales con fines terroristas.^[22]

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La acción policial y judicial

La fuerza y la eficacia del sistema de lucha contra-terrorista francés reside en la íntima conexión entre los sistemas de inteligencia, policial y judicial. Este entramado se creó tras los atentados perpetrados por terroristas de Oriente Medio a partir de mediados de los años 80. La repuesta francesa se articula alrededor de un *pool* centralizado de jueces profesionales especializados (la XIV sección del *Parquet* –fiscalía– del tribunal de París) actuando con la subdirección nacional antiterrorista de la policía nacional. El "arma absoluta" jurídica es la calificación penal de "asociación de malhechores en relación con una empresa terrorista". Esta calificación permite las acciones preventivas de la justicia antes de que logren cometerse atentados. También es preciso recalcar el papel de los servicios de inteligencia. Hasta 2008 estos comprendían: los *Renseignements Généraux* (RG) encargados de la vigilancia del islamismo en Francia (mezquitas, publicaciones y proselitismo); la *Direction de la Sécurité du Territoire* (DST), para el contra-terrorismo en el interior, y la *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE), para las amenazas exteriores; y la *Unité Centrale de Lutte Anti-terroriste* (UCLAT), encargada de la coordinación. El 1 de julio de 2008 se creó la *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur* (DCRI), fruto de la fusión de los RG y la DST, ambos dependientes del Ministerio del Interior. Adicionalmente, el presidente Sarkozy ha nombrado un coordinador nacional para la inteligencia –*coordinateur national du renseignement*– dependiente de la presidencia de la república. Es difícil saber si las reformas redundarán en una mayor eficacia respecto al sistema que tan buen resultado ha dado en el pasado, pero la idea del presidente Sarkozy es favorecer la centralización y, por supuesto, la rapidez de respuesta de los diferentes servicios.

Por último, habría que recordar los numerosos esfuerzos hechos al nivel de la UE desde 2001: la creación de una calificación común de actos de terrorismo, de una orden de arresto común, del reforzamiento de Europol con un banco de datos sobre el terrorismo, de la creación de una cláusula de solidaridad automática (tras los atentados de Madrid) en caso de grandes acciones terroristas, el nombramiento de un coordinador europeo dependiente de la Secretaría del Consejo Europeo y medidas de coordinación de la seguridad civil y de los servicios de urgencia.

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Conclusión

Michèle Alliot-Marie, en un artículo publicado en *Le Monde*, recuerda que Francia es "un objetivo esencial porque sus valores de libertad, tolerancia, respeto de las mujeres, laicidad, derechos humanos, están en oposición con los del integrismo". La ministra del interior añade que Francia "no está más amenazada que otros: los últimos años han visto más atentados en los países musulmanes que en Europa; pero no lo está menos: el desmantelamiento de redes y las detenciones de islamistas lo demuestran".^[23] Es decir, durante los próximos años, al igual que durante los años 70 y 80, no podemos esperar que esta amenaza desaparezca. La posición francesa es la de estar vigilante frente a toda conspiración en la comunidad musulmana y/o discriminación contra dicha minoría. Este es un punto imprescindible y tiene una consecuencia importante: la detección de movimientos yihadistas deberá llevarse a cabo mediante la acción judicial. El yihadismo, que no podrá vencer ni en el mundo árabe-musulmán ni en Europa –quizá porque sus medios son limitados–, desgraciadamente sí es capaz de atentar contra las vidas de los ciudadanos europeos a largo plazo. El problema para las fuerzas de seguridad es detener cualquier atentado en el futuro antes de que se cometa. Es una misión muy difícil. Desde 1996, el trabajo de fondo ha dado sus frutos, pero nadie es infalible y por lo tanto la cooperación internacional juega un papel imprescindible. El ejemplo más destacado es la cooperación franco-española, que fue el origen de la orden de arresto europeo y de otras numerosas iniciativas conjuntas. Iniciada con la lucha contra ETA, esta batalla abarca todas las formas de terrorismo y principalmente la del terrorismo islámico que España sufrió en carne propia casi 10 años después de Francia.

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[1] *La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*, La

documentation française, 2006, p. 21.

[2] Jean-François Daguzan, *Terrorisme(s), abrégé d'une violence qui dure*, CNRS éditions, Paris, 2006, p. 140.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 139.

[4] Raymond Muelle, *7 ans de guerre en France, Quand le FLN frappait en métropole*, Grancher, Monaco, 2001.

[5] "Les salafistes français, une nouvelle aristocratie religieuse", *Maghreb-Machrek*, n° 183, primavera de 2005, pp. 13-31.

[6] Joël Bouchité, último jefe de los *Renseignements généraux*: "Trabajamos sobre los movimientos de reislamización, sobre los predicadores y los reclutadores. Los lugares propicios son ciertas mezquitas, las asociaciones con objetivos disimulados, el medio carcelario –donde se relacionan los detenidos del 95 y las filiales afganas– con individuos recuperados por delitos comunes y ahí tenemos un gran problema. La prueba es que la red desmantelada por la DST había sido montada en 2005 por Safé Bourada, que había participado en la red terrorista del 95 y había salido de prisión en 2003", 8/X/2007, http://algeria-watch.de/fr/article/ml/groupes_armes/recidive_terroriste.htm.

[7] Entrevista con Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministra del Interior, *Les islamistes recrutent dans les prisons*, *Geostratégique.net*, 11/IX/2008, <http://www.geostrategie.net/viewtopic.php?p>.

[8] Xavier Raufer (dir.), *Atlas de l'islam radical*, CNRS éditions, Paris, 2007, p. 48.

[9] Farad Khosrokhavar, *Quand Al Qaida parle, Témoignage derrière les barreaux*, Paris, Grasset, 2006.

[10] Raphaël Mergui, "Les islamistes passent par la route du Haschisch", <http://Maranne2.fr>, p. 1.

[11] "Les conversions à l'islam inquiètent la police française", <http://www.geostrategie.net/viewtopic.php>.

[12] Thierry Matta (DST), "La menace vue de France après le livre blanc", actes de la journée d'études du 27 septembre 2006, *Cinq ans après le 11 septembre: le point sur la lutte contre Al Qaida et le terrorisme international*, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, <http://www.frstrategie.org>, p. 12.

[13] *Atlas de l'islam radical, op. cit.*, p. 49.

[14] "La France face au terrorisme: le chef de la DST répond aux questions d'un grand quotidien", http://www.terrorisme.net/info/2002/051_france_terr.htm.

[15] *Ibid*, p. 53. Véase también la entrevista con Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministra del Interior, "Les islamistes recrutent dans les prisons", *op. cit.*

[16] "Terrorisme, la France en ligne de mire", *Geostrategie.net*.

[17] "Al-Qaida menace la France", http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/081/article_46151.asp.

[18] "Arrestation de terroristes présumés", 10/XI/2008, <http://www.lesinfos.com/index.php/2008:09/11:202>; y entrevista con Michèle Alliot-Marie, *op. cit.*

[19] "Le terrorisme menace la France", <http://forums.france2.fr/>. Los medios de expulsión son: el destierro como pena complementaria a una pena principal y el alejamiento administrativo en caso de disturbios al orden público o la seguridad del Estado. Cada persona puede ejercer sus derechos legales a través de los recursos jurídicos disponibles.

[20] Pierre de Bousquet, Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST), "Le risque de cyber-terrorisme est réel", <http://www.mag-securis.com/spip.php?article4531>; véase también, *TE-SAT 2008, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, Europol, p. 22, <http://www.europol.europa.eu>.

[21] Bernard Squarcini, director de la nueva DCRI: "Un parcours idéologique peut se faire en trois mois sur Internet. Un individu peut, le soir chez lui, s'autoradicaliser via Internet et entrer en contact avec des membres haut placés des organisations terroristes", 8/X/2007, http://algeria-watch.de/fr/article/ml/groupes_armes/recidive_terroriste.htm.

[22] Pierre de Bousquet, directeur de la DST, "Terrorisme et prolifération", actes de la journée d'étude du 13 juin 2007", *Les défis de la prolifération au XXIème siècle*, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, <http://www.frstrategie.org>, p. 34.

[23] "Les démocraties face au terrorisme", *Le Monde*, 1/X/2008, p. 19.

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Resumen

Hace ya 50 años que Francia se enfrenta al terrorismo. El terrorismo islámico es la nueva (pero no la única) manifestación de esta amenaza. Este tipo de terrorismo tiene raíces internacionales y es fruto de la globalización, pero tiene también particularidades nacionales debido a los vínculos históricos entre Francia y el Magreb, particularmente Argelia. Este documento ofrece un análisis de la sociología de los grupos, de los motivos terroristas de los islamistas en suelo francés, de su tipología, de sus modos de acción y de sus redes de influencia tanto ideológicas como estratégicas. Presenta asimismo el modo en el que Francia lucha contra el terrorismo, fruto de muchos años de experiencia y que hace de este país uno de los más eficaces en el mundo en la prevención de esta gran amenaza.

Palabras clave

Terrorismo islámico; Francia; origen de los yihadistas; motivaciones para el terrorismo; redes de influencia;

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Estados de la cuestión

TERRORISMO YIHADISTA EN ESPAÑA: ORIGEN, OBJETIVOS Y ESTRUCTURA

Javier Jordán

[Resumen-Palabras clave / Abstract-Keywords](#)

- **Procedencia nacional de los detenidos y distribución geográfica**
- **Funciones realizadas por las redes yihadistas**
- **Relación de las redes con organizaciones yihadistas**
- **Conclusión.**

Este trabajo tiene como objeto ofrecer un análisis detallado de la evolución experimentada por el yihadismo en España con posterioridad al 11-M. Para ello se examinan los resultados de las actuaciones policiales realizadas desde entonces, seleccionando una muestra de veintiocho operaciones.

A la hora de elegir la muestra de estudio no se han contabilizado las detenciones relacionadas con la investigación del 11-M, tanto las de individuos presuntamente vinculados de manera directa con los atentados (y que permitieron desarticular al comando), como la de personas que tuvieron una implicación presuntamente menor con la trama (por ejemplo, la operación Saeta en abril de 2005 y, Sello I en junio de 2005). También se han obviado algunas operaciones policiales de carácter muy particular; por ejemplo, la detención de sujetos que estaban meramente de paso en España o la de un español-palestino, de dudosa salud mental, que, supuestamente, diseñó cohetes para Hamás. Tampoco se han contabilizado las detenciones efectuadas por razones judiciales de individuos ya detenidos en operaciones policiales previas al 11-M (por ejemplo, algunos de los detenidos en la operación Lago en enero de 2003). Sin embargo, sí que se ha incluido en la muestra de estudio las operaciones Tigris y Sello II (en junio de 2005 y enero de 2007 respectivamente) donde, además de arrestar a sujetos presuntamente vinculados con los atentados de Madrid, se desarticulaban dos redes activas de captación y envío de voluntarios a Irak.

El resultado final nos ofrece una muestra de estudio de veintiocho operaciones. A partir de ese material nuestro trabajo analiza las siguientes características de las redes desarticuladas: el origen de sus miembros, su localización geográfica, las funciones realizadas, los objetivos que perseguían, y la relación que mantenían dichas células con el entramado yihadista global.

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Procedencia nacional de los detenidos y distribución geográfica

El primer hecho observable es que el 70% de los detenidos proceden de Argelia y Marruecos; lo cual coincide con análisis previos sobre perfiles de los yihadistas en España, realizados con muestras más amplias y que incluyen a los detenidos con anterioridad a los atentados del 11-M^[1]. La procedencia mayoritariamente magrebí no resulta sorprendente ya que Marruecos es el principal país de origen de los inmigrantes musulmanes en España (seguido a distancia por Argelia) y los yihadistas dirigen preferentemente su proselitismo radical a ese segmento de la población. Por otra parte, las actividades de los grupos yihadistas argelinos y marroquíes en materia de propaganda y reclutamiento tampoco son una novedad. La presencia en España de redes yihadistas argelinas se remonta a principios de los 90, tras el inicio de la violencia civil en aquel país; y la captación de marroquíes por redes yihadistas en territorio nacional también cuenta con más de una década de historia. Se trata por tanto de una tendencia firme que con toda probabilidad se mantendrá a lo largo de al menos una década.

La tercera nacionalidad en importancia es la paquistaní, con 23 detenidos desde 2004. Este grupo resulta especialmente inquietante, ya que pertenecían a dos redes que presuntamente estaban realizando labores de vigilancia y de preparación atentados terroristas en Barcelona (una en septiembre de 2004 y otra en enero de 2008). Las redes radicales paquistaníes son muy herméticas. A la diferencia y especificidad lingüística se une el cierre comunitario; lo cual dificulta la obtención de información operativa y judicializable sobre su entidad real, actividades y contactos en el exterior. Por otra parte, los radicales paquistaníes también podrían estar utilizando a su favor el tránsito frecuente de personas que van y vienen de Pakistán por motivos legítimos (de hecho, la comunidad paquistaní en España está pidiendo la apertura de una línea de vuelos directa entre Barcelona y Pakistán, sin necesidad de tener que pasar por Reino Unido), para enviar y hacer venir a operativos propios por razones no tan inocuas. En Pakistán existen campos de entrenamiento terrorista frecuentados por radicales procedentes de Europa, y algunos de ellos con el fin explícito de adquirir habilidades técnicas para atentar a su regreso^[2].

En cuarto lugar están los españoles autóctonos. En este punto hay que matizar los datos; catorce de los diecinueve individuos de origen español detenidos, residían (y posiblemente nacieron) en Ceuta y Melilla pero sus padres eran de origen marroquí y fueron educados como musulmanes, por lo que no encajan en la categoría de conversos. Los otros cinco detenidos sí son conversos españoles; tres de ellos eran a su vez parejas de yihadistas arrestados también en las mismas operaciones policiales. No se han contabilizado en el estudio los delincuentes de origen español que colaboraban con las redes yihadistas por razones meramente económicas.

En cuanto a la localización geográfica de las redes desarticuladas, en más de la mitad de las operaciones antiterroristas (al menos 16 de los 28 casos estudiados) los presuntos integrantes de la red vivían en distintas

comunidades autónomas, en algunos casos a cientos de kilómetros de distancia unos de otros. La comunicación y coordinación interna se realizaba a través de teléfono, Internet y viajes. Cataluña ha sido la comunidad autónoma donde se han llevado a cabo un mayor número de operaciones antiterroristas (16 de las 28, y 14 de ellas en la provincia de Barcelona). Las siguientes comunidades autónomas por orden de importancia han sido Andalucía (10), Comunidad Valenciana (6) y Madrid (5), seguidas en número menor por otras como las ciudades autónomas de Ceuta y Melilla, País Vasco, Murcia, Castilla y León, etc.

La distribución geográfica de las redes desarticuladas coincide en gran medida con las zonas de España donde se concentra la inmigración de origen musulmán. Sin embargo, no es fácil explicar a qué se debe la concentración de redes en Cataluña. En las provincias de Barcelona y Tarragona hay una elevada presencia de oratorios salafistas que de manera indirecta quizás podrían preparar el terreno para el reclutamiento radical. Sin embargo, con la información disponible no es posible establecer una correlación entre ambas variables. Es posible que la cercanía de Cataluña con la frontera también sea un factor relevante pues permitiría comunicaciones rápidas, económicas y sin necesidad de mostrar documentación con países como Francia e Italia, donde también operan redes yihadistas magrebíes. Por último otra razón que podría explicar el elevado número de operaciones en Cataluña sería la capacidad de regeneración de las redes argelinas y marroquíes en un mismo lugar. Por ejemplo, la red de Merabet Fahsi desarticulada en enero de 2006, tenía conexiones con las desarticuladas en la operación Lago en enero de 2003 y con la dirigida por Abdeladim Akoudad (detenido en octubre de 2003), y posteriormente con la desarticulada en la operación Tigris (junio de 2005). Y, a su vez, miembros de la red de Fahsi, también tenían relación con miembros de redes desarticuladas posteriormente en la operación Sello II (enero de 2007) y en otras efectuadas en junio y octubre de 2008.

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Funciones realizadas por las redes yihadistas

La mayor parte de las operaciones policiales han tenido como objetivo redes (completas o miembros de redes con la mayoría de sus miembros en el extranjero) que realizaban tareas de carácter logístico; una función que vienen desempeñando este tipo de redes desde su implantación en España a principios de los años 90. Con posterioridad al 11-M, la principal actividad ha consistido en la captación y envío de voluntarios para combatir en Irak (nueve redes desarticuladas), y a ellas hay que añadir la desarticulación en 2007 de otras tres redes que enviaban voluntarios a Argelia con la intención de que más tarde marcharan a Irak. Aunque el total de individuos reclutados y enviados desde España a frentes de yihad quizás podría contarse en decenas, no existen datos contrastados sobre su número exacto. Sí se conocen algunos casos concretos, como el del argelino Belgacem Bellil, captado por una red en Cataluña y que cometió el atentado contra el cuartel de Carabinieri en Nasiriya en noviembre de 2003; o el de otros enviados por la red de Abdeladim Akaouad en Vilanova (Barcelona), como Ahmed Said Hssisni, Hassan Mourdude y Saffet Karakoc (todos ellos interceptados antes de lograr infiltrarse en Irak). Pero, por lo demás, existe un notable vacío de información en las fuentes abiertas sobre este punto.

Además de reclutamiento, las fuerzas de seguridad han detenido al menos cuatro células del Grupo Salafista por la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC) –renombrado Al Qaeda en la Tierra del Magreb Islámico (AQMI) desde enero de 2007– que proporcionaban documentación falsa o dinero a dicha organización. En todos los casos, la financiación era a través de delitos como el fraude de tarjetas de crédito o el robo en domicilios. Hay un caso que se sale de los métodos comunes: una célula del GSPC, desarticulada en diciembre de 2005, que estaba invirtiendo en la apertura de un local de prostitución en la costa de Málaga con el fin de obtener ingresos estables para enviar a Argelia^[3].

Al mismo tiempo, ha aumentado el número de grupos que pretendían atentar de nuevo en España. Existe constancia de al menos siete planes terroristas, la mayor parte de ellos en fase muy temprana de preparación. A ellos habría que añadir dos actividades de vigilancia sospechosa por parte de individuos detenidos por su vinculación a grupos yihadistas: la grabación de videos sobre edificios destacados en Barcelona por parte de una célula de paquistaníes en 2004 y la detención de dos marroquíes con una cámara de fotos en las cercanías de una central nuclear próxima a Madrid también en 2004^[4].

En casi todos los casos se habría tratado de ataques contra objetivos civiles multitudinarios con el propósito de provocar decenas de muertes indiscriminadas: sistemas de transporte como el metro en Madrid y Barcelona, o el ferry que une Ceuta con Algeciras y zonas comerciales. Las dos ciudades que más se repiten en la lista de objetivos son Madrid y Barcelona, incluso por células terroristas compuestas por individuos que residían a cientos de kilómetros de ambas ciudades, como por ejemplo los detenidos en la operación Gamo en noviembre de 2005 en Alicante, Granada y Murcia, que supuestamente estaban ideando atentar en Madrid^[5]. Dicha selección de objetivos y de lugares geográficos demuestra una vez más el interés de los terroristas por realizar ataques en ciudades que garanticen una atención mediática de alcance mundial.

Respecto al método que planeaban utilizar en los atentados, todos ellos iban a recurrir a explosivos. En cuatro casos pensaban adquirir explosivo industrial sirviéndose de delincuentes (de modo similar a como sucedió en el 11-M); y en los otros tres iba a tratarse de explosivos caseros. Al parecer, en cuatro de los siete casos se planeaba utilizar terroristas suicidas.

Por lo que se ha podido conocer, las razones que se encontraban detrás de aquellos planes eran la venganza contra la acción antiterrorista española y la presencia de tropas españolas en Afganistán, además de la más general de atacar a los infieles en su territorio. Este último no es en absoluto un motivo despreciable y aleja cualquier posibilidad de acomodo político con los radicales yihadistas. A título de ejemplo resulta ilustrativo el siguiente párrafo extraído del Auto de Procesamiento 18/2007 de 7 de junio de 2007, correspondiente a la operación Tigris:

Asimismo Abdelmalik Abdeslam Amar, Mustafa Mohamed Abdeslam y Aomar Mohamed habrían comentado en sus encuentros su disposición a castigar a los no creyentes y a sus colaboradores en cualquier lugar, realizando, si fuera necesario, una acción de martirio, ya que para conseguir la ansiada tierra del Jihad hay que utilizar la violencia. También comentaban que mientras los

seguidores de la Salafia Jihadia permanezcan unidos, no habrá infieles en Ceuta.

En este sentido, tampoco es descartable que en el futuro la 'liberación' de Al Andalus, o más en concreto de Ceuta y Melilla, se convierta en una motivación añadida que impulse la preparación de atentados en España. El análisis de contenido de una amplia muestra de material yihadista difundido en Internet (2.232 documentos) revela que 16, de un total de 50 documentos donde se menciona a España, lo hacen lamentándose de la pérdida de Al Andalus. Aunque en general se trata de un recurso retórico, conviene no olvidar que en el imaginario yihadista la Península Ibérica es antigua tierra del Islam que algún día tendrá que ser liberada. Así lo afirmaba en 2006 Ayman Al Zawahiri: *La yihad busca la liberación de Palestina (...) y liberar cualquier territorio que alguna vez fue territorio del islam, desde España a Irak*[6]. Mucho más preocupante es el hecho de que 8 de esos 50 documentos contengan llamamientos a la 'liberación' de Ceuta y Melilla. La primera mención a ambas ciudades se produjo en 2005, hubo dos más en 2006, otras dos en 2007, y tres menciones a lo largo de 2008[7].

[Volver](#)

Relación de las redes con organizaciones yihadistas

Una cuestión que actualmente es objeto de debate en los estudios especializados sobre terrorismo es el nivel de estructuración del yihadismo global[8]. En nuestro análisis los grupos desarticulados se corresponden mayoritariamente a una de las dos categorías que se exponen a continuación:

a) Redes integradas en una organización superior.

Las organizaciones yihadistas como Al Qaeda, el GSPC o el Grupo Islámico Combatiente Marroquí (GICM) han poseído desde sus orígenes un organigrama interno con diversos niveles de liderazgo y funciones especializadas. Al mismo tiempo dichas organizaciones han combinado la jerarquía con elevadas dosis de flexibilidad, pragmatismo y apoyo en redes sociales de carácter informal; especialmente desde que la presión antiterrorista aumentó de manera sustancial en Europa tras los atentados del 11-S. Al mismo tiempo, la labor de dirección sobre las redes que operan en el Continente europeo se caracteriza por dejar un elevado grado de autonomía a los líderes locales, actuando muchas veces los líderes regionales a modo de impulsores, intermediarios, facilitadores y coordinadores entre redes yihadistas, que operan en gran medida por cuenta propia, en beneficio general de la causa yihadista global, y de la organización mediante la que se coordinan, en particular.

Este modo de proceder plantea serios problemas a la hora de determinar con absoluta certeza la pertenencia de una red a una determinada organización yihadista. En este paper se proponen dos criterios para considerar a un determinado grupo integrante de una organización superior: comunicación continuada y acción coordinada con la organización yihadista superior. Es decir, que el líder u otros miembros destacados de la red mantengan contacto habitual con operativos de la organización, y que, en determinados momentos, dicha red realice labores coordinadas con otras redes relacionadas a su vez con dicha organización. Dicha coordinación horizontal puede ser directa o realizarse a través de un intermediario regional de la organización. Ejemplos de actividades coordinadas serían: reclutamiento y envío de voluntarios, transferencia de dinero y documentos falsos, preparación de atentados siguiendo las directrices de la organización superior, etc.

Se trata por tanto de criterios meramente funcionales, no de carácter formal. Es decir, no se requiere para incluir a una red en esta categoría que el líder de la célula haya hecho un juramento de fidelidad al emir de la organización superior o que los integrantes del grupo se consideren y denominen miembros de la organización.

Al mismo tiempo, es posible que una misma red se coordine con otras redes e intermediarios de más de una organización; por lo que se podría considerar que la red estaría integrada en ambas, al margen de que haya o no una alianza formal entre los líderes estratégicos de ambas organizaciones. Esa relación doble hace muy difícil saber con exactitud en qué organización está integrada la red en el momento de su desarticulación. Por ejemplo, en nuestra muestra de estudio nos encontramos con varios casos donde existe coordinación con Al Qaida en Irak, pero varios de los miembros del grupo tenían su origen y mantenían contacto con el GSPC o el GICM.

Una vez conceptualizada la categoría, se puede afirmar que de las 28 operaciones policiales analizadas en nuestro estudio, al menos 22 casos se corresponden con la categoría de red integrada en una organización superior. Es decir, la mayor parte de las redes yihadistas desarticuladas en España con posterioridad al 11-M se coordinaban de manera efectiva con otras redes relacionadas con organizaciones superiores, dentro y fuera de nuestro país, y no eran por tanto grupos de aislados de meros simpatizantes con el yihadismo que actuaban de forma completamente autónoma.

Las investigaciones policiales sobre este tipo de redes han permitido constatar la existencia de vínculos y de acción coordinada. Sin embargo en la inmensa mayoría no es posible conocer los pormenores de dicha relación, ya que los detenidos no han reconocido su culpabilidad y mucho menos han confesado los detalles sobre sus actividades y vínculos con otras redes yihadistas. No obstante en dos documentos judiciales se mencionan, por ejemplo, los contactos con Khalid Abu Bashir, el misterioso coordinador regional entre Al Qaeda y el GSPC, que jugó un papel importante en la historia de la red de Khaled Azig y Mohamed Reha: una célula desarticulada en Marruecos en noviembre de 2005 y sobre la que existe información más precisa ya que ambos líderes realizaron una confesión muy detallada a las autoridades marroquíes[9].

En un número importante de casos las redes objeto de nuestro estudio estaban integradas en el GSPC/Al Qaida en el Magreb. Nuestra estimación es de al menos 12 redes. En otros 8 casos también habría vinculación con las organizaciones yihadistas en Irak y en casi todos ellos también relación simultánea con GSPC/AQMI. En cuatro casos hay indicios suficientes para establecer integración en el GICM. Por su parte, en la célula de paquistaníes desarticulada en septiembre de 2004 la vinculación sería con la organización Jaish-e-Mohammed y en la de paquistaníes de enero de 2008 con Tehrik-e-Taliban en Pakistán.

[Volver](#)

b) Redes de base.

Por redes de base nos referimos a aquellos grupos que actúan por cuenta propia, sin comunicación continuada ni

coordinación con ninguna organización superior, aunque eventualmente puedan tener vínculos limitados con miembros de otras redes u organizaciones. Se trataría por tanto de una categoría similar a lo que Marc Sageman denomina 'bunch of guys'; y a la que el informe elaborado por el King's College de Londres para la Comisión Europea en diciembre de 2007 se refiere como *self-starters*[10]. Pero al margen de la etiqueta utilizada para denominarlos lo realmente importante es su delimitación conceptual. Se trataría de grupos que dependen de sí mismos en términos de financiación, reclutamiento, entrenamiento y planificación, y que por tanto no pueden ser considerados como parte integrante de una organización superior.

En la muestra utilizada para nuestro estudio sólo se pueden contabilizar cinco casos de redes base; lo cual demostraría que este tipo de grupos son más una excepción que la regla en el panorama del yihadismo en España posterior al 11-M. De hecho, no es descartable que alguno de ellos sea en realidad una red dependiente de una organización superior, pero la información conseguida por la investigación policial no permite determinarlo con suficiente certeza.

Por último, entre los 29 casos analizados hay uno que podría responder a la categoría de *lobo solitario*; es decir, un operativo que actúa de manera independiente al margen de cualquier organización o red de base. En septiembre de 2008 los Mossos d'Esquadra detuvieron en Girona a un individuo francés de origen marroquí que viajaba en coche desde Toulouse (Francia). El sujeto llevaba consigo dos bombonas de gas, material pirotécnico y, lo más desconcertante, una espada Ninja ajustada en posición horizontal, apuntando desde el asiento trasero a la espalda del conductor. El individuo declaró que pretendía suicidarse en un lugar solitario como consecuencia de un desengaño amoroso, y negó que fuera a cometer un atentado terrorista. Sin embargo, un examen más pormenorizado desveló indicios que apuntaban al radicalismo yihadista: el individuo se había rasurado las uñas, se había afeitado el pecho y llevaba en el coche un comunicado impreso del Ejército Islámico de Irak, alabando las acciones de martirio.

No parece creíble que una persona recorra cientos de kilómetros con todo ese equipo en el coche buscando un lugar para suicidarse a solas. Es probable que se dirigiera a Barcelona, o alguna otra ciudad cercana, para estrellarse contra algún objetivo. La presencia de la espada en el asiento trasero, apuntando a su espalda, sería un claro indicio de ello. Posiblemente el individuo se inspiró en el atentado de Glasgow en junio de 2007 (donde dos yihadistas estrellaron un coche en llamas contra el aeropuerto) y para evitar morir quemado, colocó la espada con el fin de que esta le matase rápidamente al estrellar el coche. El sujeto no era conocido por los servicios de seguridad franceses y estos no han sido capaces de vincularlo a ninguna red yihadista en el país. Se trataría así de un intento de atentado muy poco sofisticado y planeado posiblemente en solitario pero que, de haber tenido éxito, habría causado víctimas mortales y una notable atención mediática.

Resulta interesante cruzar los datos entre las categorías de grupos y las funciones realizadas. De las veintidós redes coordinadas con una organización superior, sólo dos casos planificaban atentados en España, mientras que veinte se dedicaban en exclusiva a tareas logísticas. Sin embargo, de las cinco redes de base, cuatro presuntamente planeaban atentar y una se dedicaba a la elaboración y difusión de propaganda en Internet. Por su parte, la red que ejecutó los atentados de Madrid (y que no ha sido contabilizada en este estudio) respondería, con la información disponible, a la categoría de redes de base[11].

La agresividad comparativamente superior de las redes de base (y del posible *lobo solitario*) es coherente con la doctrina elaborada por Mustafa Setmariam (aka. Abu Musab al-Suri) en su libro *La Llamada a la Resistencia Islámica Global*. Setmariam anima a que los partidarios del yihadismo contribuyan con la causa realizando acciones terroristas espontáneas de manera autónoma[12]. La agresividad de las redes de base también se explicaría por el hecho de que, al tratarse de grupos que actúan por cuenta propia, no tienen facilidad para realizar acciones logísticas, salvo la difusión de propaganda radical a través de Internet o el envío de voluntarios a zonas de yihad para que, una vez allí, traten de entrar en contacto con organizaciones yihadistas por sus propios medios. En consecuencia la principal actividad que hace sonar las alarmas de las agencias de seguridad y desencadena su detención es la preparación de atentados.

No obstante, conviene aclarar lo siguiente: las redes de base que presuntamente preparaban atentados carecían de suficiente profesionalidad, y esto les hizo vulnerables. Sin embargo, el plan terrorista que posiblemente tuvo más posibilidades de éxito iba a ser ejecutado por una célula integrada en una organización superior. Fue el caso de la red paquistaní, vinculada a Tehrik-e-Taliban en Pakistán (TTP), que presuntamente preparaba una serie de atentados en el metro de Barcelona en enero de 2008. Afortunadamente la célula fue detectada gracias a que dentro de ella había un infiltrado de los servicios de inteligencia franceses. El grupo tenía conocimientos para fabricar explosivos caseros, contaba con seis candidatos a suicidas y ya había elegido los blancos a atacar[13]. Tras los atentados, Baitullah Messud, líder del TTP, iba a hacer público un comunicado exigiendo la retirada de los países europeos de Afganistán[14].

Conclusión

La presencia de redes yihadistas en España se ha convertido en un fenómeno estructural. En su mayoría se trata de grupos compuestos por individuos procedentes de Argelia y Marruecos y vinculados con el GSPC/AQMI. Las veintiocho operaciones policiales realizadas después de los atentados de Madrid demuestran la vigilancia eficaz que ejercen las fuerzas de seguridad españolas sobre el radicalismo yihadista pero también el grado de implantación de este en nuestra sociedad y su voluntad hostil hacia España.

[Volver](#)

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Resumen

Este artículo estudia la evolución del terrorismo yihadista en España después de los atentados del 11 de marzo en Madrid. Para ello se ha seleccionado una muestra formada por las veintiocho operaciones antiterroristas más relevantes efectuadas desde entonces, sin incluir las relacionadas exclusivamente con el 11-M. A partir de esos datos se analiza el origen de los detenidos y su distribución geográfica; las funciones realizadas por las redes desarticuladas, con especial atención a nuevos planes terroristas; y la vinculación de esas redes con organizaciones yihadistas superiores.

Palabras clave

Violencia política; Terrorismo; España; Islamismo; Estructura organizativa.

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Colaboran en este número

COLABORAN EN ESTE NÚMERO

- **Eitan Azani.** Subdirector del Instituto Internacional para la lucha contra el terrorismo (ICD), en Herzliya, Israel. Coronel de las Fuerzas Armadas de Israel con experiencia operacional, académica e investigativa en la lucha contra el terrorismo en la región y en diferentes regiones del mundo. Además es consejero para entidades privadas y gubernamentales sobre temas de lucha contra el terrorismo. Profesor en la Escuela de Gobierno y Política del ICD y en instituciones de seguridad. Licenciado en Economía, Ciencia Política y Geografía por la Universidad Bar Ilan, en Israel.
- **Anneli Botha.** Investigadora principal en Terrorismo, Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad, en Pretoria, Sudáfrica. Es especialista en el terrorismo internacional con un énfasis en África. Entre sus publicaciones destaca: *Terrorism in the Maghreb: Transnationalization of Domestic Terrorism* (ISS monograph 144, 2008).
- **Jean-François Daguzan.** Profesor de investigación de la Fundación para la investigación estratégica, París. Es especialista en proliferación y terrorismo. Tiene un gran conocimiento de los países mediterráneos y de Oriente Medio desde 1976 y de Asia central desde 1998. Doctor en Derecho u Ciencia Política. Fue profesor de la Escuela Empresarial de Toulouse y principal analista de la Secretaría General de la Defensa Nacional (SGDN), de la oficina del Primer Ministro, desde 1988 hasta 1991.
- **Jonathan Fighel.** Investigador Principal del Instituto Internacional para la Lucha contra el Terrorismo (ICD), en Herzliya, Israel. Consultor y experto invitado del Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos en varios juicios sobre terrorismo y por varias firmas de abogado estadounidense sobre casos de enjuiciamiento del terrorismo. Experto en grupos terroristas islámicos como Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Palestinian Islamic Jihad -PIJ-, con énfasis en el terrorismo palestino y en suicidios terroristas palestinos.
- **Jennifer Giroux.** Profesora de Investigación del Centro de Estudios de Seguridad del Instituto Suizo de Tecnología (ETH) en Zurich. Especialista en terrorismo, selección de objetivos, con especial énfasis en infraestructuras energéticas violencia política en África y el papel del sector privado en ambientes políticamente inestables. Máster en Política Internacional y Seguridad. Licenciada en Antropología.
- **Javier Jordán.** Doctor y profesor del Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración de la Universidad de Granada, y director de la Fundación Athena Intelligence para la Investigación Avanzada en Terrorismo y Conflictos Armados. Desde enero de 2008 es también miembro de la *European Network of Experts on Violent Radicalisation*, coordinada desde The Change Institute, Londres, y financiada por la Comisión Europea.
- **Fernando Reinares.** Catedrático de Ciencia Política y Estudios de Seguridad en la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid. Investigador Principal de Terrorismo Internacional en el Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos. Imparte también docencia de postgrado sobre temas de terrorismo y contraterrorismo en el Instituto Universitario de Investigación Ortega y Gasset, así como en el Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado.
- **Abdellah Saaf.** Catedrático de Ciencias Políticas, Universidad Mohamed V y Director del CERSS, Rabat. En 1977 fue nombrado Decano de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas, Económicas y Sociales de la Universidad de Mohammedia. Fue Ministro de Educación Nacional, Presidente de la Asociación Marroquí de Ciencias Políticas. Es Director del Centro de Estudios y de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales de Marruecos.
- **Armando Spataro.** Fiscal jefe para terrorismo internacional, Fiscalía de Milán. Desde 1998 hasta 2002 trabajó como miembro del Consejo Superior de la Magistratura. Especialista en la lucha contra el secuestro, tráfico internacional de droga y el crimen organizado de la mafia. Desde 1977 es especialista en grupos terroristas de izquierdas como las Brigadas Rojas. Asimismo es el fiscal italiano de referencia elegido en la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya.
- **Guido Steinberg.** Investigador del Instituto Alemán para Asuntos Internacionales y de Seguridad, Berlín. Consejero sobre Terrorismo Internacional de la Cancillería Federal en Alemania (2002-2005). Coordinación de del Centro Interdisciplinario en Historia Social y Cultural de Oriente Medio de la Universidad Freie de Berlin. Especialista en desarrollo político del este de Arabia y de la región del Golfo, con énfasis en Iraq, Arabia Saudí; especialista en chiitas y sunnitas, en islamismo y terrorismo islámico.
- **Darko Trifunovic.** Profesor de Estudios de Seguridad, Universidad de Belgrado. Secretario General del Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad. Profesor en la Facultad de Estudios de Seguridad en la Universidad de Belgrado. Especialista en la lucha contra el terrorismo y estudios de seguridad. Diplomático del Servicio Exterior de Bosnia Herzegovina en las Naciones Unidas. Consejero del Ministro de Interior de la República de Srpska, Bosnia y Herzegovina en 2005.

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